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The Climate Change and Development Series was created in 2015 to showcase  economic 
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through evidence-based analysis.
The series is sponsored by the Climate Change Vice Presidency of the World Bank, 
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1Overview
Stabilizing climate change entails reducing net emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) to zero. This 
report outlines three principles to guide countries in their efforts to create a zero-carbon future: 
(a) planning ahead with an eye on the end goal; (b) going beyond carbon pricing with a policy 
 package that triggers changes in investment patterns, technology, and behaviors; and (c)  protecting 
poor people and avoiding concentrated losses. Although countries at different levels of income 
and with different endowments will adopt different strategies, all have a role to play.
Stabilizing climate change entails reducing net emissions of carbon dioxide (CO
2
) to 
zero. CO
2
 stays in the atmosphere for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. As long as 
we emit more than nature can absorb in its sinks (oceans, forests, and other vegeta-
tion), concentrations of CO
2
 in the atmosphere will keep rising, and the climate will 
keep warming. And the decisions we make now will determine the planet’s climate for 
centuries.
The latest science also tells us that we need to reach zero net emissions by 2100 to 
stabilize climate change around the 2°C target above preindustrial temperatures that 
has been agreed by governments as the maximum acceptable amount of warming. 
Relaxing the target to 3°C would make little difference in the policies needed, although 
a 2°C target would require more aggressive, earlier action.
But can we envisage a world in which economic activities have been made com-
pletely carbon neutral by the end of the century? Here, we should emphasize that car-
bon neutrality or decarbonization does not imply no emissions whatsoever. Positive 
emissions in some sectors and some countries can be offset, to some extent, through 
natural carbon sinks and negative emissions in other sectors and countries. So decar-
bonization means zero net emissions of CO
2
—as well as the stabilization of emissions 
of short-lived greenhouse gases such as methane that dissipate in the atmosphere in 
days, weeks, or decades.
The latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—
which presents the consensus views of 830 scientists, engineers, and economists 
from more than 80 countries and was formally endorsed by the governments of 
194 countries—identifi ed many possible pathways to reach carbon neutrality by the 
end of the century. All require acting on four fronts: (a) decarbonization of electricity; 
(b) massive electrifi cation (using that clean electricity) and, where that is not possible, 
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2Decarbonizing Development
a switch to lower-carbon fuels; (c) greater effi ciency and less waste in all sectors; and 
(d) improved carbon sinks (such as forests, vegetation, and soil).
In practical terms, what does this mean for countries, especially developing coun-
tries that are already struggling to reduce poverty and achieve prosperity? Many are 
unable to keep up with the investments to satisfy the basic needs of their citizens, let 
alone the effi cient cities, roads, housing, schools, and health systems they aspire to 
 create. At the same time, the fact that much of their infrastructure is yet to be built 
means opportunities exist to act early and gain effi ciency. Thus, the pursuit of a low-
carbon transition must be integrated into the overall development agenda: the goal is 
not just to decarbonize, but to decarbonize development.
The aim of this report is to take this lofty goal of zero emissions by 2100 and  examine 
what it means in terms of today’s policy making for development. It does not discuss 
whether or why to stabilize climate change, or at which level we should do so. Our start-
ing point is the 2oC goal set by the international community. We begin by examining 
how planning can help lay the foundation for both a stable climate and a good develop-
ment path. Next, we explore how countries can create the right enabling environment 
so that the needed technology, infrastructure, and fi nancing are available. Finally, we 
discuss how countries can carefully manage the transition, given the vital role that the 
political economy will play.
The message of this report is that to decarbonize development, and to do so by 2100, 
three broad principles must guide countries’ low-carbon efforts:
 ■ Plan ahead with an eye on the end goal. The appropriate way to achieve a given 
reduction in emissions by, say, 2030 depends on whether that is the fi nal target 
or a step along the way to zero net emissions. If the latter, early action will need 
to be a mix of cheap, quick fi xes and costlier long-term measures to promote 
technology development, investment in long-lived infrastructure, and changes 
in how cities are built. So every country needs to defi ne a long-term target—
say for 2050—that is consistent with decarbonization and to build short-term, 
sector-specifi c plans that contribute to that target and are adapted to the coun-
try’s wealth, endowments, and capacity. The good news is that many options 
with high potential offer immediate local co-benefi ts, especially in low-income 
countries, so that early action need not represent a trade-off with short-term 
development goals.
 ■ Go beyond prices with a policy package that triggers changes in investment  patterns, 
technologies, and behaviors. Carbon pricing is necessary for an effi cient transi-
tion toward decarbonization. It is also an effi cient way to raise revenue, which 
can be used to support poverty reduction and development or to reduce other 
taxes. And a carbon tax can be designed to be administratively simple yet harder 
to evade than taxes on income or capital. But carbon pricing alone cannot solve 
the climate change problem, given the many market failures and behavioral 
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3Overview
biases that distort economies. Policy makers also need to adopt measures such 
as targeted investment subsidies, performance standards and mandates, or com-
munication campaigns that trigger the required changes in investment patterns, 
behaviors, and technologies—and if carbon pricing is temporarily impossible, to 
use those measures as a substitute.
 ■ Mind the political economy and smooth the transition for those who stand to be 
most affected. Reforms live or die on the basis of how well the political economy 
is managed: a climate policy package must be attractive to a majority of voters 
and avoid impacts that appear unfair or that are concentrated in a region,  sector, 
or community. Thus, reforms have to smooth the transition for those who stand 
to be affected—by not only protecting vulnerable people but also avoiding con-
centrated losses and sometimes compensating powerful lobbies. Fortunately, 
getting rid of environmentally harmful subsidies and pricing carbon provide 
additional resources with which to improve equity, to protect those affected, 
and, when needed, to appease opponents.
Of course, these are broad principles that every country will need to interpret in 
light of its own needs, institutions, and aspirations. Even so, a few generalizations can 
be made. Low-income countries, given their extremely low emissions levels, should 
focus on options that are consistent with immediate poverty alleviation and that do not 
stand in the way of short-term growth, including the adaptation and diffusion of tech-
nologies developed elsewhere. Richer countries can afford to implement more expen-
sive measures and take the lead on developing frontier technologies such as carbon 
capture and storage and subsidizing their deployment so that the technologies improve 
and their cost decreases.
But all countries should work to avoid creating carbon-intensive lock-ins that will 
be costly to reverse later and to capture the large economic and health co-benefi ts from 
a cleaner and more effi cient economic system. Further, income is not the only factor 
that differentiates countries. Countries that are rapidly urbanizing have a crucial 
 window of opportunity to create cities that are energy effi cient and easy to serve with 
public transit. Countries with large forests can achieve a lot by focusing on reducing 
irreversible deforestation. More generally, countries differ by the endowment of natu-
ral resources—for instance, their potential for hydropower or solar energy—and will 
therefore implement very different strategies. But, although countries will follow 
 different pathways, all countries have a role to play.
Planning for a Low-Carbon Future: What We Need to Do Now Depends 
on the End Goal
A key reason scientists believe it is possible to achieve full decarbonization by 2100 is 
that they have looked at pathways that would do so. Those pathways are derived 
from various energy and economic models that examine what it would take to achieve 
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4Decarbonizing Development
decarbonization under a number of different scenarios of economic growth and tech-
nological innovation. As mentioned earlier, what all models and modelers agree on is 
that action will be needed on four fronts:
 ■ Decarbonizing the production of electricity
 ■ Undertaking massive electrifi cation (to increase reliance on clean electricity) 
and, where not possible, switching to cleaner fuels
 ■ Improving effi ciency and reducing waste in all sectors
 ■ Preserving and increasing natural carbon sinks through improved management 
of forests and other vegetation and soils
The question is when to begin and at what speed to proceed. Fortunately, there is no 
need for all countries to follow the same path or rhythm. Weaker efforts early on can be 
offset (up to a point) by greater efforts later, and more effort now means less will be 
needed tomorrow. And since decarbonization is a global goal, greater efforts by a richer 
or more able country can offset less intense efforts by a country with less capacity. As 
the IPCC argues, multiple pathways can lead to decarbonization. However, the key to 
feasibility is affordability, and affordability requires early action.
Early Action
Early action is vital for two reasons. First, it is cost-effective, because it allows countries 
to take advantage of natural opportunities to green their capital as it is retired or as it is 
fi rst built. The alternative is delays, which imply the continued construction of dirty 
power plants and other capital that create “committed emissions.” For example, the 
fossil-fueled power plants built in 2012 alone will emit some 19 billion tons of CO
2
 over 
their expected 40-year lifetime, more than the annual emissions of all operating fossil-
fueled power plants in 2012. Retiring them early is possible, but costly. The models 
reviewed by the IPCC fi nd that if mitigation is postponed until 2030, costs would rise 
an average 50 percent for the 2030–50 period, and 40 percent for the longer term 
(2050–2100).
Second, early action is prudent because delays can result in lock-ins and the loss of 
options. A failure to invest in developing new technologies such as carbon capture and 
storage now may mean they are not available by midcentury when they are needed. 
And trying to retrofi t a low-density city to make it more carbon effi cient and suitable 
for public transit is extremely diffi cult, as city managers around the United States are 
fi nding out.
Thus, the pledges made by member countries of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Cancún in 2010 are worrisome: they amount to 
such modest reductions in the short run that they would require annual cuts in emis-
sions of 6 percent per year from 2030 onward to achieve the globally endorsed stated 
objective of 2°C. Historically, such rapid declines have occurred only during economic 
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collapses, such as the fall of the Soviet Union. The highest decarbonization ever 
achieved in a planned fashion was 4.5 percent per year, when France deployed its 
nuclear energy program (fi gure O.1).
Some will say that waiting can also save money: as technologies evolve, they improve, 
become more affordable, and open up new options. But if everyone waits, those tech-
nologies will not be invented, and they certainly will neither improve nor become more 
affordable. And in the face of development pressures, waiting is not always an option. 
Things get built anyway—but incorrectly, as is occurring in much of the urbanization 
taking place in developing countries.
FIGURE O. 1 The Tortoise and the Hare: Not Starting Early Will Entail More Drastic 
Emission Cuts Later
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So someone has to start. And when it comes to new technologies, the richer  countries 
must lead in funding frontier innovation and creating the demand that allows for large-
scale deployment and lower costs. Thus, the massive expansion in solar energy in Germany 
has been critical in reducing the cost of solar panels. But even very poor countries can 
identify early action that makes sense within their overall development strategy.
What exactly does early action entail? And how should policy makers make deci-
sions in situations of uncertainty, multiple worldviews, and competing objectives? We 
would argue, as we did in Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable 
Development (World Bank 2012), that countries should focus on actions that offer syn-
ergies with short-term development goals or that are urgent:
 ■ Synergies. Many mitigation options (such as public transit, cleaner energy, and 
energy effi ciency) offer immediate and local economic and welfare benefi ts. 
Prioritizing those options will help ensure that climate considerations are well 
integrated into countries’ development plans and will increase political accept-
ability. For example, some analyses suggest that the health benefi ts of cleaner air 
alone would exceed the cost of mitigation in many regions at least until 2030 
(Shindell et al. 2012; Thompson et al. 2014).
 ■ Urgency. Some mitigation options are associated with high technical inertia 
(meaning that they carry a risk of lock-in, irreversibility, or higher costs if action 
is delayed)—such as unplanned low-density urban expansion or the cutting 
down of old-growth forests. Some abatement actions will take time and will 
need to be implemented early (such as research and development for the needed 
technologies and support for their deployment). For them, action is urgent. 
Otherwise, action can be postponed for measures that create hard trade-offs 
with other development goals in poor countries.
Planning Ahead
The good news is that a number of planning tools are available to help countries—poor 
and rich alike—devise an appropriate decarbonization plan. But the key is to use these 
tools with an eye on the end goal for a number of reasons.
First, keeping an eye on the end goal will help poorer countries align development 
and poverty alleviation with climate policies. Higher emissions from better energy 
access or structural change in poor low-emission countries or regions should not be a 
concern as long as irreversible carbon lock-in is avoided (possibly by using urban plans 
and well-enforced building norms). Indeed, those countries should use low-cost 
options to maximize poverty reduction, which may include coal where solar power or 
hydropower is not possible or is too expensive. That said, they would still benefi t from 
capturing the potential for low-cost renewable power (such as hydropower), avoiding 
energy waste, improving air quality, and creating a cost-effi cient economic system 
(with appropriate energy pricing and performance standards).
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In addition, for all countries, a focus on short-term targets (such as 2030) without 
considering long-term ones (such as for 2050 and beyond) would lead to emission 
reductions based on the cheapest options—which may lack the potential to achieve 
complete decarbonization. It could thus result in a carbon-intensive lock-in, making it 
much more expensive to achieve the long-term objective.
Take the case of a low-carbon strategy analysis done for Brazil. As fi gure O.2 shows, 
the optimal strategy for a 2020 end goal makes greater use of marginal actions that are 
cheap and easy to implement but that have a limited potential (improved energy effi -
ciency in refi neries). In contrast, the optimal strategy for a 2030 end goal entails more 
ambitious actions that are more expensive and take longer to implement but that have 
the potential to contribute to deeper decarbonization. Thus, if the goal is simply a 10 
percent reduction in 2020, limited use should be made of investments in subways, 
trains, and waterways—although those investments are critical to ensure the feasibility 
of a 20 percent reduction by 2030.
The key to designing an emission-reduction plan that accounts for the long term is 
to consider three characteristics of each option: cost, mitigation potential, and time 
needed to implement. Options with “negative costs” (such as energy effi ciency) or large 
development co-benefi ts should be implemented as soon as possible. But as fi gure O.3 
FIGURE O.2 Using a Longer Time Frame Changes the Optimal Policy Mix for Brazil
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illustrates with a fi ctional example, options that are expensive but that are slow to reach 
their full potential (such as transport) may also have to get started early in order to 
reach the long-term goal. In contrast, cheaper options may be delayed—in fi gure O.3, 
electrifi cation is cheaper than transport but can be introduced later without threaten-
ing the long-term goal.
With this information, governments can design operational short-term targets to 
ensure that they make progress in all sectors. For instance, a target may be to produce 
30 percent of electricity from renewable sources by 2030, to drive cars that emit less 
than 80gCO
2 
per kilometer by 2025, or to use wood materials—from sustainably man-
aged forests—instead of steel and cement in half of all new buildings by 2035. This 
sectoral approach has an advantage over economy-wide emission goals, because the 
latter could be achieved with marginal actions that do not contribute suffi ciently to 
meeting the long-term objectives.
Enabling the Transition with a Policy Package That Is Effi cient, 
Acceptable, and Credible
Good planning is important, but so are incentives and policies that ensure planned 
actions are implemented and projects are fi nanced. Thus, carbon pricing is a critical 
policy, as it addresses a major market failure—the failure to price the environmental 
FIGURE O.3 Devising a Strategy Requires Information on Time, Cost, and  Emission-Reduction 
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damage caused by greenhouse gases. However, a multiplicity of market and govern-
ment failures comes together to make climate change a complex problem to solve. So 
pricing is necessary, but not suffi cient, especially if a low-carbon strategy is to be politi-
cally acceptable and credible enough to trigger the kind of long-term investments that 
are needed. Also needed are complementary measures to make individuals and fi rms 
more responsive to prices—or substitutes for prices when they are ineffective.
Getting Prices Right—Good Economic and Fiscal Policy
Schemes to get prices right have the great advantage of raising revenues in an economi-
cally and fi scally effi cient way, making them good fi scal policies, in addition to their 
environmental benefi ts. That advantage is obvious with the elimination of environ-
mentally harmful subsidies, but it is also the case for carbon pricing—whether taxes or 
cap and trade (provided that permits are sold or auctioned).
Getting prices right includes reforming fossil-fuel subsidies—which reached about 
$548 billion in 2013, according to the International Energy Agency, a number that is 
likely to be an underestimate. Even so, this sum still averages a whopping 5 percent of 
gross domestic product and 25–30 percent of government revenues among the 40 
mostly developing countries for which it was calculated (IEA 2014). In addition, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development estimates that its member 
countries spent $55–$90 billion a year in the 2005–11 period (OECD 2013). Other 
environmentally harmful subsidies, such as agricultural support schemes that incentiv-
ize the overuse of pesticides and fertilizer and excessive emissions, need to be reformed 
as well.
Encouragingly, good progress has been made in recent years. Over the past two 
years, more than 25 countries, many in Asia, have signifi cantly reformed their fossil-
fuel subsidies. Indonesia abandoned a four-decades-old policy of subsidizing gasoline, 
India liberalized diesel prices and raised fuel taxes, and Malaysia eliminated subsidies 
on gasoline and diesel. That trend is likely to accelerate with the drop in oil prices, 
which makes it easier to reform subsidies for oil importers and creates pressure for 
reform among oil exporters. And Europe is fi nally overhauling its common agricultural 
policy to largely eliminate environmentally harmful subsidies.
As for carbon pricing, it is also gaining momentum—with some 39 national and 23 
subnational jurisdictions globally having implemented or scheduled to implement 
carbon-pricing instruments. For example, China has seven local emission-trading 
pilots to test possible approaches to a national scheme, and British Columbia, one of 
Canada’s fastest-growing provinces, introduced a carbon tax in 2008.
Carbon pricing offers a potential “double dividend” by providing both environ-
mental benefi ts and the possibility of reducing more distortionary taxes (such as those 
on labor or capital) by recycling carbon revenues. In addition, carbon constitutes 
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an excellent tax base, as carbon sources are concentrated and diffi cult to evade. In the 
United States, for example, tax collection covering 80 percent of emissions could be 
accomplished by monitoring fewer than 3,000 points (refi neries, coal mines, and natu-
ral gas fi elds) (Metcalf and Weisbach 2009). In Sweden, which has had a carbon tax 
since 1992, tax evasion is less than 1 percent for carbon, much less than for the value 
added tax. In the United Kingdom, evasion on energy taxes is about 2 percent, much 
lower than the 17 percent for income tax. That is a substantial advantage for the many 
developing countries that struggle with tax evasion—and the wedge it introduces 
between the formal and informal sectors.
Yet another way to get prices right is with performance-based payments, which 
can be used to create incentives to preserve or increase carbon sinks, such as forests 
and soil. Currently, more than 300 payments for ecosystem service schemes have been 
established worldwide, many of them for carbon sequestration. International incen-
tive mechanisms—such as reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degra-
dation and other forest-based mitigation activities (also called REDD+) are being 
developed.
Policies to Complement Prices or to Substitute for Them When They Are 
Ineffective or Unchangeable
But getting prices right is not enough to ensure that low-carbon policies are acceptable, 
credible, and effective. Instead, policy packages need to take into account the following 
issues:
 ■ Are prices an effective instrument to trigger the desired change? The answer 
depends on such factors as the availability of low-carbon alternatives or the need 
for long-term credibility. For instance, a carbon tax is suffi cient to trigger fuel 
shifts in the energy sector (maybe from coal to gas) but may not be enough to 
generate frontier innovation in the energy or automobile industry.
 ■ Is it possible to change prices? Whether prices can in fact be changed enough 
to trigger a response depends on the political or social acceptability of a price 
change. The issue may be concerns about the impact on poor people or the need 
to manage powerful lobbies fi ercely opposed to reform.
Those two issues are linked. If price effectiveness is low, reducing emissions to a 
given level would require a signifi cant price hike, which is more likely to hurt some 
groups or industries and is thus less acceptable. It is also possible that prices can be 
changed without leading to the expected impact on emissions because of missing 
 markets, lax compliance, lack of information, or behavioral biases and cognitive  failures. 
As a result, the policy package will need a battery of instruments—such as research and 
development and innovation support, performance standards and  fi scal incentives for 
investments, fi nancial instruments, and social policies and compensation—to create 
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an enabling environment for the low-carbon policies to work. This requires efforts on 
the following fronts.
Ensure needed technologies. A fi rst challenge is to ensure that the needed technolo-
gies exist (a pure innovation problem) and are available at scale and at a competitive 
cost (a deployment problem). Existing technologies are suffi cient to keep the world 
on a 2°C path up to about 2050, but thereafter, staying on track will require deploy-
ing technologies that are currently barely at the pilot stage or do not even exist. And 
the claim that a 2°C path is affordable relies on the assumption that the needed 
 technologies will be available.
Green innovation suffers from a double market failure—environmental externali-
ties and the same “knowledge externality” that plagues all innovation (new knowledge 
can be acquired at low cost by competitors). But a combination of a carbon price and 
broad public support for innovation will not be suffi cient. Specifi c support toward 
green innovation is essential. Economic actors prefer to innovate where they have inno-
vated before and where there is a combination of well-known demand and mature 
markets—a bias that favors marginal innovation in traditional domains, not radically 
new green innovation. Also, a carbon price is unlikely to be a suffi ciently credible 
instrument to justify the kind of long-term, risky investments that are required for 
green frontier innovation. Policy makers should kick-start the transition either by tem-
porarily supporting investments in low-carbon technologies (Acemoglu et al. 2012) or 
by imposing additional regulations or performance standards (Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, 
and Hallegatte 2014).
In addition, governments may even need to target specifi c green technologies. That 
specifi city is justifi ed in the case of solar, which is still more expensive than wind energy 
in most markets but has greater potential for reducing cost through economies of scale 
and for addressing the clean-energy challenge. Because of solar’s current relatively high 
costs, it is unlikely to be massively deployed with only horizontal (nontargeted) sup-
port to carbon-free electricity production or a carbon price.
To ensure that green technologies are invented and deployed at scale, countries 
might supplement carbon prices (or substitute for them where they cannot yet be 
implemented) with a number of instruments:
 ■ Performance standards—such as those commonly used for cars in China, the 
European Union, and North America, and energy-effi cient lighting or building 
codes (windows, ventilation, or heating and cooling systems).
 ■ Fiscal instruments—such as auto feebates, which combine a surcharge (fee) on 
energy-ineffi cient cars with a rebate on more energy-effi cient ones (used, for 
example, in a number of European countries) or a value added tax exemption 
for appliances or energy-effi cient lighting (used, for example, in China, Ghana, 
and Tunisia).
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 ■ Mandates—such as renewable portfolio standards that require electricity provid-
ers to include a minimum share of clean energy in their output mix. Mandates 
have been used throughout the world, notably in Chile, China, Germany, and 
many U.S. states.
 ■ Trade policies—such as cutting tariffs on green goods, such as solar panels, wind 
turbines, and energy-effi cient lightbulbs as Asia Pacifi c Economic Cooperation 
countries recently agreed to do—to ensure that countries, fi rms, and households 
can access the best technologies that are available globally at an acceptable cost.
 ■ Better institutional capacity and law enforcement—such as clarifying prop-
erty rights and increasing controls and fi nes. In Brazil, enforcing and clarify-
ing existing laws have proved to be an effective, low-cost strategy to reduce 
deforestation.
Ensure the needed infrastructure. Providing the needed infrastructure is critical for 
both the effectiveness of low-carbon strategies and the political acceptability of carbon 
pricing. For example, imposing signifi cant fuel taxes has proved a lot more diffi cult in 
the United States than in Europe, in part because a much larger share of U.S. voters live 
in places unserved by easy, convenient public transportation. Infrastructure also makes 
a carbon price more effective by making demand more elastic to price changes. A mod-
eling exercise for Paris shows that public transport reduces by half the carbon tax 
needed to achieve a given emission reduction (Avner, Rentschler, and Hallegatte 2014). 
Similarly, some countries have struggled to ensure that the needed electricity transmis-
sion lines and network capacity are in place to handle increased shares of renewable 
energy.
Account for behavioral biases and other obstacles to changing habits. But even with 
price incentives and available alternatives, people may still stick to old habits for a vari-
ety of reasons (fi gure O.4). They may do so because incentives are not effective due to 
 FIGURE O.4 How to Assess the Obstacles to Low-Carbon Solutions
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some market failure (for example, landlords who buy ineffi cient equipment because 
tenants pay the electricity bills) or because the incentives are just not enforced. Many 
countries have enacted energy-effi ciency requirements for new buildings without 
implementing measures to enforce them.
People may also not be aware of better alternatives. Labels and certifi cation schemes 
can easily provide the information consumers need to infl uence production technolo-
gies and promote sustainable natural resource management (for instance, for forest 
management).
Evidence abounds of people being “tempted” by the low price of an appliance and 
not paying attention to the lifetime cost of a purchase. And people tend to stick to the 
default option. Such behavioral biases can in fact be used to increase the adoption of 
green technologies. For example, a German energy company found that 94 percent of 
its customers stayed with the green (and more expensive) option when it was set up as 
the default, and only 4 percent opted for a cheaper one (the remaining 2 percent either 
changed suppliers or opted for a more expensive green option).
Getting the Finance to Flow—Which Will Take More than Carbon Pricing and 
Green Finance
Making the needed infrastructure and technologies available requires fi nancing. In fact, 
most developing countries struggle with fi nancing infrastructure provision and tech-
nological development and deployment even without the low-carbon objective. Fiscal 
limits constrain self-fi nancing and overseas development aid, so the bulk of the fi nance 
challenge lies with making sure that developing countries can access more private 
(domestic and international) resources for long-term investment. That fi nancing con-
straint extends to developing-country fi rms, especially small and medium-sized fi rms, 
many of which would need to invest in energy-effi cient and low-carbon equipment 
and to access technologies adapted to local conditions.
The challenge thus is twofold: (a) to increase fi nancing for investments in develop-
ing countries and in long-term projects, notably infrastructure, and (b) to increase the 
share of those investments that goes toward green projects. The low-carbon part of that 
challenge is an important one but should not be overestimated. According to the mod-
els reviewed by the IPCC, estimates of needed additional investment average about 
$400 billion per year, or about 0.5 percent of global gross domestic product. Another 
estimate places it at about $300 billion out of a yearly average of $6 trillion needed for 
overall investments by 2030 (NCE 2014).
That amount is far from negligible, but it is a small share of the total needed anyway 
for development and growth. Further, those investments would generate co-benefi ts 
beyond reduced climate change impacts, such as reduced air pollution that would avoid 
1 million premature deaths annually by 2050 (West et al. 2013), improved agricultural 
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productivity, increased access to public transit, reduced congestion and traffi c acci-
dents, and greater energy security for fossil-fuel importers.
Of course, investment needs could be higher or lower, depending on how technolo-
gies develop, how early we start, and how effi cient the transition is. At the sectoral level, 
the IPCC reports a possible range of $31 billion to $360 billion in annual invest-
ment needed for low-emission-generating technologies (renewable, nuclear, and 
 fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage) between 2010 and 2029 and a possible 
range of $1 billion to $641 billion per year in energy-effi ciency investments in the 
building, transport, and industry sectors over the same period.
Nevertheless, the point remains that the real challenge is likely to be access to 
 fi nancing, rather than affordability per se. Even if the absolute cost is modest relative to 
overall resources and represents a small increase in overall needs, fi nancing could be 
diffi cult for countries that already struggle to generate the needed basic investments.
How can the existing fi nancing gap be closed? Recommendations typically fall into 
two broad categories: making the investments more attractive and leveraging private 
resources to make the most of available capital. Those approaches involve well-known 
steps, such as improving the investment climate (making sure that regulations are clear 
and predictable and that the rule of law and property rights are enforced), developing 
local capital markets, and providing a pipeline of bankable projects—something that 
has proved diffi cult for many countries and is now recognized as an even greater chal-
lenge than a lack of capital. But closing the fi nancing gap most likely also requires a 
deep reform of the international monetary system, including fi nancial sector risk 
assessment and stress tests that have a longer time horizon and consider a broader set 
of risks (such as carbon exposure), along with compensation packages more attuned to 
long-term returns and risks.
In addition, low-carbon investments present a number of issues that must be 
addressed with targeted tools. Initial investments for low-carbon projects tend to be a 
higher share of total costs than for conventional projects, making them more sensitive 
to fi nancial costs. Low-carbon projects tend to carry greater technology risk, simply 
because they typically rely on newer technologies. They also have higher policy risks, to 
the extent that they may be more dependent on government policies (such as a carbon 
price). In some cases, they may just be new and different, requiring investors and 
 project managers to innovate, and may possibly lead to a perception of higher risk.
Thus, we see the need for rebalancing both the actual and perceived risk-adjusted 
returns differential between brown and green projects. The most powerful way of 
reducing risk perception is to make progress toward global agreements and the design 
of an international architecture to support climate change mitigation. That approach 
will go a long way toward convincing economic actors that the future will be carbon 
neutral. In addition, adding environmental considerations into banks’ due diligence 
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standards would help make the fi nancial system more sensitive to the risks embedded 
in carbon-entangled investments. As an example, the Bank of England recently agreed 
to examine the vulnerability that fossil-fuel assets could pose to the stability of the 
fi nancial system in a carbon-constrained world.
In addition, the development of green fi nancial products (such as green bonds) is 
helping mainstream low-carbon investments, connect green project developers with 
possible investors, and overcome the behavioral bias toward conventional invest-
ments. The green bond market has experienced rapid growth—reaching some 
$35  billion in 2014, up from $12 billion the year before—thereby contributing to the 
reallocation of resources from traditional investments to low-carbon ones. It is gaining 
further momentum with the development of green bond indexes by heavyweights such 
as Standard & Poor’s, Bank of America, and Merrill Lynch.
With regard to high fi nancial costs linked to low-carbon projects, they can be 
reduced through cofi nancing by governments or multilateral development banks that 
may want to take on the green part of the risk. Investments can also be redirected with 
bank regulations that encourage commercial banks to invest in low-carbon projects. 
The rationale for such policies comes from the diverse mandates of central banks, 
which range from simply achieving price stability to contributing to wider economic 
and social objectives. 
Managing the Transition: Protecting Poor People and Avoiding the 
Potential Pitfalls of Reforms
The goal of the transition is to decarbonize development rather than just reduce 
 emissions. Hence, reforms must contribute to poverty alleviation and shared  prosperity. 
And as with any major transition, the political economy of reforms must be managed 
with allowances made to those with a stake in the status quo and with good communi-
cation of the goals and benefi ts of the reform.
Ensuring Poor People Benefi t
Fossil-fuel subsidies and artifi cially low energy prices are not effi cient ways to boost com-
petitiveness or help poor people. Such measures drain fi scal coffers, hurt the  environment, 
slow the deployment of greener technologies, and chiefl y benefi t nonpoor people. 
A review of fossil-fuel subsidies in 20 countries shows that the poorest 20  percent of the 
population receive on average less than 8 percent of the benefi ts, whereas the richest 
20 percent capture some 43 percent (Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham 2012).
But even if removing fossil-fuel subsidies and adopting carbon pricing improve 
equity, those measures will also increase the price of energy and other goods 
(such as food), thereby reducing poor households’ purchasing power. Further, higher 
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prices for modern energy could lock poor people into using solid fuels for cooking, 
with impacts on health, gender balance, and children’s access to education (women and 
children spend a disproportionate amount of time collecting traditional fuels and spend 
more time exposed to indoor pollution). Also, industrialization has been a powerful 
force for poverty reduction in many countries and could theoretically be slowed by 
higher energy prices.
It is therefore critical to use the savings or new proceeds generated by climate poli-
cies to compensate poor people, promote poverty reduction, and boost safety nets. One 
way to do that is by recycling revenue through tax cuts and increasing transfers to the 
population—as British Columbia did to ensure that its reforms were progressive (Beck 
et al. 2014). Similarly, the Islamic Republic of Iran implemented a quasi-universal cash 
transfer (about $45 per month per capita) as part of its energy reforms (IMF 2013). A 
modeling exercise carried out using data from developing countries shows that taking 
$100 away from fossil-fuel subsidies and redistributing the money equally throughout 
the population would on average transfer $13 to the bottom quintile and take away $23 
from the top quintile (fi gure O.5).
Another way to ensure that poor people benefi t is with in-kind measures. Ghana’s 
2005 fossil-fuel subsidy reform increased the price of transport fuels by 50 percent but 
also included an expansion of primary health care and electrifi cation in poor and rural 
areas, the large-scale distribution of effi cient lightbulbs, public transport improve-
ments, and the elimination of school fees at government-run primary and secondary 
schools (IMF 2013; Vagliasindi 2012).
FIGURE O.5 Using Fossil Fuel Subsidy Resources for Universal Cash Transfers 
Benefi ts Poor People
(Impact of recycling $100 from a fossil fuel subsidy to a universal cash transfer)
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Note: The fi gure shows the impact of reducing the fossil-fuel subsidy budget by $100 and distributing the savings as a universal cash 
transfer.
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Redistribution has also been shown to signifi cantly increase the odds of reforms 
succeeding. A review of reforms in the Middle East and North Africa classifi es all 
reforms with cash and in-kind transfers as successful, as opposed to only 17 percent of 
the cases without (IMF 2013; Sdralevich, Sab, and Zouhar 2014).
Similarly, care must be taken in the design of land-use-based mitigation policies 
to ensure that they do not restrict access to land for the poorest people and that 
they respect and strengthen customary rights. A good example is Brazil’s Terra 
Legal program, which is offering formal recognition to indigenous land and grant-
ing land titles to some 300,000 smallholders. Without such a program, REDD+ 
policies may benefit only richer landowners. In addition, payment for ecosystem 
services can directly increase the incomes of poor land users. Such programs in 
Brazil, Ecuador, and Guatemala aim to support poor communities, although so far 
evidence of their impact is limited. The hope is that by 2030, an estimated 25  million 
to 50 million low-income households will benefit if carbon payments are fully 
developed and pro-poor participation conditions secured (Milder, Scherr, and 
Bracer 2010).
Managing the Political Economy of Reform without Getting Captured by 
Vested Interests
Worries about large-scale deindustrialization and job losses—which play a big role in 
debates on carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems—may be overblown. Evidence 
from developed countries suggests that there are no discernible impacts on produc-
tivity and jobs from introducing cost-increasing environmental regulations or  pricing 
schemes.
Indeed, pollution abatement costs represent only a small fraction of production 
costs for most industries, and factors such as the availability of capital and skilled labor 
or proximity to markets are much more important determinants of fi rm location and 
competitiveness (Copeland 2012). A detailed analysis of the European iron and steel 
industry shows that the impact of the European Union’s emissions-trading scheme 
remains limited, with impacts smaller than interannual exchange rate variations 
(Demailly and Quirion 2008). In contrast, resources raised by carbon-pricing schemes 
can contribute to attracting more jobs and investments by improving more important 
factors, such as education and workers’ skills or infrastructure, and by reducing capital 
and labor taxes that are more distortive than carbon pricing.
However, what is valid for relatively modest environmental regulations may not be 
true for stricter policies. A low-carbon transition entails a shift away from carbon-
intensive sectors and technologies toward low-carbon ones. In the short to medium 
term, that transition means reallocating capital, labor, and rents. It cannot be done 
without negative impacts on some asset owners and workers. Further, those impacts 
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may be spatially concentrated in regions that specialize in energy-intensive or extrac-
tive industries, such as steel production or coal mining.
A key question is the extent to which those who stand to be most affected need to be 
compensated or protected. The answer can be based on ethical considerations: poor 
people are vulnerable to those changes and have a lower capacity to adjust to price 
changes; and some (poor or non-poor) stand to lose their investments and livelihoods 
because the rules of the game have changed, not because they were willfully doing the 
wrong thing. But there is also a pragmatic argument: compensation may be needed for 
political economy reasons. Climate policy gains tend to be diffuse across economic 
actors, and the benefi ts of climate change stabilization are intangible avoided losses, 
which take place mostly in the future. Those characteristics do not help create a vocal 
group of policy supporters (Olson 1977). In contrast, policy costs tend to be visible, 
immediate, and concentrated over a few industries, which may have a de facto ability to 
veto the reform.
A number of steps can help smooth the transition and avoid concentrating losses 
(either spatially or within a particular interest group). One option is to start the 
reforms with regulations such as performance standards that apply only to new 
 capital. This approach is less effi cient from an economic point of view than immedi-
ately introducing a carbon price. But it has the advantage of putting the economy on 
the right path without hurting owners of existing capital (hence, reducing resistance). 
Further, it creates a constituency for change, as business owners are less likely to lobby 
for repeal of a carbon law or against the subsequent introduction of a carbon tax if 
they have already invested in the new, cleaner capital. So the impact of a regulatory 
approach can extend past the existing election cycle. This approach also delivers emis-
sion reductions and—maybe most important in places with highly distorted prices—
prepares the economy for the introduction of a carbon price or the removal of 
fossil-fuel subsidies, as it progressively transforms the economic system into a more 
effi cient one that remains competitive with appropriate energy prices (Rozenberg, 
Vogt-Schilb, and Hallegatte 2014).
Another solution is to adopt compensation schemes. Strong social protection 
 systems play the role of horizontal compensation systems, since they protect house-
holds and individuals against economic shocks. Specifi c instruments can also be imple-
mented, as in Japan’s support for traditional industries (such as textiles and shipbuilding) 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Japan relied on fi scal policies and, starting in 1978, planned 
capacity reduction, providing assistance to troubled fi rms and mitigating negative 
impacts on labor (Krauss 1992; Peck, Levin, and Goto 1987). The U.S. Trade Adjustment 
Assistance Program also provided reemployment services to displaced workers and 
fi nancial assistance to manufacturers and service fi rms hurt by import competition. 
Experience from trade liberalization has shown that support such as wage subsidies 
to encourage hiring in the expanding sectors and unemployment insurance for the 
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displaced workers can effectively help mitigate most of the losses and have generally 
modest costs (Porto 2012; Trebilcock 2014).
Of course, governments make mistakes when trying to smooth the transition—by 
erring when they try to pick the winners, by supporting declining sectors beyond what 
is effi cient, or by being captured by special interests. Thus, they have often taken steps 
to help reduce the likelihood of costly failures and capture. For example, East Asian 
governments used trade competitiveness as a marker for their industrial policies: pub-
lic support was swiftly cut for industries that could not compete in international mar-
kets. Such a clear test may be more diffi cult for low-carbon technologies that by nature 
depend on a government policy to be attractive (whether carbon price or a regulation), 
but, in general, the following can help (Rodrik 2013):
 ■ Clear and transparent criteria that determine when public support should be 
terminated
 ■ An institutional design that balances fl exibility (needed to adjust policies when 
new information is available) and predictability (so that long-term investment 
is possible)
 ■ Transparency and public accountability—so that the benefi ciaries of the policies 
are the public rather than the fi rms that are being supported
And Finally, Communication Matters
The political acceptability of reforms does not depend just on their impact. The percep-
tion of impact also matters. Thus, reforms must be anchored in a good understanding 
of who the stakeholders are and the nature of their fears and concerns.
Take the case of fossil-fuel subsidy reforms. A 2014 survey in the Arab Republic of 
Egypt showed that a whopping 70 percent of the population did not know the scale 
of the subsidy; worse, in Morocco, a 2010 survey found that 70 percent were unaware 
that energy was in fact subsidized. Thus, it was vital to raise awareness about the 
fact that the subsidy absorbed a huge part of government revenues (39 percent in 
Egypt and 17 percent in Morocco)—and the many other things that the government 
could achieve with those resources. Where reforms have been successful, they have 
often been accompanied by a communication campaign that spoke to citizens’ 
 concerns about “what’s in it for me?” For example, the message of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s 2010 fuel reform campaign was that the reform aimed to switch 
subsidies from products to households.
Wording also matters. Calling a carbon-pricing scheme a carbon tax suggests that 
its purpose is primarily to raise revenues rather than to improve welfare by creating 
incentives to produce and consume fewer carbon-intensive products. In fact, most 
schemes avoid using carbon, climate, or tax in their offi cial labels, instead opting for 
terms such as fee, premium, or surcharge (Rabe and Borick 2012).
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Finally, the broader benefi ts of reform must be communicated. In Germany, a study 
found that businesses were aware of higher energy taxes but not of the associated cuts 
in payroll taxes. But once they were informed, they were less likely to disapprove of the 
energy tax (Dresner et al. 2006).
In Conclusion
This report explores the types of climate policy packages needed to achieve a complete 
decarbonization of our economies by 2100, taking into account the many market fail-
ures, imperfections, risks, undesired distributional effects, and political economy 
obstacles that such a deep transition entails. It also offers a possible road map for coun-
tries that are planning their transition toward full decarbonization.
Plan ahead with an eye on the end goal. As a fi rst step, those countries need to set up 
long-term objectives—say to 2050—that are consistent with the end goal of full decar-
bonization. Although those objectives need not be commitments, they make it possible 
to work backward and identify what needs to be done immediately to avoid locking in 
carbon-intensive patterns and increasing the odds of costly changes later on. At the 
same time, countries need to identify mitigation actions that bring economic, social, or 
health co-benefi ts and are therefore desirable for development and improved welfare.
From there, countries can design sector-specifi c shorter-term targets—to 2025 or 
2030—and establish a way to track progress on the four pillars of a zero-carbon 
 strategy: (a) decarbonization of electricity, (b) massive electrifi cation and a switch to 
cleaner fuels, (c) improved effi ciency and reduced waste in all sectors, and (d) improved 
carbon sinks. A short-term goal expressed as an economy-wide emission target is also 
useful but cannot replace the sectoral targets, since it could be reached with marginal 
actions that do not contribute suffi ciently to meeting the long-term goal.
Go beyond prices. Then, countries need to craft a comprehensive policy package that 
includes the following elements:
 ■ Getting prices right—including pricing carbon, which is both good fi scal and 
environmental policy—represents an effi cient way to raise resources and can be 
designed to be easier to administrate and harder to evade than other taxes. It is 
relevant for countries at all income levels, provided that it raises revenues and 
that those revenues are used to support poor and vulnerable people, to reduce 
distortive taxes on labor and capital, and to invest in the future (such as in infra-
structure or education).
 ■ Measures to complement (or, if need be, substitute for) carbon pricing. 
Innovation incentives will be crucial in countries at the technology frontier. 
Labels, performance standards, fi scal incentives, and fi nancial instruments have 
proven track records in countries at all income levels and can ensure that the 
best technologies are deployed to reduce energy demand and carbon emissions. 
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Those instruments are not only more effi cient than a carbon price in triggering 
behavioral changes in some sectors, but they also reduce the level of the carbon 
price that is needed to achieve decarbonization, making it more acceptable, cred-
ible, and realistic. And making fi nancing available will be key to implementation.
Protect poor people and avoid concentrated losses. Finally, the policy package must 
also include measures that make it attractive for the broader population and that avoid 
impacts that appear unfair. Understandably, analyses of climate policy packages typi-
cally focus on the design of the climate side of the package—the pricing instruments, 
the role of regulation and norms, and the support to innovation and green technology. 
However, the review undertaken in this report suggests that a large share of the chal-
lenge lies in the political economy. Success in stabilizing climate change will be largely 
determined by the ability of those accompanying policies to ensure that the decarbon-
ization of the economic system contributes to economic development and the sustain-
able eradication of poverty.
Decarbonizing development is necessary to stabilize climate change. All countries 
are well-advised to start now, but not all will. Some countries will choose to embark on 
this journey sooner than others. To those countries, our message is that starting early 
in keeping an eye on the end goal is the way to go, along with a policy package that goes 
beyond prices to trigger changes in investment patterns, technologies, and behaviors 
and that smooths the transition for those who stand to be most affected—keeping in 
mind that political economy is what reforms live or die by. 
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PART I 
Planning for a Low-Carbon Future: 
What to Do Now Depends on the End Goal
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1.  Reducing Carbon Emissions 
to Zero
■ Stabilizing climate change at any reasonable level requires reducing net carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions to zero by 2100.
■ Decarbonization pathways involve progress along four fronts: (a) electricity decarbonization, 
(b) electrifi cation, (c) increased energy effi ciency, and (d) preservation and increase of natural 
carbon sinks such as forests and other vegetation and soils.
■ Countries can proceed at different speeds across those four fronts to suit their political 
and economic realities, but signifi cant progress will eventually be required on all four in all 
countries.
In recent years, the international community has agreed to hold global warming to 
about 2°C above preindustrial levels. The latest scientifi c fi ndings tell us that to reach 
that target, all countries as a group must reduce CO
2
 emissions to zero by 2100—
although rich and poor countries can proceed at different paces, and some will still be 
able to have positive emissions as long as others have negative ones.
This chapter examines where the science stands and identifi es measures—both 
from the recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and 
other studies—that are robust in the sense that they will not be regretted later on.
Stabilizing the Climate Requires Zero Net Emissions
Arguably the most important message to emerge from climate research is that in order 
to stabilize climate change, net emissions of CO
2
—the most important of the so-called 
long-lived greenhouse gases (GHGs) that stay in the atmosphere for centuries—must 
be reduced to zero. As long as human societies release CO
2
 in quantities greater than 
carbon sinks such as forests and other vegetation can absorb, the climate will continue 
changing (IPCC 2014; Matthews and Caldeira 2008).1
H owever, the issue is not just to stabilize the climate, but the level at which we do so. 
The level is largely determined by the emissions of CO
2
 accumulated over time 
( fi gure 1.1). The greater the cumulative emissions, the warmer the climate. So the 
quicker we achieve decarbonization (shorthand for reducing net emissions of CO
2
 to 
zero, also referred to as carbon neutrality), the greater our chance of keeping warming 
at a reasonable level.
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The level at which the temperature is stabilized also depends on the concentrations 
of short-term GHGs. In contrast with CO
2
, however, concentrations of short-term 
GHGs can be changed rapidly if emissions are reduced (box 1.1). Although that is 
 certainly part of the decarbonization story, policies targeting short-term GHGs are not 
the topic of this report (on this issue, see Akbar et al. 2013).
Another key area of scientifi c consensus is that carbon neutrality is needed by 
2100 if we hope to stabilize the climate anywhere below 3oC (fi gure 1.2). Moreover, 
achieving the 2oC target will necessitate negative emissions—that is, removing CO
2
from the atmosphere—in the second part of this century. Negative emissions can be 
achieved through increased natural carbon sinks—such as reforestation, which cap-
tures atmospheric CO
2
 and stocks it as vegetation. It can also be done using specifi c 
technologies, such as biofuels used in power plants combined with carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS).
Importantly, carbon neutrality is a global target, as a unit of CO
2
 emitted anywhere 
in the globe has the same warming potential. Not all countries need to achieve zero net 
emissions at the same time. Countries have room to maneuver as they move toward the 
objective of zero net emissions, taking into account their income and development 
levels. In most of the IPCC scenarios that achieve carbon neutrality, positive emissions 
in some countries are balanced by negative emissions in others.
FIGURE 1.1 Rising Cumulative Emissions of CO2 Mean Rising Temperatures
S ource: Adapted from IPCC (2014).
Note: Graph shows the almost-linear relationship between total CO2 emissions starting in 1870 and the change in global temperature.
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Zero Net Emissions Requires Action on Four Fronts
What needs to happen for world economies to achieve zero net emissions? The recent 
IPCC report explores that question by analyzing dozens of models (31 to be exact) that 
build on a variety of assumptions and technological possibilities to cover a wide range of 
possible futures. Those models are used to create hundreds of business-as-usual scenarios 
(scenarios that assume that no climate change policies are implemented), as well as mitiga-
tion scenarios associated with different targets for temperature or GHG concentrations.
The key fi nding from those scenarios and models is that carbon neutrality requires 
action on four fronts (Figure 1.3):
 ■ Decarbonized electricity production
 ■ Electrifi cation (to increase reliance on that clean electricity), and where that is 
not possible, a switch to cleaner fuels
B OX 1.1 The “Full” Story on Greenhouse Gases
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are composed of long-lived gases, mostly carbon dioxide (CO2) and nitrous 
oxide (N2O), which can stay in the atmosphere for hundreds, if not thousands, of years, and short-
lived gases (such as black carbon or soot, methane, and most hydrofl uorocarbons), which stay in the 
atmosphere for much shorter periods, from days to decades. The concentration of CO2 depends on the 
cumulative emissions over time—the sum of the emissions made in the past: it keeps increasing as 
long as emissions are positive, and it decreases only over centuries if emissions are brought to zero. 
The concentration of short-lived GHGs is proportional to annual emissions: a reduction in emissions 
rapidly leads to a reduction in concentration.
Those vastly different time frames mean that stabilizing GHG concentrations requires that 
both of the following occur:
 ■ Bringing net emissions of CO2 and N2O to zero, given that their atmospheric concentration 
increases as long as net emissions are positive; and
 ■ Keeping emissions of short-lived GHGs constant, given that their atmospheric  concentration 
stabilizes almost as soon as emissions stop increasing.
The level of warming depends on the overall concentration of those GHGs in the atmosphere, 
which is determined by the cumulative emissions of CO2 over time and the annual emissions of 
short-lived GHGs.
As fi gure 1.1 illustrates, there is a range in the temperature change that is associated with a 
given level of cumulative CO2 emissions. For example, cumulative emissions of 3,000 gigatons of CO2 
(GtCO2) would lead to a temperature increase of between 1.0°C and 2.5°C. That range refl ects the 
uncertainties that surround both the concentration of short-lived GHGs and the response of the carbon 
and climate system to emissions of CO2 and other GHGs. Because of those uncertainties, cumulative 
emissions or concentrations of CO2 do not translate into a given temperature increase but into ranges, 
usually expressed by the likelihood of not exceeding a particular level of warming. For instance, total 
emissions of 3,000 GtCO2 would maintain the temperature change below 2°C with a probability of 
66 percent. So within that limit, there is still a 34 percent chance of missing the 2°C target.
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 ■ Improved effi ciency and reduced waste in all sectors
 ■ Preservation and increase of carbon sinks such as forests and other vegetation 
and soils
Those are the pillars of carbon neutrality inasmuch as they are required to achieve 
climate change stabilization in a cost-effective way, no matter the level at which one 
wants to achieve stabilization. That is an area of full consensus across all models, 
 irrespective of the temperature target (Audoly, Vogt-Schilb, and Guivarch 2014; 
IDDRI/UNSDSN 2014; IEA 2014; Krey et al. 2014; Williams et al. 2012). Only the pace 
of progress depends on the temperature target.
Action in any of the four pillars can therefore be considered “robust” policy 
options if climate stabilization is to be achieved, in that they are needed no 
 matter what is eventually revealed about the current uncertainties (about the exact 
FIGURE 1.2 Carbon Neutrality Is Needed by 2100 to Achieve Climate Goals
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2014).
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response of climate systems to more emissions and about policies and technology 
development). In 2050, assuming that the world is on the path to climate stabiliza-
tion, the measures implemented in the four pillars cannot appear as mistakes—the 
worst that could happen is that a particular country may have implemented them too 
quickly or too slowly.
Organizing measures according to those pillars is also a useful way for policy makers 
to translate the economy-wide objective of zero net emissions into operational objec-
tives underpinned by well-defi ned sector-specifi c policies, which can be more easily 
managed by separate institutions or ministries.
Pillar One: Decarbonization of Electricity Production
To achieve zero net emissions requires full decarbonization of power generation. 
As Figure 1.4 shows, pathways consistent with a temperature change of around 
2oC require the carbon intensity of global electricity production to decrease to 
near zero around 2050. That implies that high-income countries and emerging 
 economies (such as China, India, and South Africa) would have to decarbonize 
 electricity around  midcentury and then rely on negative emissions. Low-income 
countries—which  represent a small share of global electricity consumption—would 
have a few more decades, but they too would eventually need to converge to 
 zero-emissions electricity eventually. If the target is 3oC, carbon neutrality could be 
delayed slightly to occur around 2080, and the need for negative emissions becomes 
much lower.
Reducing electricity-related emissions to zero implies a rapid penetration of 
 carbon-free technologies, and even negative-emission technologies. As Figure 1.5 
illustrates, for a 2oC target, the share of low-carbon or negative-carbon energy 
FIGUR E 1.3 The Four Pillars of Decarbonization
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transport, and 
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Source: All photos © Shutterstock. Used with the permission of the photographers and Shutterstock. Further permission required 
for reuse. 
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 supply—from renewable energy (such as wind, solar, and hydropower), bioenergy 
and bioenergy coupled with CCS, and nuclear power—must rise from less than 
20  percent in 2010 to about 60 percent in 2050 (bioenergy with CCS produces nega-
tive emissions that offset emissions from the remaining 40 percent). That would be 
an increase of more than 300 percent in 40 years, and those technologies need to 
achieve the negative emissions that are needed to compensate for the positive emis-
sions of the remaining fossil-fuel-based energy. For a 3oC target, the required increase 
is still rapid, with the share increasing by 275 percent by 2050 to reach a penetration 
of about 42 percent.
Fortunately, some of those technologies, such as wind and solar power, have matured 
in the past decades and have seen their costs decrease rapidly—in fact, their costs are 
now approaching those of technologies that use fossil fuels. Other technologies, such as 
CCS, are still in the early stages of development and deployment, and their potential 
and economic viability are more uncertain.
 FIGURE 1.4 The Possible Paths to Decarbonizing Electricity
(Carbon content of global electricity in two scenarios: on the left-hand side, a stringent GHG 
concentration target [consistent with 2°C]; on the right-hand side, a less stringent GHG 
concentration target [consistent with 3°C])
Source: Audoly, Vogt-Schilb, and Guivarch (2014) based on the AMPERE research project that integrated and compared multiple model results. The 
models used are a representative subset of those reviewed by the IPCC. Other analyses—such as the International Energy Agency’s 2014 Energy 
Technology Perspective—fi nd similar results.
Note: Each thin line corresponds to the pathway simulated by one integrated assessment model (the reported carbon intensity for 2005 and 2010 
varies among models, because they use different scopes and sources of historical data for calibration).
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Pillars Two and Three: Effi ciency and Electrifi cation or Fuel Shifting in 
All Sectors
All countries must reduce inputs of (carbon-intensive) energy and materials in pro-
duction, largely through increased effi ciency (to reduce overall energy demand) and by 
shifting to clean electricity or other low-carbon fuels. That action applies to all sectors, 
but especially to the energy-intensive sectors, like transport, building, and industry:
 ■ In the transport sector (fi gure 1.6), pathways compatible with 2oC warming gen-
erally show a steady decrease in energy demand (by about 20 percent in 2030 
and 30 percent in 2050), combined with an increase in the use of low-carbon 
fuel—mostly electricity thanks to electric cars and public transit—from a few 
percentage points today to more than 30 percent in 2050. The efforts for 3oC 
warming are less demanding but would still require signifi cant changes in the 
same direction.
 ■ In the building sector (fi gure 1.7), the initial emphasis should be placed more on 
energy effi ciency than on fuel shifting (especially by 2030). That fact is consistent 
FIG URE 1.5 Low-Carbon Energy Sources Must Become Much More Widely Used
(Required scaling up of low-carbon share of primary energy for 2030, 2050, and 2100 
compared with 2010 levels in mitigation scenarios leading to approximately 2°C and 
3°C warming)
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2014).
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Decarbonizing Development
with technical studies that show that there is great potential for energy effi ciency 
in buildings (especially in the residential sector), but that it will take a long time 
to capture it at reasonable costs. Also, a shift to electricity for heating is effi cient 
only for highly energy-effi cient buildings.
 ■ In the industry sector (fi gure 1.8), it is harder to generalize given the large differ-
ences among the subsectors. Industries that produce GHG emissions by using 
energy should be able both to shift to electricity and to increase their energy 
effi ciency. However, industries that produce GHG emissions directly from their 
industrial processes will have to either focus more on effi ciency or totally shift to 
another process (such as using wood as a construction material instead of steel 
or cement).
FIGURE 1.6 The Transport Sector Needs to Tackle Both Effi ciency and Fuel Shifting
(Energy demand and share of low-carbon fuel in transportation sector, for 
baseline scenarios, and for scenarios that stabilize concentration at 2°C [i.e., 
concentrations of 430–530 ppm CO2e] and at 3°C [i.e., concentrations of 530–650 ppm 
CO2e])
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2014).
Note: The left-hand side shows the reduction in fi nal energy demand relative to the baseline, in percentages, in scenarios that keep
warming below 2°C or 3°C; the right-hand panel shows the penetration of low-carbon fuels in the sector in these scenarios.
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As for agriculture and forestry, effi ciency efforts include minimizing the loss and waste 
of food, reducing both direct energy use (for tractors and machinery) and indirect energy 
use (for the production of fertilizers). Effi ciency in agriculture also means reducing 
emissions of non-CO
2
 gases, such as nitrous oxide, from the use of fertilizers.
More specifi cally, measures can be taken to reduce the energy intensity of produc-
tion (that is, energy needs per unit of land) and to increase productivity (that is, kilo-
gram of commodity per unit of land). As long as the productivity increase is larger than 
the increase in emissions per land unit, sustainable intensifi cation can bring mitigation 
benefi ts (Smith 2013). For instance, bringing global yields 50 percent closer to their 
potential for crops and 25 percent for livestock by 2050 could decrease agriculture and 
land-use emissions by 8 percent (Valin et al. 2013).
FIGURE 1.7 The Building Sector Can Focus First on Effi ciency
(Energy demand and share of low-carbon fuel in building sector, for baseline 
scenarios, and for scenarios that stabilize concentration at 2°C [i.e., concentrations of 
430–530 ppm CO2e] at and 3°C [i.e., concentrations of 530–650 ppm CO2e])
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2014).
Note: The left-hand panel shows the reduction in fi nal energy demand relative to the baseline, in percentages, in scenarios that keep 
warming below 2°C or 3°C; the right-hand panel shows the penetration of low-carbon fuels in the sector in these scenarios.
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Other ways to mitigate include minimizing the loss and waste of food, increasing 
the supply of less emission-intensive products (including biofuels and wood materi-
als), and changing food demand to shift consumption toward low-carbon food 
 products and to free land for other mitigation activities. For example, dietary changes 
have a considerable mitigation potential, with a switch to a plant-based diet potentially 
lowering GHG emissions by over 15 percent (fi gure 1.9).
With regard to fuel switching, the use of wood fuels and materials can further con-
tribute to mitigation by replacing fossil fuels, along with substituting carbon-intensive 
construction materials. Yet harvest rates need to be sustainable so that the temporary 
releases of carbon from logging can be compensated through regrowth. Moreover, 
FIGURE 1.8 The Industry Se ctor Doesn’t Fall Neatly into Any One Approach
(Final energy demand and share of low-carbon fuel in industrial sector, 
for baseline scenarios, and for scenarios that stabilize concentration at 
2°C [i.e., concentrations of 430–530 ppm CO2e] and at 3°C [i.e., concentrations 
of 530–650 ppm CO2e]) 
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2014).
Note: The left-hand panel shows the reduction in fi nal energy demand relative to the baseline, in percentages, in scenarios that keep 
warming below 2°C or 3°C; the right-hand panel shows the penetration of low-carbon fuels in the sector in these scenarios.
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improving the use of traditional biomass, which is used by 2.7 billion, mostly poor, 
people to meet cooking energy needs through improved cookstoves could reduce 
 emissions by up to 6 percent of the 2010 emission levels, in addition to the substantial 
health benefi ts that would bring (Smith et al. 2013); see a more in depth discussion 
in chapter 7).2
Pillar Four: Preservation and Increase of Natural Carbon Sinks
All countries will need to improve the management of landscapes, including trees, 
other vegetation, and soils, to boost their ability to act as a net-carbon sink—indeed, 
models reviewed by the IPCC show that the agriculture, forestry, and other-land use 
sectors will likely need to achieve carbon neutrality by 2030, in addition to meeting an 
increasing demand for food and possibly bioenergy. Mitigation policies can reduce 
emissions from land management and land-use conversion and can increase the 
removal of carbon from the atmosphere.
Land use-based mitigation could be an important contributor to the global abate-
ment needed by 2050 to maintain temperature change below 2°C (Smith and 
Bustamante 2014). As a step in that direction, the September 2014 New York Declaration 
on Forests aims for stopping natural forest loss by 2030, the restoration of 150 million 
hectares of degraded landscapes and forestlands by 2020, and a signifi cant increase in 
the rate of global restoration thereafter, which could reduce emissions by 4.5–8.8 
GtCO
2
 per year by 2030.3 Beyond 2030, in the scenarios in which CCS is not available 
or not deployed at scale, the negative emissions required to keep temperature change 
below 2°C or even 3°C have to be generated from the agriculture, forestry, and other 
land-use sectors, creating immense challenges in land-use management.
FIGURE 1.9 Changing the Way We Eat Can Help
(Food demand related mitigation potential in 2050)
Source: Smith et al. (2013).
a. The “Healthy Diet” is based on Harvard Medical School’s recommendations and implies a reduction of animal product intake in 
countries with rich diets and an increase in countries with poor or protein-defi cient diets.
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Progress Is Needed in All Countries on All Four Pillars, but with Flexibility as to 
When, Where, and How
Stabilizing the climate by 2100 requires reducing net emissions of long-lived GHGs to 
zero. Thus, positive emissions somewhere can be offset by negative emissions else-
where: through increased carbon sinks—for example, through reforestation or better 
soil management—or by combining bioenergy (renewable energy derived from bio-
mass, such as wood, crops, or crop residues) with CCS.4
The fl exibility that entails is critical to keep costs down and to allow countries to 
follow paths that are better adapted to their economic and political realities. Negative 
emissions provide three types of fl exibility:
 ■ Temporal fl exibility. The possibility to achieve negative emissions after 2050 
allows for lower efforts and higher emissions before 2050, without compromis-
ing temperature targets.
 ■ Spatial fl exibility. If some countries can achieve negative emissions, then it is 
possible to reduce net CO
2
 emissions to zero even as other countries continue 
to emit.
 ■ Sectoral fl exibility. Given that reducing emissions to zero will be particularly 
 diffi cult in some sectors such as air transport, negative emissions in the power 
sector would help countries achieve net zero emissions.
That fl exibility reduces the overall cost of mitigation in scenarios with negative 
emissions. In particular, models estimate that the cost of reaching the 2oC target more 
than doubles if CCS is not available (for technological, economical, or social accept-
ability reasons).5 Countries can therefore proceed at different speeds across the four 
fronts, but signifi cant progress is required on all four in all countries.
Notes
 1. As well as ocean acidifi cation, sea level rise, and biodiversity losses (Steinacher, Joos, and Stocker 
2013).
 2. Improved cookstoves also have large co-benefi ts.
 3. For more information on the New York Declaration, visit the United Nations website at http://
www.un.org/climatechange/summit/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/09/FORESTS-New-York 
-Declaration-on-Forests.pdf.
 4. Energy models see the deployment of bioenergy in energy systems increasing over time, especially 
with stricter climate targets, which raises concerns as bioenergy competes for land with forests 
and other carbon sinks, and with food production. The hope is that new technologies will develop 
second- and third-generation biofuels that either use residues from agriculture or can be grown on 
degraded and arid lands.
 5. This number may even be an underestimate, given that some models simply cannot reach the 
2°C target if CCS is not available. 
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2. Acting Sooner Rather than Later
■ Early action avoids lock-ins and is cost-effective: delays today need to be offset by faster 
decarbonization tomorrow, meaning higher costs and stranded assets.
■ Early action does not mean doing everything right away. Some actions are better delayed in 
low-income countries until technology costs have decreased, but all countries can identify 
early action that makes sense within their overall development strategy.
■ Early action is prudent: it hedges against the risk of fast and expensive decarbonization 
imposed by external pressures, radical innovation, trade and consumption trends, or revisions 
in climate risk estimates.
The latest science tells us that the global community’s goal must be zero net emissions 
of carbon dioxide (CO
2
), preferably by 2100, and that whatever the exact temperature 
target, policy makers would do well to organize their actions around four pillars: 
(a) electricity decarbonization, (b) electrifi cation and fuel shifting, (c) improved 
 effi ciency and reduced waste in all sectors, and (d) climate-friendly landscape manage-
ment. But when should they start? And how fast should they go? Not surprisingly, 
 signifi cant uncertainties surround these questions, but there are also a number of solid 
results around which robust policy making can be designed—robust in the sense that 
it minimizes the risk of regrets of doing either too little or too much.
Feasible Really Means Cost-Effective
Of course, timing would seem to hinge on the feasibility of various temperature  targets 
(for example, 2°C or 3°C above preindustrial levels), but defi ning what is feasible has 
proved challenging. In theory, emissions can be reduced to zero overnight, if we shut 
down the global economy.1 Thus, the feasibility question is not a technical  question, 
but rather an economic, social, and political one (Guivarch and Hallegatte 2013). 
Moreover, since feasibility largely depends on economic costs and distributional 
impacts, it is a function not only of which target is selected but also of which policies 
are implemented to get there.
So given that we know that smart and effi cient policies lower costs and make ambi-
tious targets more feasible, another approach—which the latest Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report follows—is to look for cost-effective pathways 
that balance the short-run and long-run costs and risks. Encouragingly, the IPCC fi nds 
that multiple pathways (including various combinations of short-term and long-term 
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actions) are compatible with various targets. However, pathways with fewer reductions 
over the short term require disproportionally larger efforts later on. In climate policies, 
as in everything else, procrastination has costs.
Take the case of the 2010 Cancún pledges, which were agreements to emission 
reductions by 2020, taken by countries at negotiations during the 2010 Conference of 
Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Cancún, 
Mexico. If implemented, they would allow for modest greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
reductions between now and 2030.2 After that (between 2030 and 2050),  emissions 
would have to be cut by 6 percent per year (averaged across time and  models) to reach 
the 2°C target. But doing so would be extremely costly and would require a dramatic 
and rapid transformation (Riahi et al. 2015). The fastest any  country has ever  managed 
to decarbonize outside of an economic collapse was 4.5 percent per year, which France 
achieved during its nuclear energy buildup (Guivarch and Hallegatte 2013). As another 
point of reference, the European Commission is committed to only a 1 percent decrease 
rate between 2008 and 2020, and about 3 percent per year between 2020 and 2030.
In cost-effective scenarios, by contrast, short-term emission reductions would be 
much larger—leading to annual emissions of fewer than 50 gigatons of carbon dioxide 
(GtCO
2
) equivalent by 2030—thereby cutting in half the subsequent pace of emission 
reductions from 6 percent to 3 percent per year. Such a front-loaded scenario would 
enable countries to enjoy much lower economic costs, less stranding of assets (refl ect-
ing unanticipated or premature retirement of capital and equipment), and lower eco-
nomic and technological risks from aggressive emission reductions (Riahi et al. 2015).
The difference in cost between immediate and delayed action is signifi cant. If addi-
tional mitigation efforts are delayed until 2030 and the target remains unchanged, the 
IPCC scenarios show an average 50 percent increase in middle-term costs (in the 2030–
50 period) and a 40 percent increase in long-term costs (in the 2050–2100 period).
How should countries decide to balance short-term versus long-term actions? One 
way is to focus on the peak date of global emissions—that is, the date at which global 
emissions start to decrease. In fact, the peak date has become a common indicator to 
measure the timing of efforts in developing countries with rapidly growing  emissions—
for example, in the recent U.S.-China pact on climate change, China committed to a 
peak date in 2030 or earlier.
Of course, the later the peak date, the higher the resulting temperature change or 
the larger the emission reductions that are needed after the peak year. Moreover, the 
rate of emission reduction that is required to reach various climate targets increases 
more than proportionally with the global peak date, so that delays in action have a 
strong impact on the efforts needed after the peak date (fi gure 2.1).3 For instance, the 
required rate rises from less than 4 percent to between 5 percent and 8 percent when 
the peak date is delayed from 2015 to 2025. As fi gure 2.1 shows, 2020 is already late for 
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a peak date if the fi nal objective is a 2°C warming. It would necessitate a reduction in 
emissions of 5–6 percent per year in the absence of negative emissions.
Further, if emission reductions are limited in the short run, maintaining the 
 temperature increase below 2°C will require large negative emissions after 2050—
necessitating the aggressive deployment of land-use policies that store carbon (like 
reforestation) and biofuels with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). However, 
these technologies and measures have potential risks and adverse side effects (especially 
on biodiversity and food security)—particularly if they are deployed on a large scale—
and their future availability is still debated. As a result, excessively modest efforts over 
the short run increase both long-run costs and risks—putting the target achievement 
at risk if required technologies are not available (or cannot be implemented for reasons 
linked to social acceptability or trade-off with other policy objectives).
FIGURE 2.1 Delaying the Peak Date Means Cutting Emissions even Faster Later
Source: Adapted from Guivarch and Hallegatte (2013).
Note: The optimistic and pessimistic lines refer to different assumptions regarding how emissions will change before the peak date. 
The fi gure also reports the fastest historical decarbonization rate achieved over fi ve years (removing periods of negative economic 
growth) and the European Union commitment between 2008 and 2020.
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Cost-Effectiveness Requires Early Action
Early action is more cost-effective. Of course, it does not mean that all countries need 
to do everything at once. Delaying some measures can also save money: technologies 
improve over time and become more affordable, reducing abatement costs. But tech-
nologies improve only if they are invested in, so at least some countries have to start 
implementing the most promising technologies. The richer countries must lead in 
funding such frontier innovation and in creating the demand that allows for large-scale 
deployment and lower costs. The decrease in the cost of solar panels that occurred over 
the past decade was largely due to economies of scale and innovation linked to 
Germany’s feed-in tariff. But although poorer countries may prefer to wait for the cost 
of some technologies to decrease before they support them, they can still identify early 
action that makes sense within their overall development strategy.
Indeed, one major reason early action is more cost-effective is that delayed action 
involves continued investments in emitting equipment (like coal power plants) that are 
not compatible with a target of 2°C or even 3°C —and thus entail large costs later on 
from the need to retire capital early to reach the climate goals. That is particularly the 
case in developing countries, where economic growth and urbanization imply that 
much infrastructure will be built in the next decades. In those countries, there is no 
such thing as “waiting”—investments will happen anyway. The choice is between 
 current development trends (assuming environmental considerations can be brought 
in later on) or leap-frogging by building cleaner and more effi cient infrastructure 
and equipment from the start.
The failure to act early means that large amounts of CO
2
 emissions are “committed” 
far into the future, because they are embedded in installed capital (like existing power 
plants, transport systems, and industrial, residential, and commercial infrastructure 
that often have long lifetimes) (Davis, Caldeira, and Matthews 2010; Guivarch and 
Hallegatte 2011; Julie Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, and Hallegatte 2014). In fact, as  fi gure 2.2 
shows, the long lifetime of some components of existing capital—such as transport 
networks and urban development patterns, which can range from 40 to 200 years—
means that emissions will continue over the next decades and even beyond, unless 
retrofi tting is possible (such as adding CCS to a coal power plant or improving a 
 building’s energy effi ciency).
Today’s investment decisions add to committed carbon emissions. The fossil-fuel-
burning plants built around the world in 2012 will emit approximately 19 billion 
GtCO
2
 over their expected 40-year lifetimes—more than the 14 billion tons of CO
2
emitted annually by all fossil-fuel power plants operating in 2012 (Davis and Socolow 
2014). And the decisions that are being made now in the fast-growing cities of the 
developing world are creating committed emissions through their long-lived impact on 
energy demand (Avner, Rentschler, and Hallegatte 2014; Guivarch and Hallegatte 
2011). For example, whether or not a public transit system exists may well determine 
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how a city develops with regard to housing density, hence, the effi ciency of carbon 
prices (see box 2.1).
The concept of committed emissions also applies to fossil-fuel exploration. At this 
point, the size of the world’s known oil reserves are growing faster than the rate of 
extraction (Matthews 2014). Yet we already know that 60–80 percent of current reserves 
of fossil fuels cannot be fully used in any scenario consistent with a 2°C or a 3°C warm-
ing (fi gure 2.3). Carbon capture and sequestration would make it possible to use more 
coal, but the global potential of CCS remains very uncertain.
So what can be done to turn this situation around? The only way to reduce 
 committed CO
2
 emissions is to replace some of the installed capital with new, lower-
emitting installations (or in the case of fossil-fuel reserves, keep them in the ground). 
But doing so rapidly would imply retiring capital and equipment before the end of 
their planned lifetimes—in effect, turning them into “stranded assets,” which could cre-
ate signifi cant costs for the owners of the assets and the workers who depend on them 
(Johnson et al. 2015; Lecuyer and Vogt-Schilb 2014; Julie Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, and 
Hallegatte 2014).4
Yet not acting quickly would make the situation worse. As a recent study fi nds, 
strong action in the short term (maintaining GHG emissions at low levels, around 
50 GtCO
2
 equivalent, in 2030) would require stranding some assets between now and 
2030 (about 150 gigawatts [GW] of coal generation), but it would make it possible to 
reduce emissions between 2030 and 2050 without additional stranding (fi gure 2.4). 
Instead, weak action (unchanged climate policies that would result in emissions 
 FIGURE 2.2 Long-Lived Capital Lasts a Very Long Time
(Expected lifetime of different types of assets)
Source: Philibert (2007).
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BOX 2.1 An Extreme Case of Commitment—Urban Forms
Many cities in developing countries are in the process of designing and building their infrastruc-
ture network—thus shaping their urban form for the next century and beyond (Lecocq and Shalizi 
2014). It is therefore critical to understand how those short-term decisions will affect how those 
cities could implement—or be affected by—a carbon price in the future and how effective that 
price would be in cutting emissions. To investigate this issue, Avner, Rentschler, and Hallegatte 
(2014) compare two cities: Paris as it existed in 2010 and an imaginary Paris in which no pub-
lic transport infrastructure would have ever been built. They use a transport–land-use model 
 calibrated for those two scenarios to compare the resulting carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and 
their response to carbon pricing or other gasoline taxes.
Figure B2.1.1 shows the spatial differences in population densities and location choices 
between the two visions of Paris (without and with public transport infrastructure):
 ■ Without public transport, households have an incentive to locate relatively close to the 
city center to shorten their commutes, but they do not concentrate around transport infra-
structure (shown by the red and orange shaded areas that appear within the fi rst 15 kilo-
meters of the city center).
 FIGURE B2.1.1 Viewing Paris through a Public Transport Lens
(Comparison of households’ location decisions when public transport exists 
relative to a counterfactual scenario without public transport)
Source: Avner, Rentschler, and Hallegatte 2014). 
(Box continues on the following page.)
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FIGURE 2.3 A Majority of Known Fossil-Fuel Reserves Will Need to Stay in the 
Ground
Source: Adapted from Clarke et al. (2014) and McGlade and Ekins (2014).
Note: In green and orange are the ranges of CO2 emissions compatible with 2°C and 3°C, respectively. The darker shading depicting oil, 
gas, and coal represents known reserves (what is recoverable under existing economic and operating conditions); the lighter shading 
represents resources that are theoretically feasible. The coal numbers include hard coal and lignite.
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 ■ With public transport, households are able to move farther away from the city center 
(thanks to a loosening of the commuting constraint) but only along the public transport 
lines (to benefi t from quick and cheap access to central Paris). That is evident in the green 
shaded areas, which show that when public transport exists, the population redeploys 
toward the outskirts of the urban area, but in a denser way that follows the public trans-
port infrastructure. This “transit-oriented development” increases the modal share of and 
accessibility to public transit.
The urban forms generated in the presence—or absence—of public transport infrastructure are 
almost irreversible. The inertia in urban form goes beyond the lifetime of buildings and infrastruc-
ture. Since cities go through a process of permanent and largely uncoordinated reconstruction of 
individual buildings or segments of infrastructure, urban forms are extremely diffi cult to change, 
even when large social gains are possible. That inertia is illustrated by the benefi ts from large-
scale reconstruction after disasters that remove some of this irreversibility, as occurred with the 
Great Fire of Boston in 1872 (Hornbeck and Keniston 2014).
These urban forms, in turn, affect greenhouse gas emissions and the effectiveness and effi -
ciency of various instruments to reduce emissions. Thus, the future ability of fast-growing cities 
in the developing world to curb their transport emissions—and to reduce pollution and remain 
competitive in the face of possibly high carbon prices—is highly dependent on their near-term 
choices in infrastructure investments.
 BOX 2.1 An Extreme Case of Commitment—Urban Forms (continued)
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reaching more than 60 GtCO
2
 equivalent by 2030) would strand fewer assets by 2030 
(50 GW) but then necessitate stranding of up to 350 GW between 2030 and 2050.
Countries differ as to the age or vintage of their energy infrastructure, and thus as 
to when it needs to be replaced (Davis and Socolow 2014). Countries that will be build-
ing a large share of energy infrastructure in the near future have a high risk of creating 
stranded assets. As such, they may want to take advantage of the natural turnover of 
capital to improve the environmental performance of installed capital without having 
to retire it early.
The Costs of Early Action Should Be Modest
How much will early action cost? The IPCC provides an estimate of global mitigation 
costs for various climate objectives (expressed here in foregone consumption  compared 
with a baseline world with neither climate impacts nor mitigation policies). As  fi gure 2.5 
shows, for the 2°C target, overall world consumption is estimated to be lower by about 
2 percent in 2030 and about 4.5 percent in 2100 compared with the no- climate-
concerns baseline (meaning with neither policies nor impacts).
These are global numbers, and even as they are modest overall, they can repre-
sent a heavy burden for individual countries and regions. The cost-minimizing 
pathways examined by the IPCC assume that mitigation happens wherever and 
whenever it is cheapest. The result is that a large share of the mitigation would 
 happen in  developing countries. For a 2°C target, the IPCC fi nds that local mitiga-
tion (expressed as a percentage of local consumption) is lower than average in the 
FI GURE 2.4 Early Action Results in Fewer “Stranded Assets”
(Mean stranded capacity of global conventional coal power plants from 2011 to 2050)
Source: Adapted from Johnson et al. (2015).
Note: The 2011 to 2050 period is divided into two periods (2010–30 and 2030–50), depending on the ambition of mitigation policies 
in the 2010–30 period.
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member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), close to the average in Latin America, and larger than average in other 
developing countries (Asia, the Middle East, and Africa) and in economies in transi-
tion (fi gure 2.6). Results are very similar for higher-temperature targets.5 Note that 
these are the costs of abatement taking place in each region, not the costs paid by 
each region, as these two costs can be disconnected—for instance, with richer coun-
tries paying for part of the abatement happening in developing countries through 
carbon markets or fi nancial transfers.
These cost estimates are extremely uncertain. As fi gure 2.5 shows, the 4.5 percent 
reduction associated with a 2°C target is actually the median of a 2–6 percent range. 
This uncertainty refl ects the inherent limitations of models, as well as the differences 
across them—for instance, regarding their representation of structural change and 
the dynamics of labor markets. It also arises from the fact that a great deal will 
depend on the available technologies and the effi ciency of the policies that are 
implemented. For instance, reaching the 2°C target without CCS—because the tech-
nologies cannot be developed or scaled up—would be around 140 percent more 
expensive than with this technology. Other technologies are less critical: phasing out 
nuclear energy or limiting the scaling up of solar or wind energy would increase 
costs by less than 10 percent. Finally, models usually assume that least-cost policies 
are implemented, and they optimally distribute abatement efforts across sectors and 
fuels. This approach is in contrast with existing climate policies, which are often 
partial in their sectoral coverage.
F IGURE 2.5 Mitigation Costs Rise with More Ambitious Target, but with a Big 
Uncertainty Range
(Reduction in aggregate world consumption—a measure of the economic cost of 
mitigation relative to a baseline of no climate change or climate policy, in 2030, 2050, 
and 2100, for two climate objectives—2°C and 3°C)
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2014).
Note: The reduction in consumption is based on a comparison with a world with no climate change, so includes neither impacts nor 
policy costs.
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In addition, these costs are not net costs. They do not capture the benefi ts from 
lower climate change impacts, which are the fi nal objective of climate policies. Nor do 
they capture the many co-benefi ts of climate action. Recent studies fi nd that health 
benefi ts from lower air pollution alone would exceed the cost of mitigation in many 
regions, at least until 2030 (Shindell et al. 2012; Thompson et al. 2014). A pathway 
 leading to a reduction in CO
2
 concentrations from 720 to 525 parts per million in 2100 
would avoid 0.5 million premature deaths annually in 2030, 1.3  million in 2050, and 
2.2 million in 2100 (West et al. 2013). Those health  co-benefi ts can be particularly large 
in places where air pollution has reached  alarming levels in the past decade (Matus 
et al. 2012). For example, in East Asia, about 500,000 premature deaths would be 
avoided annually in 2050 under climate mitigation (fi gure 2.7, panel b).6
Many other co-benefi ts are likely to occur in various sectors (World Bank 2014). 
Reduced air pollution also increases agricultural yields, and better public transit 
reduces congestion and traffi c accidents—all of which would generate large economic 
benefi ts.7 Climate-friendly landscape management can be more productive and more 
resilient to climate shocks. A lower dependence on imported energy for fossil-fuel 
FIGURE 2.6 The Costs of Mitigation to Reach the 2°C Target Varies across Regions
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2014).
Note: Regional mitigation costs are relative to the global average, assuming a uniform least-cost global climate policy, in the absence 
of any transfers. These costs are the costs of abatement taking place in each region, not the costs paid by each region, as these two 
costs can be disconnected—for instance, richer countries can pay for part of the abatement happening in developing countries through 
carbon markets or fi nancial transfers.
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 FIGURE 2.7 Lower Air Pollution Means Lower Mortality Rates
(Changes in mortality in baseline and mitigation scenarios, from particles [PM2.5] 
at the global scale and in East Asia)
Source: Adapted from West et al. (2013).
Note: REF is a reference scenario leading to a CO2 concentration of about 720 ppm in 2100. RCP4.5 is a scenario with mitigation policies that would 
lead to 525 ppm in 2100. (More ambitious decarbonization would tend to increase co-benefi ts). In panel a, uncertainty bars show the uncertainty 
that arises from the concentration-response function (not all uncertainties).
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importers would boost energy security.8 And in periods of economic recession with 
large idle resources, macroeconomic benefi ts are possible if green investments create an 
economic stimulus.9
Focusing on the investment side, the IPCC estimates that reaching the 2°C target 
would require additional investments of about $400 billion per year. Similarly, New 
Climate Economy’s report (NCE 2014) fi nds an additional investment need of around 
$300 billion, compared with baseline investment needs of $5.5 billion per year.10 This 
additional cost (a 5 percent increase) is not negligible, but it does not change qualita-
tively the challenge of mobilizing the fi nancial resources needed for development.
The relative modesty of additional investment needed for climate mitigation is 
explained by the fact that increased costs in some sectors (like renewables) are par-
tially compensated by savings in other sectors (fi gure 2.8). For instance, investment 
needs in the extraction of fossil fuels or in power plants without CCS are substan-
tially reduced in scenarios with high energy effi ciency and lower GHG emissions, 
keeping additional investment needs at manageable levels compared with overall 
infrastructure needs.
Finally, the higher up-front costs of greener technologies and options are often 
compensated—at least partly—by lower operational costs. For instance, that is the case 
for more effi cient buildings that reduce heating or air-conditioning costs, and for 
renewable power like solar or hydro that do not require purchasing fuel.
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Overall then—and keeping in mind the caveat about how uncertain they are—costs 
appear relatively modest. But the question of fi nancing the needed  investments could 
still be a binding constraint. That is a particular concern for the many  developing 
countries in which the burden could be concentrated. It is critical  therefore to ensure 
fi nancial fl ows that help dissociate who pays from who acts so that the abatement real-
ized in poor countries need not be the cost they have to bear. Instruments that discon-
nect the location of abatement from its fi nancing include market instruments—such as 
international or networked carbon markets—and direct fi nancial fl ows. These issues of 
fi nancing are discussed in depth in  chapter 6.
Early Action Paths Are Prudent
We often think of mitigation and emission reduction as a way to hedge against climate 
change risks that are uncertain but potentially “severe, widespread, and irreversible” 
(using language from the IPCC [2014]). But the reality is that even without taking 
 climate impacts into account, countries that delay action and develop in a carbon-
intensive way could be exposed to higher costs when (and if) they decide to act later.
 FIGURE 2.8 Early Action Investments Kept Manageable by Lower Needs in Some Sectors
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2014).
Note: Change in annual investment fl ows are relative to the average baseline level over the next two decades [2010–29] for mitigation sce-
narios consistent with a 2°C pathway [concentrations of 430–530 ppm CO2e by 2100. The fi gure on the left shows changes in investment fl ows 
economy-wide. The fi gure on the right shows the breakdown within electricity generation, which is broken into four components with the four 
light-blue bars: renewables, nuclear, power plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS), and fossil-fuel power plants without CCS.
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Thus, even countries that do not believe in the validity of a 2°C goal or that do not 
concur with the fi nal decarbonization objective may want to diversify away from 
excessive carbon dependency and start transitioning toward lower carbon as a strategy 
to hedge against the costs of delayed mitigation—particularly if such short-term 
efforts could bring some local and immediate benefi ts (like reduced pollution, 
increased export earnings, or reduced congestion).
After all, external trends may even render carbon-intensive assets prematurely 
 obsolete (“stranded”) and thus trigger an “imposed” decarbonization. Such trends 
include green technology developments, market demand and price shifts, local demands 
for cleaner air, changing consumer’ preferences toward greener products and lifestyles, 
and policy efforts to mitigate climate change in major export markets. They can also 
include direct external pressure from the international community to increase partici-
pation in climate change mitigation efforts—whether through border tax adjustments 
or diplomatic pressures in other domains (like trade agreements).
Since transitions are smoother when chosen and managed, countries may want 
to opt for low-carbon policies to prepare for a world that is moving toward greener 
technology, rather than risk being forced to act precipitously in the future. For 
 carbon-intensive countries, investing in energy effi ciency and renewable energy is 
comparable to diversifying an asset portfolio to manage risk. Investors need not 
think that an event will occur to hedge against it—nonzero probability that an event 
may occur implies that there is an economic benefi t from diversifi cation and hedg-
ing. Countries with high carbon intensity may see a value in diversifying their 
 economy and reducing their emissions, if they believe there is a nonzero probability 
that a carbon-intensive economy will be hurt by future socioeconomic trends 
(including climate policies in other countries, especially trade partners).
Notes
 1. The dynamics of the carbon cycle makes things more complicated: past emissions and result-
ing warming have already affected the ability of ecosystems and oceans to capture CO
2
 from the 
atmosphere, so it is not possible to return to preindustrial carbon fl ows instantaneously.
 2. The 2020 pledges made by countries at the Cancún Conference of the Parties would actually allow 
for emissions of 55 gigatons of CO
2 
to 65 gigatons of CO
2 
equivalent per year in 2030, slightly 
higher than the 2010 level (about 50 GtCO
2 
equivalent) and a modest reduction compared with 
business as usual.
 3. In addition, that nonlinearity still exists if bounded negative emissions are possible, even though 
the possibility of negative emissions reduces the level of effort needed after the peak.
 4. As Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, and Hallegatte (2014) discuss, stranding assets can be a perfectly 
rational decision from an economic perspective, and it is not always better to avoid stranded 
assets. However, stranded assets still represent a loss that early action can mitigate.
 5. Even though costs per unit of emission reduction are often lower in developing countries, their 
total costs are likely to be higher for multiple reasons, including the rapid expected growth in 
baseline emissions in the absence of climate policy, their current fossil-fuel-based energy mix, 
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and higher energy and carbon intensity. Also countries and regions that are heavily dependent on 
carbon-intensive industries or on fossil-fuel extraction would of course be affected more nega-
tively than the others (for example, in the Middle East), whereas other countries could benefi t 
from reduced energy imports or bioenergy exports.
 6. There is an active debate regarding how to measure co-benefi ts, to ensure in particular that 
 co-benefi ts are not included when they could be captured easily and cheaply by nonclimate-
related measures. For instance, health co-benefi ts from better air quality could at least be partly 
generated by measures that are not linked to climate mitigation, sometimes at a lower cost.
 7. Most economic analyses suggest that the carbon externality (that is, the impact through climate 
change) of driving is small compared with other externalities, such as traffi c accidents, conges-
tion, and local air pollution (Bento et al. 2013; Parry, Heine, and Lis 2014).
 8. Estimates regarding future oil prices are very uncertain, but climate policies hedge against that 
uncertainty (J. Rozenberg et al. 2010).
 9. This question generated a debate, especially in Europe after the 2008 crisis. See, for instance, 
(Brahmbhatt 2014; World Bank 2012; Zenghelis 2014).
 10.  Other estimates differ, sometimes markedly (Kennedy and Corfee-Morlot 2013; McKinsey 2013; 
World Bank 2012), but they all agree that the additional cost of low-carbon development is small 
compared with infrastructure fi nancing needs in the baseline scenario.
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3.  Plan Ahead with an Eye on the
End Goal
■ Climate mitigation strategies should focus on measures that carry co-benefi ts and provide 
synergies with economic development.
■ They should also favor measures with high emission-reduction potential—even if those 
 measures are slow to implement and are not the less expensive ones available in the short 
term.
■ To be effective, the long-term goal of carbon neutrality should be translated into operational 
short-term objectives at the sector level.
So far in this report, we have stressed the need for a long-term goal of bringing 
net  carbon emissions to zero by 2100 to stabilize climate change at a reasonable 
 temperature level. We have explained how carbon neutrality can be achieved by acting 
on four fronts: (a) electricity decarbonization, (b) electrifi cation and fuel shifting, 
(c) effi ciency in end-use sectors, and (d) preservation and increase of carbon sinks. 
And we have documented the rationale for early action, especially regarding long-
term investments.
The next step is to determine emission-reduction pathways that can achieve 
those goals at the sector level. The key question here is how to determine the right set 
of measures at each point in time given the uncertainty, disagreement, and multiple 
objectives that complicate development policy making. This chapter explores a core 
principle to navigate this complexity—namely, to prioritize what is urgent and 
what carries local and immediate co-benefi ts. The focus on urgency comes from 
the fact that end goals constrain short-term choices and should drive today’s priorities. 
The emphasis on  co-benefi ts comes from the fact that the goal is low-carbon 
 development—not mitigation for mitigation’s sake. The chapter also reviews some of 
the tools that can be mobilized to design operational strategies at the sector level.
Factor in Uncertainty, Disagreement, and Multiple Objectives1
As policy makers focus on how to design climate change policies, they fi nd themselves 
running into a wall of sorts—the reality that a deep uncertainty surrounds so many key 
issues. Although the long-term objective is clear, the best measures to reach it are still 
being heatedly debated.
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By deep uncertainty, we mean what happens when the parties to a decision do not 
know or cannot agree on (a) the models that relate the key forces that shape the future, 
(b) the probability distributions of key variables and parameters in those models, or 
(c) the value of alternative outcomes (Lempert et al. 2003).2 For example, the likeli-
hood of experiencing a car crash is easily estimated from ample historical data. But 
the likelihood of experiencing a given long-term land-use pattern or level of global 
economic growth is neither reliable nor verifi able, making it diffi cult to agree on the 
most likely scenario.
In the case of climate change, there are several types of uncertainties. First, we know 
that increased emissions lead to a changing climate, but how exactly local climates will 
be affected is highly uncertain. In some parts of the world, such as West Africa, models 
even disagree as to whether the climate will become drier or wetter. Second, we know a 
changing climate will have many negative consequences. But even in the most studied 
sector (agriculture) and in places with the best data availability (developed countries), 
the uncertainty on the exact impact of a changing climate on yields and carbon cycles 
is great (Porter et al. 2014). In other sectors—such as ecosystem services or extreme 
events—the uncertainty is even greater.
Third, we also know that policies and technologies can reduce emissions. But as 
countries make commitments whether action at the required level will follow is 
 uncertain. Plus the availability and acceptability of technologies (such as nuclear or 
carbon capture and sequestration [CCS]) are uncertain. Most of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s scenarios that achieve a temperature rise below 2°C assume 
negative emissions in the second half of the century (Clarke et al. 2014). But if tech-
nologies to remove carbon dioxide (CO
2
) from the atmosphere are not available, even 
greater efforts will be needed from other sectors.3
Compounding matters is the fact that those risks and uncertainties are perceived 
and valued differently across individuals, populations, and countries. For example, 
more than 30 percent of the population of the China, Colombia, Peru, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam cite pollution and the environment as the greatest threat in the 
world, compared with less than 5 percent in Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Tanzania 
(table 1.). Also, some individuals may value economic development highly, whereas 
 others prize their cultural and environmental heritage. Some may prioritize avoiding 
biodiversity losses, whereas others may not. Some may focus on worst-case scenarios, 
whereas others focus on more likely scenarios. And some individuals may worry more 
than others about the welfare of future generations.
Against this backdrop, how can policy makers design climate policies in an inclusive 
way, accounting for multiple viewpoints, and in an iterative risk management 
 framework—one that accounts for uncertainty and can be revised as more information 
becomes available?
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First, climate policies should generally aim to avoid making irreversible decisions 
and getting locked into patterns or technologies that would be diffi cult and costly to 
reverse if new information or changing preferences arise (Ambrosi et al. 2003; Lempert 
and Schlesinger 2000; Pizer 1999). For instance, it is almost impossible to transform a 
low-density city into a high-density city, even over the long term (chapter 2).
Second, climate policies should be robust, in that they should perform well under a 
broad range of possible futures, rather than just being optimal for the most likely 
future. For instance, a climate policy can be designed using projections of future costs 
of a green technology and turn out to be extremely effi cient—provided that costs 
decrease as planned. But it could also totally fail if costs remain higher than expected. 
Alternative policies may not be as effi cient in the considered scenario of rapid techno-
logical progress, but they may be more robust to less optimistic technology scenarios.
Third, climate policies need to combine multiple policy goals and create consensus. 
Take the case of a local decision maker faced with the following multiple objectives: 
(a) housing affordability, (b) climate change adaptation and mitigation, (c) the protec-
tion of natural areas and the reduction of sprawl, and (d) policy neutrality (no income 
redistribution). The policy options might include a greenbelt policy, a public transport 
subsidy, and a zoning policy to reduce the risk of fl ooding.
FIGURE 3.1 Some Countries Worry Much More about Environmental Issues 
than Others
(Share of the population citing “pollution and the environment” as the 
“greatest threat in the world”)
Source: Pew Research 2014 Global Attitudes survey.
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An analysis of that situation shows that each policy would contribute to some 
 objectives but would hurt others (fi gure 3.2). However, a package can be designed that, 
for the same total cost, results in a net improvement for all the objectives. It may not be 
the preferred option for any individual, but all should agree that the package is better 
than the status quo. Such a package—depicted as the green line in fi gure 3.2—would 
include a greenbelt policy (in which the construction of new buildings is restricted), 
fl ood zoning, and a subsidy for public transit. It might have a greater chance of being 
implemented because it is more in line with the priorities of a larger share of the 
 population (Viguié and Hallegatte 2012).
Focus on What Is Urgent and Carries Co-Benefi ts
Of course, optimal solutions will differ across countries with varying degrees of 
resources, institutional capacity, transparency, accountability, and civil society capacity. 
Thus, decarbonization strategies need to be tailored to a country’s circumstances, and 
FIGURE 3.2 Evaluating a Policy Package along Several Dimensions
(Consequences of a greenbelt policy, a public transport subsidy, and a zoning policy 
along fi ve metrics that represent fi ve policy objectives, compared with the do-nothing 
scenario)
Source: Viguie and Hallegatte (2012).
Note: Points toward the outer edge of the spider chart represent better outcomes, whereas a move toward the inside is associated 
with worse outcomes. Preferred outcomes are (a) shorter average distances traveled by car, (b) fewer people living in fl ood-prone 
areas, (c) a smaller total urbanized area, (d) larger average dwelling sizes, and (e) neighborhoods with less income inequality.
Policy neutrality
Flood zoning Greenbelt Public transport subsidy All threeDo nothing
Climate change
mitigation
Climate change
adaptation and natural
risk reduction
Natural area and
biodiversity protection
Housing affordability
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best practices should be imported with caution. With that in mind, the Inclusive Green 
Growth report (World Bank 2012) proposes a core principle for selecting mitigation 
projects: maximize local and immediate benefi ts and avoid lock-in. Project selection 
can be done using two metrics (table 3.1):
 ■ Synergies. Whether mitigation options provide net local and immediate co- 
benefi ts on top of long-term emissions reductions (such as energy cost savings 
and local air pollution reduction) or imply a trade-off with existing develop-
ment goals (universal access to electricity could be threatened by higher costs 
from renewable energy).
 ■ Urgency. Whether mitigation options are associated with high economic iner-
tia (such as a risk of costly lock-in, irreversibility, or higher costs if action is 
delayed). If yes, then action is urgent; if not, it can be postponed.
For both metrics, the local context is key. In the case of synergies, growing concerns 
over local air quality in cities in China and India suggest focusing fi rst on measures 
with large air pollution co-benefi ts. Where electrifi cation or switching to cleaner cook-
stoves is a pressing development goal, that should be taken into account (Pachauri et al. 
2013). In the case of urgency, not every developing country wants to be promoting 
innovation with pilot projects for CCS or large wind power plants. In some countries 
the priority will be to protect forests, whereas in others with rapid urbanization, 
urban planning and public transit should come fi rst.
Synergies and trade-offs are often measured as the cost of using low-carbon options 
relative to a “baseline” alternative. Some will be more expensive by nature: retrofi tting 
TABLE 3.1 Some Guiding Principles for Establishing Green Growth Strategies
Synergies
Low or negative (trade-offs)
(to be considered at higher level of income or paid for 
by external funds)
Positive
(attractive regardless of income, 
provided that fi nancial mechanism can 
be found)
U
rg
en
cy
Low: less 
inertia and 
irreversibility risk
 – Higher-cost renewable power threatening universal 
access to electricity
 – Higher-cost fossil-fuel energy threatening switch 
from traditional biomass to healthier gas for 
cookstoves
 – Reforestation/afforestation of degraded landscapes
 – Lower-carbon, lower-cost energy 
supply (e.g., hydro)
 – Loss reduction in electricity 
distribution
 – Loss reduction in food supply chain
 – Energy demand management (e.g., 
in building)
High: greater 
inertia and 
irreversibility risk
 – Reduced deforestation
 – Increase investment in energy and transport R&D
 – Pilot project with expensive technologies 
(CCS, concentrated solar)
 – Land-use planning
 – Public urban transport and transit-
oriented development
Source: World Bank (2012).
Note: CCS = carbon capture and sequestration; R&D = research and development.
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a coal power plant with CCS requires investing in heavy material to capture, transport, 
store, and monitor carbon dioxide. Capturing CO
2
 also reduces the yield of power 
plants, meaning that more coal should be burned to produce the same quantity of 
 electricity. But a number of low-carbon options can pay for themselves or, better, can 
reduce emissions at a net economic benefi t. LEDs are more expensive than incandes-
cent lightbulbs, but energy savings over their lifetime mean that LEDs can be profi table 
even without a price on carbon, and they reduce emissions.
The fact that a low-carbon option brings net economic benefi ts does not mean that 
people will adopt it spontaneously. Market or governance failures may stand in the way. 
An option to improve energy effi ciency can be unattractive to fi rms if investment is 
taxed while energy is subsidized. And homeowners will think twice before investing in 
thermal insulation for their houses if fi nding a qualifi ed fi rm to install it is diffi cult, if 
they cannot easily verify the quality of the insulation they bought, or if energy bills are 
paid by tenants anyway (Allcott and Greenstone 2012; Giraudet and Houde 2013).
Some of the net benefi t options will be benefi cial for everybody in the long run, but 
they are not attractive to individual investors in the short term. The benefi ts of renew-
able power and energy-effi cient cars will eventually pay for the cost of developing and 
deploying the technology, but knowledge spillovers mean that no investor will make 
the fi rst move without help. Finally, many options are desirable as they bring social 
co-benefi ts to the community, such as reduced pollution, reduced congestion, or better 
agricultural yields (see chapter 2), but they suffer from the tragedy of the commons. 
Chapters 4 to 6 offer more insights on implementation barriers and how to overcome them.
More generally, measuring the true cost of an option is not without challenge. 
Different measures may interact with each other, something that the individual cost of 
each measure cannot refl ect. For instance, emission reductions from using electric 
cars—and thus the cost of using electric cars to reduce emissions—depend on the 
 carbon content of power generation, which in turn depends on other policy decisions 
(on policy interactions, see also chapter 8).
It is also diffi cult to summarize multiple objectives into a single cost metric: the cost 
of emission reductions can be small if measured in monetary terms, but it can be sig-
nifi cant in nonmonetary terms. For instance, aggressive expansion of bioenergy may 
create risks for food security or may affect biodiversity in ways that are diffi cult to 
measure in fi nancial terms. That is also true of the co-benefi ts from climate policies: 
the health benefi ts from better air are diffi cult to measure (consensually) in monetary 
terms. As a result, noneconomic costs and co-benefi ts are often simply left out of the 
analysis, creating a bias in the economic analysis of emission-reduction options.
One of the most common ways to illustrate the costs of different emission-reduction 
options is through marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves (ESMAP 2012; Kesicki and 
Ekins 2012; Kolstad and Urama 2014; NCE 2014). MAC curves offer a graphic repre-
sentation of the results of model-based scenarios, showing information on abatement 
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potentials and costs (or benefi ts) for a set of technical mitigation measures at a given 
date (for example, 2030). They rank the measures according to their economic costs, 
from the ones that come with net benefi ts to the measures that come with positive costs 
and trade-offs with income and growth (fi gure 3.3). And they are powerful communi-
cation tools—in particular, helping convey that large amounts of emission reductions 
are technically possible, and much of them will bring net economic benefi ts.
However, the very simplicity of these curves implies two important limitations. 
First, MAC curves may give the erroneous impression that a given amount of emission 
reductions can be enforced with the corresponding carbon price in the curve.4 In most 
FIGURE 3.3 Marginal Abatement Cost Curves Provide Information on the Cost and 
Potential of Emission-Reduction Options
(A global marginal abatement cost curve, ranking options from those that bring the 
most co-benefi ts to the most expensive ones)
Source: NCE (2014).
Note: Each bar represents an emission-reduction option, showing how much it could reduce emissions (abatement potential) on the 
horizontal axis; and the benefi t or cost of doing so (in dollars per tons of CO2 reduced) on the vertical axis. Options above the zero line 
generate net benefi ts; those below come with net costs. Green bars include only reduced operating costs as benefi ts, whereas blue 
bars include other co-benefi ts, such as reduced health impacts.
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cases, that is not the case: enforcing a given measure requires tackling a number of 
government and market failures, as discussed in parts II and III of this report.5 Second, 
MAC curves do not convey information on the time dimension—that is, how long it 
would take to implement a measure and thus the relative urgency of that measure. As a 
result, they are often misinterpreted as a kind of dispatch function that calls for doing 
the cheapest options fi rst (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2014). For instance, the MAC 
curve displayed in fi gure 3.3 may give the false impression that action on deforestation 
or the development of CCS should be delayed until after other cheaper potentials have 
been captured, which, as it turns out, would be misguided.
So in addition to the cost dimension, planning short-term action requires account-
ing for the time dimension, in other words, the urgency of implementing each measure. 
Some measures with high abatement potential—such as switching to renewable power, 
retrofi tting existing energy-ineffi cient buildings, or developing CCS—may take decades 
to implement, as a number of factors limit the speed at which some changes can occur. 
Among them are the following:
 ■ Slow capital turnover. The average lifetime for energy-consuming equipment 
ranges from an estimated 7 years (for lightbulbs) to more than 35 years (Williams 
et al. 2014). Thermal electricity–generating plants have an average life expec-
tancy of 30 years, although in practice most are used longer.6 This is particularly 
important for coal-fi red power plants, as some 40 percent of them are now less 
than 15 years old (Davis and Socolow 2014).
 ■ Slow technological diffusion. Diffusing new technologies such as electric vehicles 
or heat pumps may take decades because of technical and sociological factors—
including research and development time, lack of information, network effects, 
slow capital turnover, and learning-by-doing (Iyer et al. 2015). Typical time lags 
between the research and development of new technologies and fi rst commer-
cialization range from 5 to 10 years (Mansfi eld 1998). And lag times can take 
an average of 14 additional years from fi rst commercialization to sales takeoff 
(Agarwal and Bayus 2002). Technologies that are components of interlocking 
networks, as in the case of electric or plug-in vehicles and specifi c charging 
infrastructure, exhibit the longest diffusion time scales (Grübler Nakic´enovic´, 
and Victor 1999).
 ■ Availability of skilled workers. Some mitigation options require new skills for 
workers—such as construction sector workers specialized in insulation—and 
building the skill base can take a long time, depending on the strength of lifelong 
(continuing) education (Jagger, Foxon, and Gouldson 2012).
 ■ Financial constraints. Transitioning to a decarbonized economy will require 
signifi cant up-front investment in clean capital. But as discussed in chapter 6, 
investors and fi rms frequently face capital rationing, many countries face severe 
fi scal constraints, and laws often limit the amount of debt that public agencies 
can contract—effectively restricting how much they can invest each year.
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 ■ Institutional constraints and social norms. Existing laws and regulations can make 
it diffi cult for investors to start new projects or invent new products (for exam-
ple, regulations protecting historical sites in France have been an obstacle to the 
expansion of solar power). Some solutions require changes in the way institu-
tions function, the creation of new institutions, or even changes in what is con-
sidered socially acceptable behavior and what is not (Weber and Johnson 2011).
The limited speed at which different options can deliver emission reductions is crucial 
information that needs to be available to decision makers when they are devising a strategy. 
Moreover, investigating the constraint on implementation speed is a way of identifying 
policies and measures that could accelerate the scale-up of some mitigation solutions.
Because of those limits, what is done now cannot be decided independently of the 
fi nal objective. The optimal quantity of short-term abatement depends on long-term 
objectives (see chapter 2; Luderer et al. 2013; and Riahi et al. 2015). Moreover, ambi-
tious long-term goals require focusing on the quality of abatement—that is, their 
potential long-term contribution to carbon neutrality. Emission-reduction options 
involving marginal changes in the economic system, at low cost but with limited poten-
tial for deep decarbonization, will not contribute to reaching the end goal and can be 
considered low-quality abatement (Vogt-Schilb, Hallegatte, and de Gouvello 2014).
Thus, short-term targets need to be reached with high-quality measures, which may be 
slow to implement and more expensive, but which will make deeper decarbonization pos-
sible in the long term. For example, the best strategy to decarbonize the European electricity 
sector is not to sequentially switch from coal to gas, and then from gas to renewable power. 
Rather, investing early in renewable power can smooth costs over time and avoid wasteful 
over-investment in gas power plants (Delarue et al. 2011; Lecuyer and Vogt-Schilb 2014).
Another reason not to focus only on the options with the lower technical cost in the 
short term is that many of the technologies used to reduce emissions (such as electric 
cars or renewable energy) are still in the early stages of their development. Since their 
costs will decrease as their deployment continues—through learning-by-doing effects 
or economies of scale—it makes sense to use some of these options in the short term to 
bring their costs down (Azar and Sandén 2011; Bramoullé and Olson 2005; del Río 
González 2008; Gerlagh, Kverndokk, and Rosendahl 2009; Kalkuhl, Edenhofer, and 
Lessmann 2012; Rosendahl 2004).
The need to keep long-term objectives in mind while designing short-term strate-
gies is well illustrated by a recent study of Brazil’s low-carbon development options. 
Another illustration is how differently Germany’s energy transition strategy can be 
viewed depending on one’s time frame (box 3.1).
So how can we easily communicate the time dimension (the urgency) along with the 
abatement cost (the synergies or trade-offs)? To communicate the time dimension, ana-
lysts often construct what has become known as a wedge curve (Pacala and Socolow 2004), 
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BOX 3.1 Short-Term Strategies Need to Be Designed Keeping the 
Long-Term Goal in Mind—Examples from Brazil and Germany
Picking a Path to Low Carbon in Brazil
As Brazil develops a low-carbon development strategy, it will have to choose whether and how 
much to invest in cleaner transportation (such as subways, trains, and waterways) and in upgrad-
ing existing refi neries. An interesting question is whether the time frame should matter—that is, 
should policy makers look just 10 years ahead or further into the future. To study this question, we 
used a marginal abatement cost curve built at the World Bank for studying low-carbon develop-
ment in Brazil in the 2010–30 period (Vogt-Schilb, Hallegatte, and de Gouvello 2014). Given that 
that is as far as the data extend, we opted to make 2030 our long term and to use existing data to 
design an optimal plan for 2020 (our short term). We then studied whether actions in the 2010–20 
period are different if the 2030 goal is accounted for (fi gure B3.1.1).
The answer is yes. If the strategy for 2010–20 is designed to fulfi l the 2020 target as an end 
goal rather than as a step toward the 2030 goal, it will achieve the same amount of emission 
reduction, but underinvest in high-potential options (such as clean transportation infrastructure) 
and overinvest in cheap but low-potential options (such as heat integration and other improve-
ments in existing refi neries). In other words, developing clean transportation infrastructure in the 
short term is appealing only if the long-term abatement target is accounted for.
FIGURE B3.1.1 Using a Longer Time Frame Changes the Preferred 
Investment Plan
Source: Adapted from Vogt-Schilb, Hallegatte, and de Gouvello (2014).
Note: The bars on the left represent the optimal emission-reduction strategy if the 2020 target is the end goal; the bars 
on the right are the optimal emission-reduction strategy by 2020, knowing the goal is to reduce emissions even further 
by 2030. For the same quantity of reduction, the latter uses more high-potential measures and fewer cheaper but lower-
potential measures.
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We also fi nd that not developing clean transportation infrastructure in the short term (by 2020) 
precludes deeper emission reductions in the middle (2030) and longer term. Loosely speaking, the 
2020-only strategy provides a sensible quantity of abatement by 2020, but that abatement is of 
insuffi cient quality to reach the subsequent 2030 target. Thus, if the goal is simply a 10 percent 
reduction in 2020, limited use should be made of subway and rail; however, those become critical 
to ensure the feasibility of a 20 percent emissions reduction by 2030.
Germany’s Energy Transition Deserves a Long-Term Perspective
Germany has adopted an ambitious energy strategy. This Energiewende (or energy transition) com-
bines a nuclear phaseout by 2022 with ambitious objectives for energy effi ciency, and a goal of reach-
ing an 80 percent share of renewable power generation by 2050. But it is being criticized for two main 
reasons: the large investments in renewables are costly, resulting in signifi cant rises in electricity 
prices, and the nuclear phaseout implies a growing reliance on highly emitting coal over the short term.
The outcome of this debate will ultimately depend on whether and how the transition from coal 
to renewables will happen. The obvious risk is that current investments in the coal sector could lock 
Germany in a carbon-intensive development pathway. But if coal plants are  decommissioned on 
time—a political economy challenge—and the 80 percent renewable target is met, then the short-
term increase in coal-related emissions will, in retrospect, appear as a negligible bump in global 
emissions. The important outcome will be the development and scale-up of renewable energy tech-
nology that would bring Germany closer to the goal of zero net emissions from electricity generation.
Moreover, this strategy creates global knowledge spillovers that will test and demonstrate tech-
nologies for scaling up renewable power and thus will help the rest of the world make their  electricity 
generation carbon free. So looking at the end point and at the global scale, the short-term cost—slightly 
higher emissions in a country that accounts for less than 0.5 percent of world emissions—seems low 
compared with the long-term global benefi ts that would accrue if the transition is successful.
which shows the sequencing and deployment of various emission-reduction options (see 
left panel of fi gure 3.4).
MAC and wedge curves are both good ways of displaying complex information in a 
simple and informative way, but each covers only two out of the three key dimensions 
of emission-reduction options (time, cost, and potential). The good news is that they 
can be combined by fl ipping the MAC curve and then connecting it to a wedge curve. 
The resulting fi gure, shown in fi gure 3.4 with illustrative numbers, displays when early 
efforts are needed to reduce emissions, even in sectors that are more expensive to 
 decarbonize. In fi gure 3.4, the transportation sector should start earlier than the 
 decarbonization of electricity generation, in spite of its higher cost. The World Bank 
has recently developed a piece of software, MACTool, to help countries develop their 
own wedge and MAC curves (see box 3.2).
Another element that can be brought into the debate is the spatial dimension—that 
is, where within a country mitigation actions should take place. That aspect would be 
useful for policy  makers who are wondering how to design a deforestation strategy, as 
explored for Brazil in box 3.3.
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FIGURE 3.4 Devising a Strategy Requires Information on Time, Cost, and Mitigation 
Potential
Source: Author elaboration.
Note: By displaying the wedge curve next to the fl ipped MAC curve, this fi gure illustrates the need for sectoral abatement pathways to inform 
short-term action. In this illustrative example, avoiding carbon lock-in requires early efforts to decarbonize the transportation sector—even though 
the transportation sector is also the most expensive one.
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BOX 3.2 A World Bank Software for Comparing Abatement Options: 
MACTool
The World Bank has developed the Marginal Abatement Cost Tool (MACTool) to help governments 
compare the costs and benefi ts of emission-reduction options that can be used to build low-carbon 
scenarios at a national or subnational level.
As inputs, MACTool uses the key sociotechnical parameters of a set of large mitigation mea-
sures and macroeconomic variables. For instance, technology options to produce electricity are 
characterized by the required capital and operation expenditures, as well as by their lifetime, 
energy effi ciency, and type of fuel used. Physical constants, such as the carbon intensity of each 
fuel, are factored in. The user must also specify at least one scenario on the future macroeconomic 
variables of interest, such as the price of fossil fuels and the future demand for electricity. And the 
user must provide scenarios of future penetration of (low-carbon) technologies and measures, in 
both a baseline and at least one emission-reduction pathway (ESMAP 2012).
As outputs, MACTool computes the amount of greenhouse gases saved by each measure dur-
ing the past year (in tons of carbon dioxide per year), as well as the cost of doing so (in dollars per 
ton of carbon dioxide)—illustrated with two fi gures: a MAC curve and an abatement wedge curve, 
which shows when each option would be deployed and how the different mitigation interven-
tions add up over time (fi gure 3.4). It also estimates the incentives needed to make those options 
attractive for the private sector by calculating a break-even carbon price, and it helps governments 
assess the total investment needed to shift toward low carbon growth.
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BOX 3.3 Using Space to Design Deforestation Policies
Besides time, cost, and abatement potential, another dimension that matters is space. Not only 
is the set of feasible mitigation options dependent on the location, but so are the costs and ben-
efi ts of those options. Take the case of a strategy to combat deforestation for Brazil (fi gure B3.3.1). 
The opportunity cost of land that is protected from deforestation, reforestation, or afforesta-
tion (if it has been without a forest in the past) depends on the value of its alternative use for 
 agriculture, other natural areas, or even urbanization. That value, in turn, depends on (a) land-use 
designations, (b) land tenure and accessibility, (c) land suitability for different uses and its produc-
tivity, (d) the value of the goods produced, and (e) the local costs of labor and other inputs. As a 
result, the cost of climate-forestry policies (per ton of carbon dioxide) is highly location specifi c. In 
fi gure B3.3.1, the dark-green areas would be the least costly areas (and the red would be the most 
costly areas) to protect from deforestation.
FIGURE B3.3.1 The Costs of Avoiding Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
(Spatial distribution of abatement costs of protecting forest areas threatened 
by deforestation)
Source: Börner et al. (2010).
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Building Sectoral Pathways to Carbon Neutrality
Focusing on short-term targets (such as for 2030) without considering longer-term 
objectives (such as for 2050 and beyond) could lead to emission reductions based on 
the cheapest options—which may lack the potential to achieve complete decarboniza-
tion. It could thus result in a carbon-intensive lock-in, making it much more expensive 
to achieve decarbonization over the long term.
To avoid that pitfall, countries can use short-term sectoral targets to monitor 
 progress along the four pillars of decarbonization. Doing so would ensure not only that 
the appropriate quantity of emission reductions is achieved over the short term, but 
also that the quality of those abatements is such that they really put the country on a 
cost-effective pathway toward decarbonization.
TABLE 3.2 Examples of Possible Sectoral Targets for Tracking Progress toward the 
Decarbonization End Goal
Pillar Sector Example of target Rationale
Decarboniza-
tion of electricity 
production
Power 
generation
Produce at least 30% 
of electricity from 
renewable sources 
by 2025 
This type of target prevents the power sector from 
locking into intermediate solutions, such as gas power 
or enhanced coal power, which do not have the potential 
to fully decarbonize the power sector. It also supports 
the development of the required technologies (e.g., solar 
photovoltaic and smart grid able to manage intermittency). 
Effi ciency Transport Get 50% of the 
population to 
commute by public 
transport (bus) in 2025 
in a city
At city scale, this target helps reduce energy expenditures, 
congestion, and local pollution, in addition to lowering CO2 
emissions and building zero-carbon cities. Accessible public 
transit can also infl uence household localization choices, 
which have long-term consequences on energy and carbon 
effi ciency.
Building Build 50% of zero-
energy buildings in 
2030
Zero-energy buildings are needed for full decarbonization, 
and reduce energy bills and increase comfort. Early action is 
needed given the long lifetime of buildings.
Cities Plan for dense cities Urban sprawl is mostly irreversible and locks inhabitants 
into carbon-intensive pathways as it makes it much more 
diffi cult to develop viable public transit systems.
Fuel shifting/ 
substitution
Transport Reach 1% of electric 
vehicles in 2015
Favoring electric vehicles prevents locking into marginal 
improvements of combustion engines, and contributes to 
total decarbonization as long as the electricity sector is 
being decarbonized at the same time.
Buildings/ 
forestry
Use 20% of 
sustainable wood in 
new building structure 
by 2025 
Wood construction contributes to reaching zero carbon, if 
wood is produced sustainably. It is one of the options to 
reduce emissions from construction materials.
Natural carbon 
sinks
Forestry Stop deforestation 
by 2017
Deforestation (and associated loss of ecosystem services) is 
largely irreversible, so action in this domain cannot wait. 
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Those sectoral pathways are also useful because they provide more implementa-
tion guidance for sector plans, and they make it possible to use existing regulators 
and institutions to design and implement the measures. Table 3.2 provides examples 
of possible sectoral targets—ranging from producing at least 30 percent of electricity 
from renewable sources by 2025 and getting half the population of a city to commute 
by bike in 2025 to reducing agricultural waste by half by 2030 and stopping defores-
tation by 2017.
So how can countries decide which sectoral targets to use? A fi rst option is to 
 leverage the vast literature on the topic. For instance, the International Energy 
Agency has published more than 20 technology road maps, covering topics such 
as energy-effi cient buildings, wind energy, fuel economy of road vehicles, and 
 modern bioenergy for heat and power (IEA 2015). The deep decarbonization path-
ways  project from the United Nations Social Development Network also offers 
insights for 15 countries, including Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico 
(IDDRI/UNSDSN 2014). When no pathways are available, countries will need to 
investigate new ones. The annex to this chapter reviews some of the modeling tools 
available to do so.
Annex 3A: Tools to Develop Sectoral Pathways to Zero Emissions
Economy-Wide Models: The Helicopter View to Capture Interactions 
across Sectors
Typically, scenarios published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
work backward from a carbon budget and assess the least-cost pathway to reach it using 
global economy-wide models. Those models are a particularly important tool for 
 policy makers who are designing emission-reduction pathways, because they account 
for interactions across sectors (for instance, the link between power generation and 
transportation) and across countries (oil revenues and oil imports, impacts on trade). 
Those models are also often dynamic models that make it possible to investigate the 
timing of actions and emission reductions across sectors.
There are three broad categories of economy-wide models, each with its own 
strengths and weaknesses in its ability to capture different economic and physical 
processes:
Technology-explicit models represent a set of technologies, their capital costs, opera-
tion costs, and the fuel they use and generate pathways of technology mix, as a function 
of policy choices. They can model the impacts of climate policies leading to changes in 
investment patterns using performance standards, changes in energy prices, or innova-
tion and changes in technology costs. For instance, they can estimate how the share of 
coal generation changes in response to the introduction of a carbon price, and the 
consequences on investment needs and energy prices.
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Those models usually include the drivers and effects of research and develop-
ment and learning-by-doing on technology costs, even though those components 
are highly uncertain. They are also capable of assessing how the availability of some 
technologies can decrease the cost of reaching certain climate targets (the 
International Energy Agency uses this type of model to produce its technology road 
maps). And most include sophisticated land-use modules that make it possible to 
investigate the interaction between economic policies and land-use choices (Hurtt 
et al. 2011). They can also assess stranded assets (Johnson et al. 2015). But most 
technology-explicit models take growth of gross domestic product as an input and 
measure mitigation costs as  additional investment needs and increases in opera-
tional costs (compared with the baseline). Thus, they are not the most appropriate 
models for investigating macroeconomic impacts, economy-wide policies such as 
carbon pricing, or the effect of climate policies on international trade and 
competitiveness.
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models provide a more detailed representa-
tion of the macroeconomic mechanisms and can investigate international links 
through trade and capital fl ows. But they often lack a detailed representation of tech-
nologies, making it diffi cult to explicitly represent climate policies, such as invest-
ments in public transit infrastructure or performance standards on polluting 
equipment (such as vehicles, appliances, or industrial equipment). Further, and most 
critical, CGE models often assume full market equilibrium and full use of factors of 
production. Consequently, they cannot capture the reality of underemployment and 
stranded assets and will omit some of the co-benefi ts expected from climate policies 
(World Bank 2012).
Hybrid models are being developed to bring together the characteristics of CGEs 
with those of technology-explicit models (Guivarch, Hallegatte, and Crassous 2009; 
Hourcade et al. 2006; Kiuila and Rutherford 2013; Schäfer and Jacoby 2006). These 
models are better able to connect macroeconomic mechanisms to underlying tech-
nology assumptions. In parallel, some models have included underemployment and 
other market imperfections (Babiker and Eckaus 2007; Guivarch et al. 2011), show-
ing that how the labor market is modeled strongly infl uences mitigation cost 
estimates.
Beyond global models, countries may have a country-specifi c model that has been 
used to investigate local emission-reduction pathways. These pathways downscale the 
outputs of global models, allowing for better calibration and the integration of con-
text-specifi c issues (such as political economy constraints and specifi cities of the energy 
system). Such models have been—or are being—developed in many high-emission 
countries (such as Brazil, China, South Africa, and the United States), but they are not 
yet available in all countries. When and where available, these national scale models can 
produce national road maps to guide policy action.
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Sectoral Models: Detailed Insights on Specifi c Issues
A variety of models are being used at the sectoral level—which is often the level at 
which climate change policies need to be introduced. Two examples follow:
Energy sector models. Arguably the most important change required to bring 
greenhouse gas emissions to zero is to decarbonize electricity production. Energy 
sector models—or models of the electricity system—can be mobilized to investigate 
how to do so. Take the case of power in Europe and the neighboring countries. For 
instance, a recent study uses the LIMES-EU model of the power sector of Europe 
and the Middle East and North Africa to investigate the role of long-distance trans-
mission and storage in the transition toward large renewable shares (Haller Ludig, 
and Bauer 2012). The authors build a scenario leading to an almost full transition to 
renewables in 2050 (see fi gure 3A.1, left panel) and investigate the required invest-
ments in long-term transmission and storage. They show how long-distance trans-
mission reduces the need for electricity storage and lowers electricity costs and price 
volatility. They also estimate the capacity required for transregion transmission 
(fi gure 3A.1, right panel).
Other models are available for other regions. For instance, the TIMES model is 
available at the global scale, and in many locations, such as the European Union and the 
United States, and for individual countries such as China and Norway.
Urban models. In the urban sector, land-use transport interaction (LUTI) models 
aim to describe how transport investments or prices can change city structures, and 
how changes in city structure and land-use regulation can affect transport patterns. 
They seek to answer the question of how public transit infrastructure and the choice 
of a transport pricing scheme would affect commuting patterns and localization 
choices (for households that decide where to live and for fi rms that decide where to 
invest). Numerous models exist (Anas 1995; Anderstig and Mattsson 1992; 
Elhorst and Oosterhaven 2006; Viguié and Hallegatte 2012); for a review, see, for 
instance, Hunt, Kriger, and Miller (2005) and Iacono, Levinson, and El-Geneidy 
(2008).
If a LUTI model is coupled with a global energy-economy model that provides sce-
narios for macroeconomic variables (such as the evolution of national gross domestic 
product per capita, oil prices, and labor productivity changes), it can be used to create 
local scenarios for cities and urban agglomerations, including scenarios for the green-
house gas emissions from transport. As illustrated by Viguié, Hallegatte, and Rozenberg 
(2014), these city-scale scenarios can then be used as baselines to investigates the con-
sequences of various urban-climate policy packages, taking into account the spatial 
elements and the interactions between transport, fi rms and households localization 
choices, and urban developments.
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FIGURE 3A.1 Formulating a Power Sector Strategy for Europe and North Africa
(Left panel: “wedge” curve showing the changing generation mix over time, aggregated 
across both regions; right panel: required transmission capacity across regions to support this 
changing generation mix)
Source: Haller Ludig, and Bauer (2012).
Note: CC = combined cycle; CSP = concentrating solar power; PV = photovoltaic.
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The Low-Cost Approach: Aggregating Expert Views with Back-of-the-Envelope 
Calculations
When sophisticated models are not available, other types of less complex modeling 
may be needed for designing emission-reduction pathways. Thus, some studies have 
developed mitigation scenarios using a mix of sectoral models (such as for the energy 
system), simple calculations (such as using an average carbon content for various tech-
nologies), and expert opinions. Examples include some of the countries analyzed in the 
report Pathway to Deep Decarbonization (IDDRI/UNSDSN 2014).
This approach still requires collecting appropriate data (Vogt-Schilb, Hallegatte, 
and de Gouvello 2014). In most cases, emission-reduction potential and costs are 
assessed from expert surveys. To account for the long term and the role of inertia, it is 
also useful to include information on implementation barriers and factors that limit 
the pace at which emission reductions may be achieved. Including such information 
would be particularly helpful to decision makers if it permits identifying distinct 
bottlenecks (such as the availability of skilled workers) that can be translated into 
 specifi c policies (such as training). It would also be critical to determine the scheduling 
of various actions as a function of the long-term goals.
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Notes
 1. This section is based on Kalra et al. (2014).
 2. In his seminal 1921 paper, economist Frank Knight offered a similar defi nition, distinguishing 
between two kinds of ignorance about our uncertain future—that which we can reliably quantify 
(called Knightian risk) and that which we cannot (Knightian uncertainty, which corresponds to 
deep uncertainty).
 3. Technologies to remove carbon from the atmosphere include electricity produced from bioenergy 
combined with CCS (plants capture CO
2
 from the atmosphere as they grow, and the CO
2
 emitted 
from their use can then be stored underground) and changes in land use, including afforestation. 
Those technologies imply risks of their own. For instance, large-scale biofuels may negatively affect 
biodiversity and food security, carbon stored underground can leak, and poorly designed hydro-
power can lead to methane emissions or can divert water from other critical uses.
 4. The version proposed in fi gure 3.3, where benefi ts are plotted instead of costs, is more diffi cult to 
interpret in this way.
 5. The investor’s MAC curves commissioned by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (NERA 2011a, 2011b, 2012) are noticeable exceptions. These curves take the point of 
view of private sector investors, facing among others energy subsidies, transaction costs, and high 
fi nancing costs, and show what carbon price would be needed for the private sector to implement 
each emission-reduction option.
 6. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, about one-fi fth of the United States’ coal-fi red 
power plants are “ripe for retirement,” averaging 45 years of age (USC 2012).
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Enabling a Low-Carbon Transition: 
Prices and More
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4. Getting Prices Right
■ Getting prices right will require phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies, which are bad for the 
 environment and for fi scal policy, and are ineffi cient to help the poor or competitiveness.
■ Carbon pricing is necessary for decarbonization to be effi cient.
■ Carbon pricing is not just good environmental policy, it is also good economic and fi scal policy. 
Carbon is a better tax base than labor and capital; it is less distortive and more  diffi cult to 
evade.
Good planning is important, and part I explored how pathways toward decarboniza-
tion can be determined. The next step for governments is to enact policies to trigger the 
transition and to enforce those pathways, the topic of part II.
Economic incentives—such as putting a price on carbon—are critical to promoting 
the transition toward zero carbon, because they change behaviors in a manner that 
typically leads to least-cost solutions. They encourage the market to allocate efforts in 
an optimal manner, and they minimize the overall cost of achieving a given pollution 
target. On ethical grounds, pricing instruments can also be justifi ed by a polluter-pays 
principle, whereby the individuals responsible for damages are paying for them.
This chapter discusses the steps to getting the prices right, starting with the urgent 
need to remove distortive subsidies—a move that is also equity improving and fi scally 
responsible—before turning to the argument for carbon pricing and a review of its 
many co-benefi ts.
But prices will not be enough, either because of imperfect markets or because of 
behavioral issues (we are aware that few humans behave like a textbook homo economicus), 
so chapters 5 and 6 examine how to complement prices with measures that can make 
them more effective, or how to substitute for prices when they are not. Then, in part III, 
chapters 7 and 8 look at social and political acceptability, arguing that getting the prices 
right can be done in a way that is not just equitable but actually good for the poor.
A Necessary Step: Removing Fossil-Fuel Subsidies
The world spent some $548 billion on direct subsidies for the consumption of  fossil fuel 
in 2013 (IEA 2014), mostly in developing countries. That amount is likely an underes-
timate, as it does not include the more diffi cult-to-capture subsidies to producers.1
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In addition, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development estimates 
that its member countries spent some $55 billion to $90 billion a year on fossil-fuel 
subsidies over the period 2005–11, of which about 20 percent were production  subsidies 
(OECD 2013).
Fossil-fuel subsidies have a number of damaging impacts: economic, environ mental, 
and social. They drain public coffers and crowd out more productive public spending. 
Among the countries for which the IEA estimated consumption subsidies, fossil-fuel 
subsidies averaged 5 percent of gross domestic product, which represents an estimated 
25–30 percent of total government revenue—substantially more than what those 40 
governments currently spend on health (11 percent of government revenue) or educa-
tion (15 percent). And where energy prices do not cover the costs borne by utilities and 
energy companies, chronic underinvestment causes shortages, blackouts, and reduced 
access to modern energy, especially for the poor. Subsidies also often result in smug-
gling, adulteration, and black markets (IEA 2014).
Fossil-fuel subsidies also discourage investments in clean energy and energy effi -
ciency, tilting the balance in favor of fossil fuels and making it diffi cult for renewable 
energy and energy-effi cient equipment to compete. This is particularly obvious in the 
Middle East where oil and gas subsidies reduce electricity prices to 30–45 percent of 
what they would be if full reference prices were paid (fi gure 4.1). Electricity generation 
from oil is currently one of the least-cost options in the Middle East, but it would be 
more expensive than wind, photovoltaic, and even concentrated solar power, absent the 
 FIGURE 4.1 Fossil-Fuel Subsidies in the Middle East Distort Incentives for 
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subsidies. In Saudi Arabia, the removal of gasoline subsidies would reduce the payback 
period of upgrading from a vehicle with average fuel economy to one twice as effi cient 
from 16 to 3 years (fi gure 4.2) (IEA 2014).
As a result, a number of countries fi nd themselves subsidizing both fossil-fuel sub-
sidies and renewables—and sometimes even taxing carbon (Whitley 2013)! Globally, 
total spending on fossil-fuel subsidies amount to about four to fi ve times total spend-
ing on renewable energy—about $121 billion in 2013 (IEA 2014). 
By encouraging overconsumption of fossil fuels and discouraging renewables and 
energy effi ciency, fossil-fuel subsidies have serious environmental impacts—both 
global and local. The IEA estimates that phasing out consumption-related subsidies in 
the 40 countries covered in its data set would cut global energy-related CO
2
 emissions 
by about 7 percent by 2020 (IEA et al. 2010). A subsidy phaseout would lead to reduced 
emissions of air pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulate 
matter, which are harmful to human health and cause environmental problems, 
such as acid rain. The human health impacts would be substantial. Outdoor air 
 pollution—primarily from fossil-fuel  combustion—causes more than 3 million pre-
mature deaths each year worldwide. A combination of subsidy reform and corrective 
taxes on fossil fuels could result in a 23 percent reduction in emissions, as well as a 
63 percent decrease in worldwide deaths from outdoor fossil-fuel air pollution (Parry, 
Heine, and Lis 2014).
Although fossil-fuel subsidies tend to occupy the limelight when it comes to envi-
ronmentally harmful subsidies, others exist that also need to be tackled. In particular, 
FIGURE 4.2 Fossil-Fuel Subsidies in the Middle East Lengthen Payback Period for 
Investments in Energy Effi ciency
Source: IEA (2014).
Note: LED = light-emitting diodes; PLDV = pasenger light-duty vehicle.
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reducing the hefty agricultural subsidies that prevail in many countries would also help 
both government budgets and the environment (box 4.1).
Moreover, fossil-fuel subsidies are singularly ineffective instruments to help 
with countries’ competitiveness or to protect the poor—despite the fact that those 
are the very arguments usually invoked in their favor. A review of subsidies in about 
20 countries fi nd that they tend to be highly inequitable: only 7–8 percent of fossil-fuel 
subsidies benefi t the poorest 20 percent of the population, whereas the wealthiest 
20 percent receive on average some 43 percent of benefi ts (Arze del Granado, Coady, 
and Gillingham 2012).
However, even if fossil-fuel subsidies are inequitable in that they benefi t primarily the 
rich, poor households could be harmed by their removal and the associated increases in 
energy prices. Moreover, abrupt subsidy removal can be detrimental to other develop-
ment goals, such as encouraging the shift from traditional biomass to cleaner, but more 
carbon-intensive, fuels for cookstoves (Pachauri et al. 2013). Thus, subsidies need to be 
phased out progressively and to be accompanied by mitigating measures tailored to local 
context to ensure that the reform does not result in an increase in poverty. Fortunately, 
and as discussed in chapter 7, reform frees more than enough resources to allow for 
compensatory measures. In fact, the vast majority of  successful reform episodes were 
accompanied by measures to help the poor (Sdralevich, Sab, and Zouhar 2014). And the 
drop in oil prices is creating an opportunity to eliminating subsidies (box 4.2).
Box 4.1 Agricultural subsidies Are Also Sizable
Both developed and emerging countries heavily subsidize a number of agricultural practices and 
inputs, at a heavy cost to both taxpayers’ pocketbook and health. For instance, China’s agricultural 
subsidies amounted to $73 billion in 2012, of which $17 billion were targeted to agricultural 
inputs (Gale 2013). Such subsidies encourage farmers to overuse pesticides, water, fuel, and, 
most important, nitrogen-based fertilizers, which have a sizable impact on climate change (as they 
release nitrous oxide into the atmosphere). One recent study fi nds that reducing the overapplica-
tion of fertilizers, combined with better water management, could reduce Chinese national green-
house gas emissions by 2–6 percent without compromising food production (Zhang et al. 2013).
Reforming wasteful agricultural subsidies can also free fi nancial resources for supporting 
land-use-based mitigation. The recent reform of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy 
redirects support to the provision of environmental public goods, such as landscapes, farmland 
biodiversity, and climate stability. About 30 percent of the direct payments will be devoted to 
increasing crop rotation, along with maintaining permanent grassland and ecological buffers. 
These measures could increase carbon sequestration from soils and could reduce emissions 
from land-use change or agricultural practices (European Commission 2011). Overall, however, 
the reform’s mitigation potential by 2020 is estimated to be limited—reducing emissions from 
agricultural soils by 3 percent (from 0.5 to 1.0 million tons of carbon dioxide per year) and from 
agricultural practices by about 1.1 percent (7 million tons of carbon dioxide per year) (PBL 2012).
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 Box 4.2 Progress on Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform
Although subsidies remain unacceptably high, progress is being made in eliminating them. 
In the past two years, as illustrated in map B4.2.1, more than 25 countries—many of which are in 
Asia—have introduced signifi cant reforms.
Reforms are arduous and require careful preparation and planning, but success is possible. Out 
of 28 reform episodes that occurred over the past 20 years, 12 can be considered full  successes 
and 11 as partial successes (often because of partial reversals or incomplete implementation; 
IMF 2013). More recently, a number of countries have made great progress:
 ■ The Arab Republic of Egypt adopted signifi cant increases in the price of transport fuels, 
electricity, and natural gas, which should generate $7 billion in savings ($3 billion of which 
are being channeled into health and education spending).
 ■ India liberalized diesel prices, capped subsidies for liquefi ed petroleum gas and increased 
natural gas prices by 50 percent.
 ■ Indonesia combined increases in the prices of gasoline, diesel, and electricity by 
44  percent, 22 percent, and 15 percent, respectively, with a $2.6 billion package of com-
pensation mechanisms.
In addition, China and the United States recently agreed to a peer review exercise in the con-
text of the Group of Twenty to examine remaining subsidies with a goal to further improve their 
energy-pricing policies. Moreover, the current decline in oil prices provides a good opportunity 
to smooth reforms, while the need for fi scal tightening is an increasingly powerful motivation 
for many countries, notably oil producers such as Malaysia, which recently fully eliminated its 
gasoline and diesel subsidy.
MAP B4.2.1 Many Countries Are Moving to Reform Fossil-Fuel Subsidies
Source: World Bank (IBRD 41500, March 2015).
MEXICO
ARGENTINA
ECUADOR
NIGERIA
ANGOLA
A.R. OF
EGYPT
SUDAN REP. OF
YEMEN
OMAN
KUWAIT
BAHRAIN
I. R. OF
IRAN
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
UKRAINE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
CHINA
INDIA
NEPAL
BANGLADESH
MYANMAR
THAILAND
INDONESIA
MALAYSIA
TUNISIA
MOROCCO
GHANA
COUNTRIES IMPLEMENTING
REFORMS IN 2013–2014
IBRD 41500  |  MARCH 2015
Source: IEA (2014).
DD.indb   83 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
84
Decarbonizing Development
The Economics of Carbon Prices—Pretty Straightforward
Carbon prices ensure that the cheapest abatement options are pursued and that fi rms 
equalize marginal abatement costs, a necessary condition for an effi cient transition 
(Nordhaus 1991; Pearce 1991; Pigou 1932). They do so by creating incentives for mar-
kets to use all available levers to reduce emissions: the type of activity pursued, the 
structure of the industry or of the economy, its energy intensity, and the type of fuel 
chosen. Carbon prices encourage producers to decrease the carbon intensity of prod-
ucts, and consumers to lower their consumption of carbon-intensive goods. They 
encourage a shift in favor of less carbon-intensive goods (such as public transporta-
tion) and improved effi ciency of existing capacities (such as carpooling and ecodriv-
ing). They promote the adoption and diffusion of existing abatement technologies. 
And they redirect investment toward cleaner alternatives (such as more effi cient cars).
Carbon-pricing schemes are making inroads (box 4.3). But they still cover only a 
fraction of overall emissions. A major challenge is that they can trigger substantial 
resistance—as in the United States, which failed to pass national legislation, or in 
Australia, which recently repealed its tax. The key to greater acceptability lies in prag-
matic approaches that highlight the many co-benefi ts of carbon pricing, and in the 
complementary policies discussed in chapter 5.
Tax or Cap and Trade? Pragmatism Should Rule
As to how carbon pricing should be done, the choice should be a pragmatic one, 
made on the basis of what is likely to work best given a country’s political and institu-
tional setup (Goulder and Schein 2013). The main instruments to price carbon are 
cap-and-trade schemes and carbon taxes.
Cap and trade and carbon taxes are largely equivalent, but the local context can 
make one easier to implement than the other. On the one hand, a tax may be politically 
unpalatable—a number of jurisdictions have found it easier to implement a carbon 
levy or fee (box 4.4). On the other hand, a cap-and-trade scheme is more complex to 
establish and more costly to administer. All countries already have a tax administration 
in place—and a carbon tax is mostly an extension of well-understood energy or fuel 
taxes—while a new institution must be created for cap and trade. Further, a carbon tax 
would presumably be the responsibility of the ministry of fi nance, making it easier for 
the revenues to be recycled in reduced conventional taxes. With cap and trade, the regu-
lator must not only monitor emissions but also establish a registry for allowances and 
keep track of allowance trades and the associated changes in ownership of allowances.2
Another difference between carbon taxes and cap and trade is that carbon taxes set 
the price but allow the quantity to fl uctuate, whereas cap and trade fi xes a cap on green-
house gas (GHG) emissions while allowing the price to vary.3 As a result, most cap-
and-trade schemes have shown considerable price volatility. Between 2008 and 2014, 
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the carbon price in the EU’s emissions-trading system fell from €30 per ton of CO
2
 to 
€5 per ton in 2014. In California, when the 2000 energy supply crisis encouraged 
power companies to bring back online some older and dirtier plants, the resulting 
increase in the demand for nitrous oxide emission allowances drove prices from $400 
to $70,000 per ton in the peak month.
Indeed, the price of allowances is very sensitive to demand shocks. If activity turns 
out to be lower than expected when allowances were distributed, their price will tend to 
drop. In addition, cap-and-trade schemes interact with overlapping policies, such as 
performance standards or feed-in tariffs, which depress the price of emission quotas by 
making it easier to achieve a given emissions cap (see chapter 8).
Box 4.3 Gaining Momentum on Carbon Pricing
Carbon pricing is gaining momentum: 39 national and 23 subnational jurisdictions globally have 
implemented or are scheduled to implement carbon-pricing instruments (map B4.3.1). Chile 
has enacted a carbon tax expected to generate $160 million in revenues. China has launched 
seven local emissions-trading pilots covering the equivalent of 1.1 billion tons of carbon dioxide 
emissions to test different structures as it prepares to develop a nationwide carbon market that 
would initially cover 3 billion to 4 billion tons of carbon emissions. Together, China’s pilot markets 
make up the second-largest carbon market in the world after Europe and are expected to attract 
tens of billions of dollars of investment. In an initiative initially promoted by the World Bank, 
some 74 national and 23 subnational jurisdictions and more than 1,000 business and institutional 
investors have joined a coalition of fi rst movers supporting carbon pricing.
 MAP B4.3.1 More Countries Are Turning to Carbon Pricing
Source: World Bank (IBRD 41501, March 2015).
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One way to reduce volatility is to allow for the intertemporal banking and borrow-
ing of allowances, whereby fi rms can save excess allowances allocated to them for use in 
the future, or borrow from their future allowances. This approach has been partially 
implemented in the EU emission trading system, where banking is allowed without 
limit, and borrowing is limited to one year (to avoid relying too much on tomorrow’s 
institutions to limit today’s emissions). Other recent proposals to reduce volatility 
include relying on carbon stability reserves (World Bank 2014) or on price ceilings, 
price fl oors, or price corridors, beyond which the government buys or sells unlimited 
allowances to stabilize the price (Knopf et al. 2014).
For most other aspects, the two schemes are largely equivalent (Goulder and Schein 
2013). The trading of emission quotas allows for convergence to a unique carbon price, 
similar to a tax. Free allowances (under a market) and partial exemptions (under a tax) 
can both be used to distribute efforts across fi rms. International competitiveness issues 
may also be tackled with a free output-based allowance under a cap-and-trade system 
and output-based rebates under a tax (see chapter 8). Finally, allowance auctioning or 
sales can make a cap-and-trade scheme raise revenues, just like a tax.
Box 4.4 Public Acceptance of Carbon Taxes: Good Communication Helps
Let’s face it, carbon taxes tend to be unpopular. One reason is that many misunderstand their 
purpose or benefi ts. In Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, interviews 
with policy makers, businesspeople, and the general public on attitudes toward environmental 
tax reforms fi nd that the general public and business consider taxes solely as a means of raising 
revenue, rather than for their incentive effects—which they do not consider effective at infl uencing 
behavior (Dresner et al. 2006).
In British Columbia, part of the public did not understand how a carbon tax could help, given 
that the revenue is “given back to those who pay it” (Harrison and Peet 2012). Indeed, the fact that 
reforms may be fl aunted as being revenue neutral is a common source of misunderstanding and 
frustration. The reality is that even if the public gets the tax proceeds back, it still has to fi nance 
the emission-reduction activities. In addition, the rebates are generally not designed in a way 
that compensate according to emission intensity—meaning that those who are responsible for 
more emissions will necessarily be hit harder. In other words, environmental reforms are usually 
designed to be revenue neutral from the point of view of the government implementing them, but 
not for each individual in society.
One solution to this unpopularity is to clearly communicate how the revenues from taxation 
are used. In Germany, businesses were aware of higher energy taxes but not of the associated 
cuts in payroll taxes. Once they knew the cuts were fi nanced with energy taxes, businesses were 
less likely to disapprove of energy taxes (Dresner et al. 2006). Wording also matters. Few carbon-
pricing instruments in U.S. states and Canadian provinces are offi cially labeled taxes. Instead, 
they are presented as fees, charges, surcharges, payments, and premiums, with slightly different 
legal meanings but sometimes greatly different public perceptions (Rabe and Borick 2012).
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To trigger the right amount of investment in emission-reduction activities, carbon 
prices should grow predictably over time. In the case of a carbon tax, the tax rate can 
simply be set to grow automatically at a fi xed rate above infl ation.4 A good, but theo-
retical, example is the carbon tax examined by the U.S. Congressional Budget Offi ce in 
2011, which was set to automatically grow at 4 percent above infl ation per year (Rausch 
and Reilly 2012). Under cap-and-trade schemes, emission allowances should decrease 
predictably over time (and fi rms should be able to bank and borrow allowances over 
time, as discussed above).
The Many Co-Benefi ts of Carbon Pricing
An important benefi t from carbon-pricing schemes is that they raise revenues. In British 
Columbia, the carbon tax currently provides 3 percent of the province’s budget 
(Harrison 2013), and in Sweden, it contributes 1 percent to 2 percent of the national 
government budget. Carbon pricing may thus offer a potential double dividend by pro-
viding both environmental benefi ts and the possibility of reducing more distortionary 
taxes by recycling carbon revenues: taxing bads (pollutants) rather than goods (labor 
and capital) should allow for a less costly tax system.
Studies suggest that the double dividend can reduce the macroeconomic cost of 
carbon pricing.5 In the United States, a recent study estimates that the gross cost of cap 
and trade (that is, without factoring in the local or global environmental benefi t) would 
be 0.9 percent of gross domestic product for a lump-sum rebate, but only 0.5 percent if 
revenues were recycled to reduce taxes (Goulder 2013). In Sweden and British Columbia, 
where sizable carbon taxes were implemented in 1991 and 2008, respectively, no impact 
on economic growth has been found (Harrison 2013).
An argument less frequently invoked in favor of carbon pricing, but one that adds 
to the potential double dividend, is that it offers a good tax base, at least over the short 
and middle term. It does so because a carbon price is diffi cult to evade. First, carbon 
sources are concentrated, making it easy to measure and monitor physical units of 
energy at the supplier level. In the United States, tax collection covering 80 percent of 
U.S. GHG emissions, and nearly all CO
2
 emissions, could be accomplished by monitor-
ing fewer than 3,000 points: 146 oil refi neries, 1,438 coal mines, and 500 natural gas 
fi elds (Metcalf and Weisbach 2009). As a result, monitoring a carbon-pricing scheme is 
much easier than monitoring other tax bases, such as hours worked, profi ts earned, or 
personal income. Second, an entire infrastructure of meters, bills, and storage tanks are 
already available to objectively measure how much energy is consumed. Third, com-
mercial users have powerful incentives to deduct their energy expenditures, making it 
easy to catch cheating suppliers. Third, the price of energy is typically well established, 
occurring in transparent marketplaces, which makes it more diffi cult to report infl ated 
prices as a mean to evade taxes (Liu 2013).
DD.indb   87 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
88
Decarbonizing Development
The evidence supports the idea that carbon, or energy more generally, is a good tax 
base. In Sweden, evasion of the carbon tax is less than 1 percent, substantially less than 
evasion of the value added tax. In the United Kingdom, evasion of the excise tax 
on diesel is about 2 percent, as opposed to 9 percent for the corporate tax, 11 percent 
for the value added tax, and 17 percent for income taxes (HM Revenue & Customs 
2014). Such relatively high compliance would particularly benefi t the large emitters 
of GHGs—such as China, India, and Indonesia—that suffer from high tax evasion 
(Gordon and Li 2009).
In addition, carbon taxes reduce incentives for fi rms and individuals to stay in the 
informal sector—keep in mind that although conventional taxes (such as wages, sales, 
or profi ts) apply only to the formal sector, a fuel tax applies equally to both the formal 
and the informal sectors. When revenues from the carbon tax are used to reduce other 
conventional taxes, the gap between the tax burden in the formal and the informal 
 sectors decreases, which in turns reduces the incentive to join the informal sector 
(Bovenberg 1999; Goulder 2013). Carbon taxes would also boost total welfare by free-
ing up resources previously spent on tax evasion—possibly signifi cantly lowering the 
cost of the tax. One new study estimates that in countries with higher tax evasion, such 
as China and India, reduced tax evasion can divide the cost of a carbon price by a factor 
of close to 10 (Liu 2013).
An interesting twist here is that some contend that since the objective of a carbon 
tax is to reduce GHG emissions, its very purpose is to erode its own base (that is, reduce 
or even eventually eliminate fossil-fuel consumption). That argument is valid over the 
long term: by the end of the century, once the fi nal objective of carbon neutrality is 
achieved, carbon taxes should no longer be a source of revenue. But in the short and 
middle term, carbon prices are a good source of revenue.
In fact, the expected effect of a carbon tax is not to decrease emissions immediately 
or brutally, as that would be a costly shock to the economy. Instead, a carbon price is 
expected to fi rst progressively reduce the pace at which GHG emissions are growing 
until that growth stops and emissions fi nally start to decrease. Also, the best design for 
a carbon price is to make it grow exponentially over time. Over the fi rst few decades, the 
growing tax rate can thus offset the decreasing base of GHG emissions. For instance, as 
fi gure 4.3 shows, if the United States introduced a carbon tax at $20 per ton in 2012 and 
let it rise by 4 percent above infl ation per year, the tax would reduce emissions from 
5.7 billion to 4.8 billion tons of CO
2
 per year between 2010 and 2050, while increasing 
revenue from $110 billion in 2012 to $340 billion in 2050 (Rausch and Reilly 2012).
Incentives for Land-Use-Based Mitigation
Although carbon-pricing schemes seldom cover land uses—exceptions include carbon 
markets in California, Kyoto, and New Zealand—many countries have implemented 
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performance-based payments that mostly involve public funds to reward landscape 
actors for reducing emissions or sequestering carbon.
Currently, more than 300 payments for ecosystem service schemes have been 
established worldwide to support carbon sequestration, biodiversity, watershed 
 services, and landscape beauty. Brazil’s Bolsa Floresta program offers a monthly 
 payment to low-income households if they commit to zero deforestation and enroll 
their children in school (Ecosystem Marketplace 2015). Ecuador’s Socio Bosque 
 program pays land users for the conservation of natural forests. And China’s Grain 
for Green program aims to convert 20 million hectares of cropland and barren 
land on steep slopes into tree-based plantations—with early results suggesting 
 enormous carbon sequestration benefi ts in soils and tree biomass (Chang et al. 2011; 
Chen et al. 2009).
All together, the largest national programs in China, Costa Rica, Mexico, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States provide payments of more than $6.5 billion per year 
(NCE 2014).Yet such national-level initiatives face two main challenges in getting the 
price right. It is diffi cult to defi ne the payment level that will compensate the many dif-
ferent landscape actors for not pursuing more profi table activities (such as conversion 
of forestland). And because of limited national funds, such schemes are unlikely to 
preserve and increase carbon sinks at the speed and scale needed. Thus, international 
incentive mechanisms—such as for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
FIGURE 4.3 A Rising Rate Can Offset a Declining Tax Base
(Estimated carbon tax revenue and GHG emission reductions from a U.S. carbon 
tax starting at $20 per ton of CO2 in 2014 and growing at 4 percent above infl ation 
per year)
Source: Adapted from Rausch and Reilly (2015).
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degradation and for other forest-based mitigation activities (REDD+)—are being 
developed (box 4.5).
Notes
 1. The International Energy Agency (IEA) measures subsidies only at the consumption level by calcu-
lating the difference between the reference price in a market-based transaction and the actual price 
charged to consumers. The IEA’s estimates represent a lower bound because producer subsidies 
are not necessarily captured. For a discussion of fossil-fuel subsidy methodologies, see Kojima and 
Koplow (2015).
 2. However, cap-and-trade schemes are easier to link across jurisdictions, helping fi rms in one place 
pay for emission reductions in another place, as the joint Québec-California cap-and-trade system 
illustrates (World Bank 2014).
 3. On the one hand, the fact that carbon markets make total emissions exogenous is appeal-
ing for cost-effectiveness, for instance, for governments willing to stick to announced targets 
(Weitzman 1974). On the other hand, exogenous prices help avoid problematic interactions 
Box 4.5 Global Mechanisms to Cut Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation
Increasing international attention and funding have been raised for reducing emissions from 
 deforestation and forest degradation and for other forest-related mitigation activities. At the 
Cancún meeting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2010, 
 member countries agreed to establish an international mechanism, whereby developed countries 
would pay low-income and middle-income countries in the tropics for fi ve types of forest-related 
mitigation activities: (a) reducing emissions from deforestation, (b) reducing emissions from forest 
degradation, (c) conservation of forest carbon stocks, (d) sustainable management of forest, and 
(e) enhancement of forest carbon. That mechanism is known as REDD+ in reference to the fact 
that it is broader than an earlier scheme to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest deg-
radation, known as REDD. REDD+ can be implemented domestically through a mix of instruments, 
including law enforcement and payments for ecosystem services.
The REDD+ fi nancing architecture is still under discussion within the Framework Convention. 
Most of the existing funding related to REDD+ is being made available at the bilateral level, 
mainly from developed countries. Norway has pledged $1 billion for the Amazon Fund, which 
includes incentives for small-scale farmers to invest in more intensive and profi table crop and 
livestock systems (Nepstad et al. 2014); another $1 billion in exchange for a two-year moratorium 
in Indonesia on new concessions for clearing or logging of peat and old-growth forest and the 
eventual defi nition of performance-based payments (Luttrell et al. 2014); and $250 million for 
Guyana. Germany has established a program of about $50 million for early movers in reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (FMECD 2012).
There are also several multilateral funds that can provide performance-based payments 
for land-use-based mitigation. They include the Carbon Fund of the World Bank’s Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility, the Forest Investment Program as part of the Climate Investment Funds, and 
the BioCarbon Fund.
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with other climate policies and avoid large wealth transfers to fossil-fuel-exporting countries 
(Goulder and Schein 2013).
 4. The ideal policy is to make the tax rate grow at the current risk-free interest rate, so that the tax 
increases are slower during slowdowns and faster during economic booms, and the present value 
of the carbon tax remains constant over time.
 5. See the collection of papers and presentations made at the Mercator Research Institute on Global 
Commons and Climate Change’s Public Finance Workshop in May 2013. http://www.mcc-berlin 
.net/en/events/event-detail/article/public-fi nance-workshop.html.
References
Arze del Granado, F. J., D. Coady, and R. Gillingham. 2012. “The Unequal Benefi ts of Fuel Subsidies: 
A Review of Evidence for Developing Countries.” World Development 40: 2234–48.
Bovenberg, A. L. 1999. “Green Tax Reforms and the Double Dividend: An Updated Reader’s Guide.” 
International Tax and Public Finance 6: 421–43.
Chang, R., B. Fu, G. Liu, and S. Liu. 2011. “Soil Carbon Sequestration Potential for ‘Grain for Green’ 
Project in Loess Plateau, China.” Environmental Management 48: 1158–72.
Chen, X., X. Zhang, Y. Zhang, and C. Wan. 2009. “Carbon Sequestration Potential of the Stands under 
the Grain for Green Program in Yunnan Province, China.” Forest Ecology and Management 258: 
199–206.
Dresner, S., L. Dunne, P. Clinch, and C. Beuermann. 2006. “Social and Political Responses to Ecological 
Tax Reform in Europe: An Introduction to the Special Issue.” Energy Policy 34: 895–904.
Ecosystem Marketplace. 2015. “The Forest Conservation Grant Fund (Bolsa Floresta).” Forest 
Carbon Portal. http://www.forestcarbonportal.com/project/forest-conservation-grant-fund 
-bolsa-fl oresta.
European Commission. 2011. “Annex 2B: Assessment of Selected Measures under the CAP for Their 
Impact on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Removals, on Resilience and on Environmental Status 
of Ecosystems” of “Impact Assessment: Common Agricultural Policy towards 2020.” Commission 
staff working paper, European Commission, Brussels.
FMECD (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development). 2012. “REDD Early Movers 
(REM): Rewarding Pioneers in Forest Conservation.” FMECD, Bonn.
Gale, H. F. 2013. “Growth and Evolution in China’s Agricultural Support Policies.” Report 153, 
Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC.
Gordon, R., and W. Li. 2009. “Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible 
Explanation.” Journal of Public Economics 93: 855–66.
Goulder, L. H. 2013. “Climate Change Policy’s Interactions with the Tax System.” Energy Economics, 
40 (Supplement 1): S3–S11.
Goulder, L. H., and A. R. Schein. 2013. “Carbon Taxes versus Cap and Trade: A Critical Review.” 
Climate Change Economics 4: 1350010.
Harrison, K. 2013. “The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax.” OECD Environment 
Working Paper, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
Harrison, K., and C. Peet. 2012. “Historical Legacies and Policy Reform: Diverse Regional Reactions 
to British Columbia’s Carbon Tax.” BC Studies 184: 97–122.
HM Revenue & Customs. 2014. “Measuring Tax Gaps: 2014 Edition.” UK Government, London.
IEA (International Energy Agency). 2014. World Energy Outlook: 2014. Paris: IEA.
IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank. 2010. “Analysis of the Scope of Energy Subsidies and Suggestions 
for the G-20 Initiative.” Joint report prepared for submission to the G-20 Summit, 26–27 June, 
Toronto.
DD.indb   91 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
92
Decarbonizing Development
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2013. Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications. 
Washington, DC: IMF.
Knopf, B., N. Koch, G. Grosjean, S. Fuss, C. Flachsland, M. Pahle, M. Jakob, and O. Edenhofer. 2014. 
“The European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS): Ex-Post Analysis, the Market Stability 
Reserve and Options for a Comprehensive Reform.” FEEM Working Paper 79.2014, Fondazione 
Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, Italy.
Kojima, M., and D. Koplow. 2015. “Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Approaches and Valuation.” Policy Research 
Working Paper 7220, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Liu, A. A. 2013. “Tax Evasion and Optimal Environmental Taxes.” Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 66: 656–70.
Luttrell, C., I. A. P. Resosudarmo, E. Muharrom, M. Brockhaus, and F. Seymour. 2014. “The Political 
Context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Constituencies for Change.” Environmental Science & Policy 
35: 67–75.
Metcalf, G. E., and D. Weisbach. 2009. “The Design of a Carbon Tax.” Harvard Environmental Law 
Review 33: 499–556.
NCE (New Climate Economy). 2014. Better Growth Better Climate: The New Climate Economy Report. 
Washington, DC: NCE.
Nepstad, D., D. McGrath, C. Stickler, A. Alencar, A. Azevedo, B. Swette, T. Bezerra, M. DiGiano, 
J. Shimada, R. S. da Motta, E. Armijo, L. Castello, P. Brando, M. C. Hansen, M. McGrath-Horn, 
O. Carvalho, and L. Hess. 2014. “Slowing Amazon Deforestation through Public Policy and 
Interventions in Beef and Soy Supply Chains.” Science 344: 1118–23.
Nordhaus, W. D. 1991. “A Sketch of the Economics of the Greenhouse Effect.” American Economic 
Review 81: 146–50.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2013. Inventory of Estimated 
Budgetary Support and Tax Expenditures for Fossil Fuels 2013. Paris: OECD.
Pachauri, S., B. J. van Ruijven, Y. Nagai, K. Riahi, D. P. van Vuuren, A. Brew-Hammond, and 
N. Nakicenovic. 2013. “Pathways to Achieve Universal Household Access to Modern Energy by 
2030.” Environmental Research Letters 8: 024015.
Parry, I. W. H., D. Heine, and E. Lis. 2014. Getting Energy Prices Right: From Principle to Practice. 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
PBL (Netherlands Environmental Agency). 2012. “Greening the CAP: An Analysis of the Effects 
of the European Commission’s Proposals for the Common Agricultural Policy 2014–2020.” PBL, 
The Hague.
Pearce, D. 1991. “The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming.” Economic Journal 
101: 938–48.
Pigou, A. C. 1932. The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan.
Rabe, B. G., and C. P. Borick. 2012. “Carbon Taxation and Policy Labeling: Experience from American 
States and Canadian Provinces.” Review of Policy Research 29: 358–82.
Rausch, S., and J. Reilly. 2012. “Carbon Tax Revenue and the Budget Defi cit: A Win-Win-Win 
Solution?” Technical Report 228, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, 
Cambridge, MA.
———. 2015. “Carbon Taxes, Defi cits, and Energy Policy Interactions.” National Tax Journal 
68: 157–78.
Sdralevich, C. A., R. Sab, and Y. Zouhar. 2014. Subsidy Reform in the Middle East and 
North Africa: Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead. Washington, DC: International 
Monetary Fund.
Weitzman, M. L. 1974. “Prices vs. Quantities.” Review of Economic Studies 41: 477–91.
DD.indb   92 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
93
Getting Prices Right
Whitley, S. 2013. “Time to Change the Game: Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Climate.” Overseas Development 
Institute, London.
World Bank. 2014. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Zhang, W., Z. Dou, P. He, X.-T. Ju, D. Powlson, D. Chadwick, D. Norse, Y.-L. Lu, Y. Zhang, L. Wu, 
X.-P. Chen, K. G. Cassman, and F.-S. Zhang. 2013. “New Technologies Reduce Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Nitrogenous Fertilizer in China.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
110: 8375–80.
DD.indb   93 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
DD.indb   94 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
95
5.  Building Policy Packages 
That Are Acceptable, Credible, 
and Effective
■ Policy packages are needed that complement prices in cases of multiple market and  government 
failures—or that substitute for them where prices are ineffective at changing behaviors.
■ These policies need to ensure that needed technologies are available and affordable, the 
 necessary infrastructure is in place to offer viable alternatives, and that other factors, such as 
behavior, that reduce the impact of price incentives are taken care of.
■ Even in the absence of a carbon price, these policies will deliver emission reductions. Further, 
they lower the carbon price required for decarbonization and make the economy more energy 
effi cient, thereby reducing economic and social disruptions from climate policies and increas-
ing their acceptability.
Carbon prices are necessary for the effi ciency of the transition, but, alone, they will not 
be enough to generate the needed shifts in investments and behaviors. The reason is 
because carbon prices can address only one market failure—the fact that the costs of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution is not captured by markets. Yet in reality, many  market 
and government failures combine to make climate change such a complex problem. 
Thus, complementary measures and investments are needed to make individuals and 
fi rms more responsive to prices.
This chapter explores a variety of policies that would complement prices, or that 
would substitute for them where they are ineffective instruments. It focuses on three 
areas: (a) policies to ensure that the needed technologies are available and deployed at 
the required pace and cost, (b) infrastructure to offer viable alternatives to carbon-
intensive options, and (c) behavioral issues and other implementation barriers.
Together, those policies accomplish two objectives (Bertram et al. 2015; Hallegatte, 
Fay, and Vogt-Schilb 2013). First, they directly reduce emissions and help countries 
progress toward full decarbonization. That objective is particularly important in  sectors 
where pricing solutions remain ineffective or insuffi cient. For example, a carbon price 
cannot replace energy-effi ciency regulations in buildings. Second, those policies reduce 
the carbon price needed to achieve the transition to carbon neutrality, making it less 
disruptive and more acceptable. 
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Ensuring the Needed Technologies Are Available and Affordable
The transition to a low-carbon economy will require substantial innovation. Although 
existing technologies should be enough to keep the world on track for warming below 
2°C until 2050, new technologies will be needed beyond 2050, such as biofuel  electricity 
production with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) (Guivarch and Hallegatte 
2013; IPCC 2014; Pacala and Socolow 2004; Tavoni and Socolow 2013; World Bank 
2010). Those technologies do not exist today—the most advanced are barely at the 
pilot stage—and are unlikely to emerge without a lot of investment in research and 
development (R&D) and pilot projects. Further, even the technologies will need to be 
fully deployed and brought to scale. So the technology challenge of a low-carbon 
 transition includes both innovation and deployment. 
The Innovation Challenge
Green innovation suffers from a double market failure. The fi rst is the environmental 
externality, which can be tackled using carbon-pricing instruments. The second is the 
same knowledge externality that plagues all innovation and results in levels of innova-
tion that are below what is socially desirable (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003). Because 
new knowledge can be acquired at a low cost by competitors, innovations generally 
produce benefi ts beyond what their inventor can fully capture.1 As a result, government 
action is required to promote socially optimal levels of new knowledge production, 
research, or training (Dutz and Sharma 2012). 
Furthermore, economic actors generally prefer to do what they are already set up for 
and are good at, so they tend to innovate and invest in technologies that are already 
mature and have a large market share, thereby locking in carbon-based technologies 
and sectors (Acemoglu et al. 2012). One solution might be to impose a carbon price 
higher than the marginal cost of carbon, but that would impose unnecessarily high 
costs in the short term. Instead, the optimal strategy is to kick-start the transition by 
temporarily supporting investment in low-carbon technologies and sectors (Acemoglu 
et al. 2012; Rosendahl 2004). 
There are many other reasons governments may want to target support to green 
innovation. First, the knowledge externality argument is in fact greater for green inno-
vation, given that returns on low-carbon innovation are likely to be realized over longer 
time horizons than in other domains (such as information and communication tech-
nologies). Green innovation may thus be less well supported by traditional intellectual 
property rights instruments such as patents and may require additional encourage-
ment. Although a 20-year patent is more than suffi cient for cell phone innovations that 
offer a rapid return on R&D investment, such a time horizon may be too short to 
motivate investments in innovation in solar panels or electric cars (Gerlagh, Kverndokk, 
and Rosendahl 2014).
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Second, green innovation appears to offer more growth benefi ts than brown 
 innovation (Dechezleprêtre, Martin, and Mohnene 2013). Clean technology R&D has 
economic benefi ts that spill over throughout the economy via new knowledge 
 diffusion—comparable with those from robotics, information technology, and nano-
technologies, and is much larger than those from fossil-based technologies (fi gure 5.1). 
In other words, new clean technologies may represent a source of economic growth as 
large as that of other frontier-emerging technologies, and possibly some 50 percent 
higher than fossil-based technologies. That is likely because green innovations have 
broader applications throughout the economy than dirty innovation, and they tend to 
be radically new compared with innovation in the brown technologies, which tend to 
be more incremental.
Third, targeted support is needed when the potential of one low-carbon technology 
is deemed to be superior to another (Bramoullé and Olson 2005; del Rio Gonzalez 
2008). Specifi c support to solar energy production—as opposed to other carbon-free 
electricity production technologies such as wind power—is justifi ed by the larger 
potential of this technology to solve the clean-energy challenge at low cost. The current 
relatively high costs make it unlikely for solar energy to be massively deployed with 
only horizontal (nontargeted) support to carbon-free electricity production or a 
 carbon price (which would trigger investments in cheaper wind energy). A feed-in 
FIG URE 5.1 Green Innovation Generates Much Greater Knowledge Spillovers than 
Brown Innovation
Source: Adapted from Dechezleprêtre, Martin, and Mohnen (2013). 
Note: Knowledge spillovers are measured by patent citation and are normalized in an index set to a baseline of zero for biotechnology, 
the technology that happens to have the average spillover.
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 tariff that favors solar over wind may thus be more effi cient in the medium to long run 
than technology-neutral feed-in tariffs (designed as a function of GHG emissions of 
electricity production) that incentivize electricity providers to choose today’s cheapest 
low-carbon technology (Azar and Sandén 2011).
Fourth, sometimes carbon prices cannot be implemented, or are implemented at 
suboptimal levels. In such a case, direct support may be desirable, especially in 
 sectors where green technologies may eventually compete with carbon-based tech-
nologies even with no or insuffi cient carbon pricing. One example is hybrid cars. 
Another is photovoltaic solar electricity, which is already competitive in some 
 markets (such as off-grid, small-scale electricity supply) and may become competi-
tive as soon as 2020 in countries with the appropriate potential (de La Tour, Glachant, 
and Ménière 2013; IEA 2014a).
Fifth, innovation in low-carbon technologies facilitates the eventual adoption of 
carbon prices. Economic actors are more likely to accept a carbon price if there are 
alternatives to carbon-intensive technologies and lifestyles—such as an affordable 
plug-in hybrid electric car. And when alternatives are palatable, lower price hikes are 
needed to change behaviors. 
To date, innovation in low-carbon technologies has been concentrated in a few 
leading countries, such as Germany and the United States (World Bank 2012). 
Elsewhere, the focus is on adapting and tailoring those technologies to the local con-
text. Governments can help support dissemination of new technologies, notably 
through education policies to ensure that there are enough scientists and engineers 
locally to adapt the technologies. Access to low-carbon technologies can also be 
improved with openness to international trade. Eliminating tariff and nontariff barri-
ers in developing countries would signifi cantly increase the diffusion of energy- effi cient 
lighting and renewable power generation (World Bank 2008). 
Technology and skill transfer also occur through the movements of people attached 
to multinational corporations or from the diaspora and through the purchase of man-
ufacturing equipment on global markets. That channel was critical in the ability of 
Chinese producers to become world leaders in photovoltaic panel production (De La 
Tour, Glachant, and Ménière 2011). Also, Indian windmill manufacturer Sulzon estab-
lished R&D offi ces in Germany and the Netherlands, making it easier for its staff to 
learn from local expertise.
Specifi c trade policies can accelerate technology transfers, for instance, by requiring 
local content and technology transfers when contracts are signed with more advanced 
countries. For instance, when Morocco hired a French company to build the Casablanca 
tramway and provide high-speed train connection with Rabat, the contract included 
technology transfers and the construction of a local factory to produce parts (beam 
and wire) for the domestic and international markets. 
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Finally, countries lagging in the innovation process can become innovators 
 themselves. In some cases, low-carbon technologies may be suffi ciently different 
from traditional alternatives that new countries do not start at a disadvantage in the 
competition. For instance, traditional automakers have accumulated more than a 
c entury’s worth of expertise on technologies, such as internal combustion engines and 
mechanical transmission. A shift to electric vehicles would reduce their technology 
advantage and make it easier for new entrants to compete in the automobile sector.
The Deployment Challenge
The mere existence of carbon-free technologies does not ensure that they are scaled up 
at the pace and to the extent needed for both availability and affordability. Rather, 
 specifi c policies may be needed to encourage sunrise sectors or technologies and help 
them take on the many challenges that any new technology or product would face 
(Hallegatte, Fay, and Vogt-Schilb 2013). 
The Obstacles
Such policies should tackle several obstacles to technology deployment.
Policy credibility. A price signal is unlikely to provide enough incentive to deploy exist-
ing technologies. For instance, given the expected lifetime of power plants, a credible 
carbon price pathway would need to be announced at least three decades in advance to 
spur the optimal amount of investment in low-carbon power plants. But doing so is 
diffi cult, because governments have a very limited ability to commit over such long 
periods (Brunner, Flachsland, and Marschinski 2012; Helm, Hepburn, and Mash 
2003)—as Australia’s recent reversal on carbon taxes illustrates. Thus, where reducing 
emissions requires dealing with investments with long-term consequences (such as 
infrastructure, R&D, and long-lived capital), additional regulations, norms, or direct 
investments are needed (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2011).
Economies of scale and latent comparative advantage. Technology deployment is ham-
pered by market failures, such as economies of scale and latent comparative  advantage—
that is, a comparative advantage that can be realized only if public action allows the 
economy to get out of a low-productivity trap. To correct such market failures, govern-
ments may need to temporarily support the uptake of some technologies (Harrison and 
Rodríguez-Clare 2009; Kahn and Blankenburg 2009; Rodrik 2004). The case of solar 
panels in China illustrates the potential of green sectors that are based on a latent com-
parative advantage that could not have grown without initial support. It also illustrates 
the role of increasing returns, because the recent drop in production costs can be largely 
explained by scale effects (including direct scale effects and material and equipment 
 discounts) rather than by labor costs or land subsidies (Goodrich et al. 2013).2 In this 
context, capturing those opportunities may require that governments discover 
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comparative advantages of their country through exchanges between government orga-
nizations and the private sector (Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare 2009; Rodrik 2004).
In some cases, a latent comparative advantage can be observed ex ante and thus can 
justify a targeted policy, as has been occurring with large-scale renewable energy 
 projects in North Africa. Even though the fi rst projects are more expensive than an 
equivalent fossil-fuel-based production (for example, the Ouarzazate concentrated 
solar plant in Morocco), some countries hope to reduce the price of solar technologies 
to capture the advantage that their climate, solar irradiance, and proximity to the large 
European market offer and to transform solar power into a cheap resource and a pos-
sible new source of export revenues. Renewable energy potential depends on observ-
able country conditions, such as climate and geographic characteristics. But the ability 
to connect to markets is also critical. Take the case of South Africa, where policy makers 
must weigh both solar irradiance and closeness to transmission lines when deciding 
where to install large solar power plants (map 5.1).
Coordination failures. Climate strategies are by essence multisectoral and require 
interagency, intersectoral, and public-private coordination (Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1988; Okuno-Fujiwara 1988; Pack and Westphal 1986; Rosenstein-Rodan 
1943). Increasing the share of electric cars, for instance, requires long-term coordinated 
MAP 5.1 Pinpointing Where to Install Large Solar Power Plants in South Africa 
Source: Fluri (2009). 
Note: DNI stands for direct normal irradiance, a measure of how much solar energy can theoretically be captured at ground level. 
Lighter share corridors are existing transmission lines. Areas in white are not suitable locations due to other reasons (e.g., land is too 
steep). Suitable areas have good DNI, proximity to transmission lines and appropriate land (fl at enough with vegetation that is not 
under threat and a suitable land use profi le).
DNI > 1 kwh/m2 and Distance to transmission > 20 km
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investments by carmakers, electricity providers, and infrastructure providers—which, 
in turn, necessitates adequate institutions (both market and regulatory) and possibly 
some targeted policies. 
The Policy Instruments
How can policy makers tackle these obstacles to deploying green technologies? A solu-
tion is to combine an economy-wide carbon price with sectoral policies that aim spe-
cifi cally at encouraging investment in long-lived equipment or at coordinating 
multisector strategies. Such policies complement carbon prices by ensuring that they 
are effective. But they also deliver emission reductions even in the absence of a carbon 
price. And where prices are distorted, these measures redirect new investments toward 
more effi cient technologies and production capacity. They progressively transform the 
economic system into a more effi cient one that is able to remain competitive when 
carbon prices are introduced (Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, and Hallegatte 2014). It may 
therefore be easier to start with such instruments, which include the following.
Performance standards. Performance standards are commonly used for cars and other 
light-duty vehicles. Currently, 36 countries have imposed performance standards on 
light-duty vehicles (Brazil, Canada, China, the EU countries, India, Japan, Mexico, the 
Republic of Korea, and the United States), and fi ve are studying performance 
 standards for heavy-duty vehicles. The Global Fuel Economy Initiative is working 
with 20  countries to help them increase the effi ciency of their car fl eets. Other sectors 
where performance standards are used include energy-effi cient lighting, household 
appliances, and industrial equipment. Through the United Nations Environment 
Programme–Global Environment Facility en.lighten initiative, 55 countries have com-
mitted to implement policies and measures that will reduce ineffi cient lighting by 2016. 
Energy-effi ciency requirements have also been integrated in building codes, mostly in 
developed countries. Scaling up performance standards for buildings, or key parts of 
buildings (such as windows and ventilations systems), is likely to be critical for achiev-
ing net zero emissions in the building sector (Saheb et al. 2013). Performance standards 
are particularly effi cient when they are announced in advance: doing so allows fi rms 
to develop new products that meet the standards (IEA 2012). Thus, performance 
 standards not only reduce emissions, they also redirect private R&D expenditures 
toward low-carbon options and technologies.
Fiscal instruments (including feebates). Fiscal incentives are often successfully used to 
improve the energy effi ciency of cars (such as feebate programs in European countries 
and an adjusted value added tax [VAT] in South Africa), lighting and appliances (such 
as VAT adjustments in Ghana), and buildings (such as subsidized loans to fi nance 
energy-effi ciency improvements). They complement mandatory standards and label-
ing policies. They also sway purchase decisions and in some cases production decisions 
and retail stocking decisions toward high-effi ciency products. VAT reductions for 
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effi cient equipment—notably, compact fl uorescent lamps (CFLs)—constitute the most 
common application for a tax-reduction strategy outside developed countries. Well-
designed feebates have the advantage of being self-fi nanced. Other possible fi scal 
instruments include tax increases for ineffi cient technologies, subsidies, rebates, and 
giveaways (box 5.1). Given that they progressively transform the production system, 
the fi scal incentives prepare the economy and the public to more easily implement or 
phase in higher carbon prices in the medium term (Rozenberg Vogt-Schilb, and 
Hallegatte 2014). Moreover, they do not need to be permanent. In 2003, Ghana elimi-
nated the VAT for CFLs but reintroduced it when incandescent bulbs were phased out 
and CFLs became the most common technology on the market. Subsequently, the 
 government eliminated the VAT for LEDs. 
Regulatory mandates (renewable portfolio standards, or RPS) require electricity 
 producers to include a minimum share of renewable energy in their output mix. They 
are more effi cient when used in combination with tradable renewable certifi cates, 
whereby utilities with excess renewable production can sell certifi cates to utilities that 
produce too little. RPS are used in most U.S. states (IEA 2014b)—typically to regulate 
renewable energy production in the electricity sector but also to mandate the usage of 
biofuels for transportation. In Chile, an RPS requires that 5 percent of electricity sold 
comes from renewable sources (excluding large hydro) by 2015 and up to 10 percent by 
2024. In the United Kingdom, a similar program called renewable obligation sets an 
objective with regard to renewable production but gives producers an option to buy 
unlimited renewable certifi cates from the government at a fi xed price. 
A downside of regulatory mandates is their lack of fl exibility, which can translate 
into high compliance costs. For instance, the United States has set a mandate for retail-
ers to blend bioethanol into gasoline. During the recent economic slowdown, reaching 
the blending mandate—expressed as an absolute volume, not a proportion of gasoline 
sold—was made more diffi cult by the fact that gasoline consumption was stagnating. 
More fl exible options include using a target expressed as the minimum of a given 
 volume and a proportion of gasoline sold, or, better, using price instruments, such as 
fi scal incentives, discussed above, instead of quantity instruments (see also chapter 8). 
Pilot projects partially funded, and sometimes coordinated, by the government help 
lower the cost of capital for risky projects. Morocco hosts two large-scale pilot projects 
to demonstrate the feasibility of concentrated solar power plants. In Brazil, China, and 
India, this approach has been used, in the form of public auctions, to encourage the 
deployment of renewable power plants (Elizondo Azuela et al. 2014), and in many 
European countries such as France and Denmark, it has recently been used for large-
scale offshore wind power. Pilot projects are also used around the world to support the 
uptake of carbon capture and storage (MIT 2015). 
Skills and education. Climate policies affect the demand for skills in three ways: 
(a) structural change increases the demand for skills specifi c to expanding industries, 
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BOX 5.1 Fisc al Instruments to Encourage Demand for Clean Technology 
Products
Cars
In France, the Bonus-Malus program paid 2009 buyers of cars emitting a maximum of 160 grams 
of carbon dioxide (CO2) per kilometer (209 grams per mile) a bonus ranging from $250 to $6,400, 
depending on emissions levels. A fee for high-emission vehicles was introduced to fi nance the 
scheme. The feebate program resulted in an immediate drop of 7 grams of CO2 per kilometer 
for new vehicles. Fees and rebates have been updated frequently, because the success of the 
measure was underestimated and the initial structure led to a high budgetary cost. Today, rebates 
focus on providing sizable subsidies to very effi cient vehicles ($4,500 for vehicles that emit fewer 
than 60 grams per kilometer), and fees for ineffi cient vehicles reach almost $9,000. Similar fee-
bate programs have been enacted in other European countries (including Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), at the state level in the United States, and at the 
provincial level in Canada.
Energy-effi cient lighting
In Tunisia, exemptions from the value added tax and minimum  customs duty on the import and 
production of compact fl uorescent lamps (CFLs) and a range of other energy-effi ciency equip-
ment materials has been in place since 1995. A tax has been introduced on incandescent lamps 
(10 percent in 2007, 30 percent in 2008, 50 percent in 2011), generating revenues that are used for 
subsidizing CFLs. In the Republic of Korea, domestic residents seeking to invest in energy-saving 
facilities, as designated by the president’s executive order excluding investments in  secondhand 
equipment, can apply for a tax waiver (20 percent of total investment cost) from income or cor-
porate tax. The tax incentive covers investments across sectors. Lighting products targeted 
include single-phase electric motors, fl uorescent lamps, ballasts for fl uorescent lamps, CFLs, high- 
luminance refl ectors for fl uorescent lamps, and sensor lighting equipment.
Appliances
In Mexico, the Electric Power Savings Trust Fund and the Federal Electricity Commission started 
the Program for Financing of Electric Energy Saving, which fi nances the  substitution of old, inef-
fi cient refrigerators and air conditioners with modern and more effi cient equipment. The program 
also provides fi nancial support for thermal insulation of homes. The cost of more effi cient light-
ing is fi nanced through a credit paid on electricity bills, which is largely recovered because of 
reduced electricity costs. The fi rst phase of the program ran from 2002 to 2006, with approximately 
30,000 homes being insulated and about 130,000 refrigerators and 623,000 air-conditioning units 
being replaced.
In China, an upstream subsidy program began with a CFL promotion program in 2008. A total 
of 210 million subsidized CFLs were sold to consumers between 2008 and 2009, resulting in 
estimated electricity savings of 8,800 gigawatt-hours each year. In June 2009, the government 
extended the incentive program to air conditioners, offering subsidies of $72 to $122 per unit for 
effi cient products, rated as grade 1 in the Chinese label system and $45 to $95 per unit for grade 
2 products. Local governments were encouraged to provide additional subsidies. By early February 
2010, about 5 million subsidized high-effi ciency air conditioners had been sold, leading to a reduc-
tion of 1.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. In June 2012, the Chinese government extended the 
program to include other appliances: TVs, refrigerators, washing machines, and water heaters.
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such as renewable energy, and reduces the demand for skills, such as those for coal 
 mining; (b) new occupations are emerging, such as photovoltaic fi tters; and (c) the 
content of many jobs is affected by companies’ stronger focus on effi ciency and clean 
energy (Strietska-Ilina et al. 2011). For instance, increasing carbon sinks requires new 
practices that go beyond traditional agricultural techniques, such as soil and water 
 conservation, agroforestry, and grazing land management. That said, few unique green 
skills exist, and the observed skill scarcity arises mostly from generic failings in educa-
tion and training. Those failings range from poorly functioning education systems and 
the mismatch between students’ choices of discipline and the needed skills to the lack 
of incentives for employers to invest in developing the transferable skills of their work-
forces, the poor’s lack of access to training, and the stickiness of relative pay rates 
(World Bank 2012). The transition toward a low-carbon economy may however 
 exacerbate those issues, making it even more urgent and important to increase enroll-
ment in technical secondary and tertiary education in developing countries and to 
improve the quality of education in those domains.
Another policy that can be introduced in parallel or in anticipation of the introduc-
tion of a carbon price is to increase investment in the infrastructure that is needed to 
support a more energy-effi cient, less carbon-intensive economy. 
Ensuring the Needed Infrastructure Is in Place
People’s ability to change their behavior in response to a carbon price or energy tax 
depends on the existence of an alternative—preferably, a safe, convenient, inexpensive 
one. But such alternatives often depend on the appropriate infrastructure being avail-
able. Take the following two examples.
Transport and urban forms. Transport is responsible for 14 percent of global GHG 
emissions, and the sector is considered as one of the most diffi cult to decarbonize—
notably because of its reliance on large-scale infrastructure (such as road networks, 
urban forms, and railways). Two (nonexclusive) options are usually considered. The 
fi rst is to maintain current shares of various transport modes but to replace vehicles by 
carbon-free vehicles such as electric cars (charged with carbon-free electricity)—a 
move that will require large investments in electricity-charging infrastructure. The 
 second is to modify modal shares by reducing the number of individual vehicles and 
increasing public transit. But this option requires urban forms that favor public transit, 
namely, higher density around train stations and bus stops. 
As it turns out, studies fi nd that urban planning that promotes densifi cation and 
investments in public transportation infrastructure substantially increases the elastic-
ity of energy demand to carbon price. In other words, prices will work better in chang-
ing behaviors if combined with infrastructure development (box 5.2). For example, the 
huge difference in the availability of public transport infrastructure may explain the 
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 BOX 5.2 Combining Carbon Pricing with Infrastructure Development in 
Paris
Just how important is the existence of a public transit system for making carbon prices change 
behaviors? A recent study of Paris concludes that it is very effective (Avner, Rentschler, and 
Hallegatte 2014). The authors calibrate a transport–land-use model with two different cities: 
Paris as it existed in 2010 and a counterfactual Paris in which no public transport infrastruc-
ture would have been built. They then compare the resulting carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and 
their response to carbon pricing. They fi nd that a €200 per ton of CO2 carbon tax results in emis-
sions dropping by 16 percent when public transport is available, compared with a little less than 
10  percent without public transport (fi gure B5.2.1). That means that in the medium run, a €200 per 
ton of CO2 carbon tax is over 60 percent more effective when a modal shift is possible, and in the 
short run (until 2014), it is 130 percent more effective. 
How about the carbon tax required to achieve a given abatement objective? The study fi nds 
that without public transport, achieving a 6 percent decrease in CO2 emissions would require 
FIGURE B5.2.1 Carbon Taxes Work Best When Public Transport Is Available
(Relative impact of carbon taxes on commuting-related emission levels in the 
Paris metropolitan area in 2020 for scenarios with and without public transport) 
Source: Avner, Rentschler, and Hallegatte (2014). 
Note: Where the horizontal green dashed line crosses the blue and green curves, we can read on the X-axis the  corresponding 
carbon tax starting values that must be implemented in 2012 to achieve a 6 percent reduction in CO2 emissions. 
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gap between low gasoline taxes in the United States (with limited availability of public 
transport and high dependence on private cars) and high gasoline taxes in Europe 
(with much lower reliance on individual cars). In the absence of alternatives, public 
acceptability of gasoline taxes is much lower in the United States. 
As emphasized in chapter 3, a key aspect of transportation infrastructure is that it 
takes time to develop. Moreover, once a city has developed and sprawled without a public 
transit option, it is extremely diffi cult, if not impossible, to retrofi t it (since good public 
transit requires density). For cities to enjoy the benefi ts of good public transport infra-
structure, they must therefore act early. Early action is particularly important for devel-
oping countries with fast-growing new cities: they face a window of opportunity to act.
Electric grid and renewable power. Another typical example is an electricity transmis-
sion grid, which is especially critical for countries weighing massive expansions of their 
renewable generation capacity (Haller, Ludig, and Bauer 2012). In India, the wind 
resource potential is an estimated 3,000 gigawatts, or approximately 12 times the 
 current total installed electricity production capacity (Phadke, Bharvirkar, and 
Khangura 2011). China is considering a solar photovoltaic road map for 1,000–2,000 
gigawatts of photovoltaic developments by 2050 (Grimes 2014). Renewable power 
development, especially that of intermittent sources such as wind and solar, has taken 
place at an unprecedented rate in many places around the world over the past decade. 
Four important attributes of (grid-connected) wind and solar capacity set them apart 
from their conventional fossil-based power generation counterparts: 
 ■ Renewable energy plants have to be located where the energy source is (sun, 
water, or wind), unlike thermal plants, which are easier to locate close to con-
sumption centers.3
almost double the carbon tax compared with the scenario in which public transport exists (€115 
per ton of CO2 instead of €65 per ton of CO2). But even a tax of €65 per ton of CO2 is large com-
pared with the one debated in France in 2008 (only €17 per ton of CO2). Yet this bill failed in part 
because the fi nancial burden on commuters living far from public transport was considered to be 
too high. 
The limited impact of the carbon tax in reorienting behaviors toward more sustainable loca-
tion and commuting decisions can be explained by the importance of the time cost component 
compared with the monetary component of commuting costs. For instance, a recent study fi nds 
that the cost of time in 2010 represents up to 90 percent of the generalized costs of transport in 
the Paris urban area (Viguié, Hallegatte, and Rozenberg 2014). Thus, even a strong increase in fuel 
prices will only marginally affect generalized costs and travel behavior. In contrast, an effi cient 
public transit system avoids congestion and offers shorter trips.
 BOX 5.2 Combining Carbon Pricing with Infrastructure Development in 
Paris (continued)
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 ■ Since the time required to build wind and solar plants is typically one-third, if 
not less, of a conventional power generation and transmission project, it is criti-
cal that the rest of the power system be ready before those resources start getting 
harnessed at a rapid pace.
 ■ Wind (~35 percent average capacity factor) and solar (~18 percent average 
capacity factor) have much lower capacity utilization limits and higher costs per 
unit of capacity compared with their conventional counterparts (for  example, 
~80 percent for a baseload plant). Consequently, the up-front investment 
needed for an equivalent amount of generation (megawatt-hours) is typically 
three to four times higher for intermittent renewable generation than for typical 
thermal plants. As a result, fewer resources are available to invest in nonrenew-
able  generation and transmission projects, albeit the near zero operating costs 
in wind-based and solar-based generation reduce the need for operating capital. 
 ■ Wind and solar have intraday, seasonal, and interannual variability—which 
means that the rest of the generation, as well as the transmission system, needs 
signifi cant excess capacity. That implies higher investments without necessarily 
increasing the system’s generation potential. It also makes it desirable to inte-
grate energy markets over the largest scale possible—so as to be able to tap a 
large pool of baseload plants and access regions with different wind, sun, and 
hydrological conditions. 
Although these seem like basic facts that should be folded into policy developments, 
the novelty of large-scale renewable means that they have not always been considered 
(Box 5.3).
Although some infrastructure services and investments do respond to market and 
price incentives, an estimated 60 percent to 80 percent of developing-country infra-
structure investments are still in the hands of the public sector, which has a different 
incentive structure. Infrastructure decisions are often driven by concerns other than 
economic ones (say, a desire to integrate the country through a transport network or to 
promote the development of lagging regions). As a result, one cannot expect a carbon 
price to automatically translate into the required changes in infrastructure investments 
and technologies, and specifi c policies may be required. 
The use of shadow carbon pricing can help reorient investment decisions, although 
the correct value to use is the subject of debate. Those governments, fi rms, and institu-
tions that have adopted a shadow price for carbon typically have used values ranging 
between $20 and $60 in 2015, with central fi gures usually around $25 to $40 (fi gure 5.2) 
and increasing over time. The World Bank Group introduced a similar shadow price 
for use in its project assessments (World Bank 2014a). But although a shadow price is 
useful, the decision to invest in the kind of low-carbon infrastructure or to follow more 
effi cient land-use planning will be driven mostly by policy priorities—whether about 
the climate or local and immediate benefi ts, such as lower pollution and congestion.
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 BOX 5.3 Orchestrating Renewable Power Scale-Up—The Case of India and 
Australia
Renewable-based power generation is essential for reducing emissions to near zero levels in the 
long term. It also provides major benefi ts by reducing both atmospheric pollution and reliance on 
fossil fuel. However, experience with efforts to boost the share of renewal energy highlights the 
need for fi rst carefully laying the groundwork—as illustrated in the following two country cases.
Not Enough Preparation in India
Over the past decade, India has embarked on a number of ambitious wind and solar expansion 
plans. As a result, total wind and solar grid-connected capacity of 25 gigawatts reached 10 percent 
of total installed capacity in October 2014, from a near zero base 10 years before. The bulk of 
that investment—about 7.4 gigawatts of wind power—occurred in the southern state of Tamil 
Nadu thanks to private developers. That development has many positive aspects, including less 
reliance on the state’s 10 gigawatts of the coal and gas generator fl eet. However, it has come at 
an expense. The baseload generation and transmission line development in Tamil Nadu took a 
backseat for the better part of the past decade, because most of the funding was channeled into 
lucrative wind deals. 
As a result, close to 1,000 megawatts of wind capacity were effectively off grid in 2012, and 
the lack of backup generation capacity led to a massive 33 percent peak and energy defi cit in the 
state in 2010/11 (Chattopadhyay 2014). Not surprisingly, under these circumstances, since 2013, 
there has been a shift to reduce incentives for wind power development and a renewed focus on 
bolstering backup generation and transmission investment. Better foresight in policy development 
and power system planning could have minimized those negative impacts of an unplanned growth 
in renewables.
Careful Preparation in Australia
In contrast, the benefi ts of a carefully planned transition to a low-carbon state are visible in 
Australia—a country that is endowed with abundant solar and wind resources and that has been 
under considerable pressure from the international community to reduce its reliance on coal for 
power generation.
Australia started out slowly in the 1990s with a renewable energy target of about 5 percent 
of total electricity in 2010 and 20 percent by 2020. A signifi cant parallel effort was under way to 
promote gas-based generation, in part to improve the diversity and fl exibility of the generation 
system. That effort showed a remarkable degree of foresight and resulted in Australia’s enjoying 
a signifi cant generation capacity reserve margin. A new Scale Effi cient Network Extension 
mechanism was also explored to support developing transmission lines to connect major wind 
hubs (AEMC 2011). Even so, the rapid expansion of wind has run into minor problems (such as 
greater congestion and diffi culty in managing some of the lignite-based baseload capacity). New 
transmission projects are being developed to create much stronger interconnections across the 
states, thereby facilitating both new generation development and the management of the existing 
fl eet of coal generation.
This box was contributed by Deb Chattopadhyay. 
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Tackling Other Factors—Such as Behavior—That Reduce the Impact 
of Price Incentives
Economies of scale, incomplete information, and lack of infrastructure are all argu-
ments used to advocate policies that will boost demand for low-carbon solutions and 
enable them to be quickly scaled up and their costs reduced. But there may well be 
other types of market failures and behavioral obstacles to their quick deployment. 
Figure 5.3 summarizes some of the obstacles that may require specifi c actions. 
Incentives 
The fi rst question is whether individuals and fi rms face the right incentives. Of course, 
incentives are distorted in the presence of subsidies for fossil fuels and in the absence of 
pricing of the climate externality. But bad incentives can also be due to other market or 
government failures. For example, a common market failure is what is known as the 
principal-agent problem—landlords who are reluctant to invest in energy effi ciency if 
the tenant pays the heating bill, or employees who ignore energy-effi ciency measures 
because their employer pays the energy bill. 
As to government failures, many countries have enacted energy-effi ciency 
 requirements for new buildings without implementing measures to enforce them. 
 FIGURE 5.2 Institutions with a Shadow Carbon Price Use a Range of Value That 
Increases over Time 
Source: World Bank (2014a).
Note: EIB = European Investment Bank; IEA = International Energy Agency; WBG = World Bank Group.
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Where regulations exist but are not enforced, better law enforcement can be an effective 
and low-cost strategy. In Brazil, enforcing existing laws caused deforestation to drop by 
70 percent between 2005 and 2013 (Nepstad et al. 2014). That was accomplished by 
requiring landholders to submit their property boundaries and enabling government 
agencies to use satellite data, while expanding fi eld operations and visibly applying 
fi nes and penalties (Assunção, Gandour, and Rocha 2013). Programs, such as REDD+ 
can be an important transitional tool to strengthen institutional capacities and reforms 
for better law enforcement.
Effective monitoring, verifi cation, and reporting mechanisms are needed for better 
enforcement of laws, regulations, and pricing instruments. However, establishing such 
mechanisms is diffi cult in all sectors. For instance, verifying that new or retrofi tted 
constructions are compliant with building energy-effi ciency regulations is diffi cult and 
may explain the reluctance of homeowners to invest more. It has also proved extremely 
challenging in land-use sectors in developing countries, where a large number of 
 generally very heterogeneous and dispersed land users in remote areas are involved. 
Relying on local communities for monitoring could reduce implementation costs and 
increase local ownership (Danielsen et al. 2011; Larrazábal et al. 2012; Palmer Fry 
2011). The use of new technologies for data collection, such as low-cost satellite imag-
ery, cloud computing, and mobile phones provides low-cost opportunities for better 
enforcement of existing regulation at low costs.
Information 
If incentives are correct, a second issue has to do with the availability of information 
and how individuals process it. Information may not be available about the energy 
effi ciency of a product. Or it may be that individuals tend to rely on simple rules of 
 FIGURE 5.3 How to Assess the Obstacles to Low-Carbon Solutions 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2013).
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thumb rather than carefully processing the available information. Hence, information 
disclosure efforts are often seen as a key step toward getting individuals to adopt more 
socially desirable behaviors (“if only they knew …”). For instance, energy-effi ciency 
labels for appliances exist in some 40 countries worldwide (CLASP 2015). Those labels 
provide information, such as electricity consumption, in kilowatt-hours per year, that 
is expected from a refrigerator or a particular dwelling, and are sometimes comple-
mented with estimated expenses from energy consumption. Forest certifi cation 
 programs (such as through the Forest Stewardship Council or the Rainforest Alliance) 
have been established for the environmentally friendly production of forest products. 
Similarly, multistakeholder roundtables—such as for palm oil, soybeans, sugarcane and 
sugar-cane ethanol, biofuels, and beef—have helped develop performance standards 
and principles for sourcing major commodities from deforestation-free sustainable 
practices (Nepstad et al. 2013). 
The record of information disclosure programs is mixed, although they are effective 
if done well (Davis and Metcalf 2014; Kallbekken, Sælen, and Hermansen 2013; Nepstad 
et al. 2014; World Bank 2014b). Some labeling reports information that is too abstract, 
too vague, or too diffi cult to understand. Thus, the kilometers-per-gallon or miles-per-
gallon measure used to evaluate vehicle fuel effi ciency has been found to lead people to 
undervalue the fuel and cost savings of replacing ineffi cient vehicles (Larrick and Soll 
2008). In fact, better labeling, focused on estimated lifetime costs, has been found to 
lead to better choices (Davis and Metcalf 2014). How the information is presented 
(in novel or vivid ways) is also important, given people’s limited attention span 
(Sunstein 2013). 
Behavior 
But even if information is available, individuals do not necessarily behave according to 
economic theory. World Development Report 2015 (World Bank 2014b) is devoted to 
this topic, with a chapter on how behavioral issues contribute to the climate change 
challenge. The following are a few of the key issues: 
 ■ Evidence abounds about people being tempted by the low price of a refrigerator 
(Tsvetanov and Segerson 2014) or being inconsistent in their treatment of time 
(Ainslie 1975). The implication is that even with good information, people may 
not purchase a cost-effective energy-effi cient appliance. 
 ■ People are easily infl uenced by social norms. The often-quoted experience of 
the U.S. Opower energy conservation program—in which home energy reports 
were mailed to residential utility customers, providing them with feedback on 
how their own energy use compared with that of their neighbors—illustrates the 
strengths and limitations of the use of social norms in energy conservation pro-
grams (Allcott 2011). The effect was shown to be strong—with energy consump-
tion reduced by 2 percent, equivalent to an increase in electricity prices of about 
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11–20 percent—but to decrease rapidly over time. However, as the experience 
was repeated, new habits were formed, with homeowners investing in new appli-
ances or developing new consumption habits (Allcott and Rogers 2014). That 
said, social norms programs need to be used carefully, so they do not backfi re 
and result in high energy savers, reducing their efforts to bring their consump-
tion down to that of their peer group’s average. 
 ■ People tend to stick with the default option, which is why many energy compa-
nies are now setting the default program for consumers to be the greener but 
more expensive tariff, which consumers can opt out of. In southern Germany, 
the energy company Energiedienst GmbH found that 94 percent of its custom-
ers stayed with the default green option, whereas only 4 percent switched to a 
cheaper one, 1 percent switched to a more expensive greener one, and 1 percent 
switched to another supplier (Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2008). 
A critical challenge has to do with the salience—that is, the importance or the 
 visibility—of the issue. Thus, fi rms for which energy costs are a small share of overall 
costs—or wealthy individuals for whom energy costs are a small share of their income—
may choose not to devote attention to what is a small issue calling on their limited time 
and attention span. Thus, it appears as if business investments in energy effi ciency in 
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
require rates of return substantially higher than for investments with comparable risks 
(Center for Sustainable Energy [2012] as cited in World Bank [2014b]). More generally, 
the smaller the energy cost of a product relative to its purchase price, the more likely it is 
that consumers will not include energy-effi ciency issues in their choice of appliance or 
technology (Sallee 2013). For example, as fi gure 5.4 shows, the relatively high lifetime 
energy costs of air conditioners and incandescent lightbulbs (compared with their price) 
stand out more than the case of a typical refrigerator, meaning that pricing solutions are 
more likely to be effective on the former than on the later (Allcott and Greenstone 2012).
Further, producers may not offer innovations that could pay for themselves, because 
they are not visible (hence, salient) to the consumers. A case in point is the automobile 
sector, where more cost-effective, but invisible-to-consumer effi ciency improvements 
(such as low-friction lubricants, engine friction reduction, and variable valve timing) 
are not implemented, but far less cost-effective deployments (advanced diesel engines 
and turbocharging) are (Sallee 2013). 
Financial Resources 
A fi nal obstacle is the challenge of accessing the fi nancial resources required to act. 
Most green or energy-effi ciency improvements require an up-front additional cost that 
is expected to generate a fl ow of savings, but coming up with the needed fi nance will be 
tough for fi rms and individuals that are credit constrained. This topic is discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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Notes
 1.  This problem is compounded by information asymmetry in capital markets: competitive innova-
tive projects often struggle to fi nd the necessary funding, because investors lack the knowledge 
and information needed to assess the quality of innovative and risky projects, especially when 
technical details cannot be shared by the developers without risking competitors’ reproducing 
their innovation.
 2.  Overcapacity led to a drop in prices that was even larger than the production-cost reduction. 
 3.  Note that transport costs create an incentive to build power plants close to infrastructure or fuel 
extraction locations, especially for lignite, which is very expensive to transport. 
References
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, L. Bursztyn, and D. Hemous. 2012. “The Environment and Directed 
Technical Change.” American Economic Review 102: 131–66.
AEMC (Australian Energy Market Commission). 2011. Scale Effi cient Network Extensions. Final Rule 
Determination ERC0100, Australian Energy Market Commission, Sydney. http://www.aemc 
.gov.au/Rule-Changes/Scale-Effi cient-Network-Extensions.
Ainslie, G. 1975. “Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse Control.” 
Psychological Bulletin 82: 463.
Allcott, H. 2011. “Social Norms and Energy Conservation.” Journal of Public Economics 95: 1082–95.
Allcott, H., and M. Greenstone. 2012. “Is There an Energy Effi ciency Gap?” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 26: 3–28.
Allcott, H., and T. Rogers. 2014. “The Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Behavioral Interventions: 
Experimental Evidence from Energy Conservation.” American Economic Review 104: 3003–37.
FIGU RE 5.4 What Matters Is the Relative Lifetime Energy Cost
Source: Allcott and Greenstone (2012). 
Li
fe
tim
e 
en
er
gy
 c
os
ts
 ($
)
Ra
tio
 o
f l
ife
tim
e 
en
er
gy
 c
os
ts
 fo
r p
ric
e
100,000
1,000
100
1
0.1
10
10
1
Ho
use
Tru
ck 
(16
 M
PC
pic
kup
)
Ca
r (2
9 M
PC
sed
an
)
Air
 co
nd
itio
ne
r
Re
frig
era
tor
Wa
shi
ng
ma
chi
ne
Flu
ore
sce
nt
lig
htb
ulb
Inc
an
de
sce
nt
lig
htb
ulb
10,000
Lifetime energy cost Lifetime energy cost/price
DD.indb   113 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
114
Decarbonizing Development
Assunção, J., C. Gandour, and R. Rocha. 2013. “DETERring Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: 
Environmental Monitoring and Law Enforcement.” Climate Policy Initiative, Rio de Janeiro.
Avner, P., J. E. Rentschler, and S. Hallegatte. 2014. “Carbon Price Effi ciency: Lock-In and Path 
Dependence in Urban Forms and Transport Infrastructure.” Policy Research Working Paper 
6941, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Azar, C., and B. A. Sandén. 2011. “The Elusive Quest for Technology-Neutral Policies.” Environmental 
Innovation and Societal Transitions 1: 135–39.
Bertram, C., G. Luderer, R. C. Pietzcker, E. Schmid, E. Kriegler, and O. Edenhofer. 2015. “Complementing 
Carbon Prices with Technology Policies to Keep Climate Targets within Reach.” Nature Climate 
Change 5: 235–39.
Bramoullé, Y., and L. J. Olson. 2005. “Allocation of Pollution Abatement under Learning by Doing.” 
Journal of Public Economics 89: 1935–60.
Brunner, S., C. Flachsland, and R. Marschinski. 2012. “Credible Commitment in Carbon Policy.” 
Climate Policy 12: 255–71.
Chattopadhyay, D. 2014. “Modelling Renewable Energy Impact on the Electricity Market in India.” 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 31: 9–22. 
CLASP. 2015. Global S&L Database. http://www.clasponline.org/en/Tools/Tools/SL_Search.aspx.
Danielsen, F., T. Adrian, S. Brofeldt, M. van Noordwijk, M. K. Poulsen, S. Rahayu, E. Rutishauser, I. 
Theilade, A. Widayati, N. The An, N. Bang, A. Budiman, M. Enghoff, A. E. Jensen, Y. Kurniawan, 
Q. Li, Z. Mingxu, D. Schmidt-Vogt, S. Prixa, V. Thoumtone, Z. Warta, and N. Burgess. 2013. 
“Community Monitoring for REDD+: International Promises and Field Realities.” Ecology and 
Society 18: 41.
Davis, L. W., and G. E. Metcalf. 2014. “Does Better Information Lead to Better Choices? Evidence from 
Energy-Effi ciency Labels.” Working Paper 20720, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA.
Dechezleprêtre, A., R. Martin, and M. Mohnen. 2013. “Knowledge Spillovers from Clean and Dirty 
Technologies: A Patent Citation Analysis.” Working Paper 135, Grantham Research Institute on 
Climate Change and the Environment, London.
De La Tour, A., M. Glachant, and Y. Ménière. 2011. “Innovation and International Technology 
Transfer: The Case of the Chinese Photovoltaic Industry.” Energy Policy 39: 761–70.
———. 2013. “Predicting the Costs of Photovoltaic Solar Modules in 2020 Using Experience Curve 
Models.” Energy 62: 341–48.
Del Rio Gonzalez, P. 2008. “Policy Implications of Potential Confl icts between Short-Term and Long-
Term Effi ciency in CO
2
 Emissions Abatement.” Ecological Economics 65: 292–303.
Dutz, M. A., and S. Sharma. 2012. “Green Growth, Technology and Innovation.” Policy Research 
Working Paper 5932, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Elizondo Azuela, G., L. Barroso, A. Khanna, X. Wang, Y. Wu, and G. Cunha. 2014. “Performance of 
Renewable Energy Auctions: Experience in Brazil, China and India.” Policy Research Working 
Paper 7062, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Fluri, T. P. 2009. “The Potential of Concentrating Solar Power in South Africa.” Energy Policy 37: 
5075–80.
Gerlagh, R., S. Kverndokk, and K. E. Rosendahl. 2014. “The Optimal Time Path of Clean Energy R&D 
Policy When Patents Have Finite Lifetime.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
67: 2–19.
Goodrich, A. C., D. M. Powell, T. L. James, M. Woodhouse, and T. Buonassisi. 2013. “Assessing the 
Drivers of Regional Trends in Solar Photovoltaic Manufacturing.” Energy & Environmental 
Science 6: 2811–21.
DD.indb   114 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
115
Building Policy Packages That Are Acceptable, Credible, and Effective
Grimes, J. 2014. “No Danger Australia Will Lead the World on Solar.” Climate Spectator, May 21.
Guivarch, C., and S. Hallegatte. 2013. “2C or Not 2C?” Global Environmental Change 23: 179–92.
Hallegatte, S., M. Fay, and A. Vogt-Schilb. 2013. “Green Industrial Policies: When and How.” Policy 
Research Working Paper 6677, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Haller, M., S. Ludig, and N. Bauer. 2012. “Bridging the Scales: A Conceptual Model for Coordinated 
Expansion of Renewable Power Generation, Transmission and Storage.” Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 16: 2687–95.
Harrison, A., and A. Rodríguez-Clare. 2009. “Trade, Foreign Investment, and Industrial Policy for 
Developing Countries.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Hausmann, R., and D. Rodrik. 2003. “Economic Development as Self-Discovery.” Journal of 
Development Economics 72: 603–33.
Helm, D., C. Hepburn, and R. Mash. 2003. “Credible Carbon Policy.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
19: 438–50.
IEA (International Energy Agency). 2012. “Improving the Fuel Economy of Road Vehicles.” Policy 
Pathway, International Energy Agency, Paris.
———. 2014a. Energy Technology Perspectives 2014: Harnessing Electricity’s Potential. Paris: IEA.
———. 2014b. Policies and Measures Database. http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2014. “Summary for Policymakers.” In Climate 
Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change (Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), edited by O. Edenhofer, 
R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, 
P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel, and J. C. Minx. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
 Khan, M., and S. Blankenburg. 2009. “The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Asia and Latin 
America.” In The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation: The Past and Future of Policies 
for Industrial Development, edited by M. Cimoli, G. Dosi, and J. E. Stiglitz, 1–38. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Kallbekken, S., H. Sælen, and E. A. T. Hermansen. 2013. “Bridging the Energy Effi ciency Gap: A Field 
Experiment on Lifetime Energy Costs and Household Appliances.” Journal of Consumer Policy 
36: 1–16.
Larrazábal, A., M. K. McCall, T. H. Mwampamba, and M. Skutsch. 2012. “The Role of Community 
Carbon Monitoring for REDD+: A Review of Experiences.” Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability 4: 707–16. 
Larrick, R. P., and J. B. Soll. 2008. “The MPG Illusion.” Science 320: 1593–94.
MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 2015. Carbon Capture and Sequestration Technologies 
web page. https://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/index_pilots.html.
Murphy, K. M., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. “Industrialization and the Big Push.” Working 
Paper 2708, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Nepstad, D., W. Boyd, C. M. Stickler, T. Bezerra, and A. A. Azevedo. 2013. “Responding to Climate 
Change and the Global Land Crisis: REDD+, Market Transformation and Low-Emissions Rural 
Development.” Philosophical Transactions B. 368: 20120167.
Nepstad, D., D. McGrath, C. Stickler, A. Alencar, A. Azevedo, B. Swette, T. Bezerra, M. DiGiano, 
J. Shimada, R. S. da Motta, E. Armijo, L. Castello, P. Brando, M. C. Hansen, M. McGrath-Horn, 
O. Carvalho, and L. Hess. 2014. “Slowing Amazon Deforestation through Public Policy and 
Interventions in Beef and Soy Supply Chains.” Science 344: 1118–23.
DD.indb   115 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
116
Decarbonizing Development
Okuno-Fujiwara, M. 1988. “Interdependence of Industries, Coordination Failure and Strategic 
Promotion of an Industry.” Journal of International Economics 25: 25–43.
Pack, H., and L. E. Westphal. 1986. “Industrial Strategy and Technological Change: Theory versus 
Reality.” Journal of Development Economics 22: 87–128.
 Pacala, S., and R. Socolow. 2004. “Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 
50 Years with Current Technologies.” Science 305 (5686): 968–72.
Palmer Fry, B. 2011. “Community Forest Monitoring in REDD+: The ‘M’ in MRV?” Environmental 
Science & Policy 14: 181–87. 
Phadke, A., R. Bharvirkar, and J. Khangura. 2011. “Reassessing Wind Potential Estimates for India: 
Economic and Policy Implications.” Report LBNL-5077E, Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory, Berkeley, CA.
Pichert, D., and K. V. Katsikopoulos. 2008. “Green Defaults: Information Presentation and 
 Pro-Environmental Behaviour.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 28: 63–73.
Rodrik, D. 2004. “Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century.” CEPR Discussion Paper 4767, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
Rosendahl, K. E. 2004. “Cost-Effective Environmental Policy: Implications of Induced Technological 
Change.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 48: 1099–1121.
Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N. 1943. “Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.” 
Economic Journal 53: 202–11.
Rozenberg, J., A. Vogt-Schilb, and S. Hallegatte. 2014. “Transition to Clean Capital, 
Irreversible Investment and Stranded Assets.” Policy Research Working Paper 6859, 
World Bank, Washington, DC.
Saheb, Y., A. Saussay, C. E. Johnson, A. Blyth, A. Mishra, and T. Gueret. 2013. Modernising Building 
Energy Codes. Paris: International Energy Agency.
Sallee, J. M. 2013. “Rational Inattention and Energy Effi ciency.” Working Paper 19545, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Strietska-Ilina, O., C. Hofmann, M. Durán Haro, and J. Shinyoung. 2011. Skills for Green Jobs: 
A Global View—Synthesis Report Based on 21 Country Studies. Geneva: International Labour 
Organization.
Sunstein, C. R. 2013. “Behavioral Economics, Consumption, and Environmental Protection.” In 
Handbook on Research in Sustainable Consumption, edited by L. Reisch and J. Thøgersen. 
Forthcoming.
Tavoni, M., and R. Socolow. 2013. “Modeling Meets Science and Technology: An Introduction to a 
Special Issue on Negative Emissions.” Climatic Change 118: 1–14. 
Tsvetanov, T. G., and K. Segerson. 2014. “The Welfare Effects of Energy Effi ciency Standards When 
Choice Sets Matter.” Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
1: 233–71.
Viguié, V., S. Hallegatte, and J. Rozenberg. 2014. “Downscaling Long Term Socio-Economic Scenarios 
at City Scale: A Case Study on Paris.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 87: 305–24.
Vogt-Schilb, A., and S. Hallegatte. 2011. “When Starting with the Most Expensive Option Makes 
Sense.” Policy Research Working Paper 5803, World Bank, Washington, DC.
World Bank. 2008. International Trade and Climate Change: Economic, Legal, and Institutional 
Perspectives. Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. 2010. World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
DD.indb   116 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
117
Building Policy Packages That Are Acceptable, Credible, and Effective
———. 2012. Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable Development. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
———. 2013. World Development Report 2014: Risk and Opportunity—Managing Risk for Development. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. 2014a. “Social Value of Carbon in Project Appraisal.” Guidance note to the World Bank 
Group staff, World Bank, Washington, DC.
———. 2014b. World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
DD.indb   117 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
DD.indb   118 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
119
6. Getting the Finance Flowing
 ■ A low-carbon transition requires increased long-term fi nance fl ows to 
 developing countries and a bigger share allocated to low-carbon invest-
ments. As such, dedicated green fi nance is helpful but not enough. 
 ■ Obstacles to attracting long-term fi nance need to be tackled by improv-
ing the investment climate, growing local fi nancial markets, building a 
pipeline of bankable projects, and reforming global fi nance to reduce the 
short-term bias of capital markets. 
 ■ Increasing the green share of the pie requires steps both to increase 
returns thanks to lower costs for low-carbon projects and to improve risk 
perception.
Getting prices right and developing climate policy packages will increase demand for 
low-carbon investment, in both public goods (such as mass transport  infrastructure) 
and private goods (such as factories’ energy-effi cient machinery or fi rms’ and house-
holds’ building improvements). But fi rms, governments, and households are unlikely 
to fi nd their own savings suffi cient and will require access to external fi nancing sources. 
Analysts agree that the additional investments needed for a low-carbon economy 
are modest compared with total investment levels. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change estimates that reaching the 2°C target would require additional invest-
ments of about $400 billion per year. Similarly, the New Climate Economy’s report 
(NCE 2014) estimates an additional $300 billion will be needed, compared with base-
line investment needs of $4 billion per year over the next 15 years.
However, those requirements will come on top of existing unsatisfi ed fi nancing 
needs. Firms and households in developing countries are chronically credit constrained. 
Governments in both developed and developing countries already struggle to fi nance 
infrastructure. Thus, the bulk of the fi nancial fl ows for the low-carbon transition will 
have to come from the private sector—but with assistance from public money and 
regulatory reforms. Addressing the fi nance gap entails looking at banking and fi nancial 
regulations and how they can be used to make long-term investments more attractive 
for investors and intermediaries. The recent fi nancial crisis, combined with growing 
awareness of the increasing divergence between the needs of society and the perfor-
mance of fi nancial markets, is resulting in calls for deep reforms in fi nancial markets 
DD.indb   119 06/05/15   9:57 PM
EMBARGOED: NOT FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST, OR TRANSMISSION 
UNTIL MONDAY, MAY 11, 2015 AT 4:00 PM EDT (8:00 PM GMT)
120
Decarbonizing Development
and banking regulation—reforms that can reduce market power and opaque opera-
tions so that assets and basic risks can be properly valued. 
Low-carbon projects present a mix of challenges in attracting fi nancing. Some are 
standard and have to do with the generic challenges of attracting fi nance to developing 
countries and to long-term investments such as infrastructure. Others are specifi c to 
low-carbon investments—which tend to be more capital intensive, may involve newer 
technologies, carry more policy risks, or simply require doing things differently. Hence, 
the key message of this chapter is that reforms are needed to increase both the fi nancing 
available to long-term projects in developing countries—to grow the pie—and the 
share of fi nancing apportioned to low-carbon investments—to green the pie. 
Growing the Pie
The challenge of the low-carbon transition starts with tackling the chronic lack of 
fi nancing for productive investments that plagues most developing countries and the 
need to fi nd new sources of fi nancing and to leverage existing ones. 
The Long-Standing Challenge of Increasing Financing for Long-Term Projects 
and for Developing Countries
Infrastructure does not attract enough capital, especially in developing countries. Long-
term, less liquid investments are not perceived as attractive by global capital, especially 
in developing countries. Consequently, developing countries struggle to fi nance the 
infrastructure and private sector development they need to grow and prosper.
Many countries are simply too poor to generate the needed pool of savings 
 domestically. Many others lack local capital markets that are suffi ciently developed 
to transform local liquidity into the patient capital that is needed for longer-term 
investments. Maturities are also signifi cantly shorter for sovereign bonds in developing 
countries, increasing their exposure to changing economic conditions and raising risks 
from projects with long-term returns (Borensztein et al. 2005). 
Further, public spending is limited by a low tax base (10–20 percent of gross 
 domestic product in many countries) and debt ceilings. Overseas development assis-
tance can play a catalytic role in mobilizing additional resources. But it is constrained 
by the donor’s own fi scal constraints and remains limited relative to overall needs—at 
its highest around 2011, it reached about $90 billion.
There is no question that infrastructure spending needs scaling up (box 6.1). But it 
also needs derisking so as to generate a steady, long-term rate of return attractive to the 
private sector. Green or not, infrastructure requires sinking very large sums of money 
into largely illiquid assets. Investments are typically lumpy even as they generate fl ows 
of services over long periods. Some can be managed to generate income fl ows (such as 
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power plants, water and sanitation plants, high-traffi c highways, ports and airports, 
public transportation, and telecommunications), whereas others struggle to do so 
(such as lower-traffi c roads and electricity transmission lines). Furthermore, infra-
structure is regulated by public entities, making it subject to signifi cant regulatory risk.
Private participation in infrastructure may already be fi nancing about 20–40  percent 
of total infrastructure investments and could theoretically be expanded. However, after 
nearly two decades of steady growth, private participation in infrastructure seems to 
have slowed down and has hovered between $150 billion and $200 billion over the past 
seven years (fi gure 6.1). 
Most countries are constrained by a limited pipeline of bankable projects for private 
investment (leading experts to complain about “too much money chasing too few 
bankable projects”) and not enough resources to prepare projects and develop a robust 
project pipeline. Many countries struggle to develop the expertise to negotiate fi nanc-
ing terms, to access nontraditional fi nancing without overloading national debt 
BOX 6.1 Infrastructure Investment Needs Illustrate the Challenges Faced in 
Securing Long-Term Financing in Developing Countries
Millions of people in developing countries still lack access to safe water, improved sanitation, 
electricity, and transport. Even disregarding climate concerns, developing countries need substan-
tially more infrastructure to grow and address poverty, inequality, and unemployment concerns. 
Little data exist on how much is being spent on infrastructure, and how much should in fact be 
spent—except in Africa, where a concerted, multiyear effort was undertaken to collect that infor-
mation (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). Also, estimations of needs depend on countries’ 
objectives—providing basic services to the population or investing in state-of-the-art infrastruc-
ture for long-term growth. 
A number of guesstimates of infrastructure requirements exist, which vary depending on the 
defi nition of needs and the countries they cover. The World Bank Group estimates that about 
$1  trillion per year would be needed in developing countries to start closing the infrastructure 
gap, with about $100 billion for Africa alone. But the costs are much higher if the goals are 
more  ambitious. For example, by another estimate the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) alone could absorb $1 trillion per year to build the infrastructure needed to become 
high-income economies. And, of course, the numbers balloon if high-income countries are 
included. The New Climate Economy’s report estimates that about $5.5 trillion per year will be 
needed in infrastructure globally by 2030 (NCE, 2014).
But regardless of the variations across estimates, all agree that developing countries under-
invest in infrastructure—with the notable exception of China. Another guesstimate (this one from 
the World Bank) is that the developing world currently invests some $500 billion per year in infra-
structure. Existing gaps in access to infrastructure are evidence to this underinvestment. Spending 
better and improving cost recovery would surely help reduce the gap, but more will still likely be 
needed. The study by Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) showed that addressing these inef-
fi ciencies in Africa could reduce the funding gap by  two-thirds—but cannot make it go away. 
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burdens, and to evaluate projects on multiple criteria (including value for money, 
fi nancial viability, affordability, and sustainability). 
Moreover, project preparation is costly: the legal and engineering studies for a repeat 
and fairly simple project will amount to only 1 percent of project costs, but it can reach 
2–3 percent for new sectors in middle-income countries and 3–10 percent for new  sectors 
in low-income countries (fi gure 6.2). And although a number of project  preparation 
facilities exist (mostly in Africa), they tend to be small and lack suffi cient expertise.1
Grant sizes rarely exceed $10 million and in most cases are less than $1 million. 
In developing countries, access to fi nance is a problem not only for infrastructure but 
also for households and fi rms. Although capital markets are emerging that allow for 
local-currency trading, they remain concentrated in a few countries. Moreover, local 
markets tend to focus on government bond markets, leaving corporate bonds and other 
fi nancial assets aside. Banks tend to prefer to lend against assets (as for mortgages) or to 
buy government bonds. Access to fi nance is particularly problematic for small and 
medium-size enterprises, which typically lack transparency, tangible assets, and records 
often because of informality. World Bank Group estimates suggest that the unmet credit 
needs of formal small and medium-size enterprises amount to nearly $1 trillion—and 
FIGURE 6.1 After Two Decades of Growth, Private Infrastructure Investments in 
Developing Countries Seem to Have Plateaued 
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that amount more than doubles to between $2.1 trillion and $2.5 trillion if microenter-
prises and informal businesses are included (Stein, Goland, and Schiff 2010). 
Finding New Financing and Leveraging Existing Sources
So where can the needed fi nancing come from? Recommendations typically fall into 
two broad categories: steps to make the investments more attractive and steps to lever-
age and make the most of available capital.
Making investments more attractive starts with improving the investment climate. 
Investments will go where regulations are clear and predictable, the rule of law and 
property rights are enforced, infl ation is low, and growth is high, or at the very least 
where economic prospects are good.
In addition, the lack of a good project pipeline for private investments has led to a 
new focus on making resources available for project preparation. Thus, new fi nancing 
facilities such as the World Bank’s Global Infrastructure Facility will make dedicated 
funds available for preparation. More generally, the lack of a good pipeline calls for 
using concessionary fi nancing to help prepare projects in a way that enables countries 
to attract more private fi nancing and to increase the quality of the public-private 
 partnership projects they engage in. 
FIGURE 6.2 Project Preparation Costs Can Sharply Increase the Overall Tab
(Typical preparation costs for medium-size [$40 million] infrastructure projects)
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Making the most of available capital starts with improving the role and dynamism 
of local fi nancial markets. Local banks, pension funds, and capital markets offer a num-
ber of advantages if they can be tapped. Those investors have a better knowledge of 
local conditions, making them much better investors for politically complex projects, 
such as those in the water sector. Further, local fi nance mitigates foreign-exchange risk, 
provides opportunities for reforming and enhancing local fi nancial markets, creates 
additional opportunities for local banks and investors, and unlocks long-term liquidity 
in those fi nancial markets.
But efforts are needed to ensure that developing countries have the means to trans-
form local liquidity into tenders of debt for a 12-year to 18-year range or longer. 
Governments have experimented with various models, each with its own challenges, 
strengths, and weaknesses. Some have relied on a fi nancial intermediary such as a 
national development bank, for example, the Brazilian National Bank for Economic 
and Social Development. Others have opted to intervene directly in market creation, as 
in the case of Fonadin in Mexico. Such actions leverage the government’s credit posi-
tion, allowing access to lines of credit and capital markets that a private entity might 
not have. However, public entities are generally subject to public employment rules and 
may not be able to pay the salaries needed to compete with fi nancial markets to attract 
the best talent. They are also vulnerable to political infl uence as to which projects they 
fi nance and how decisions are made. Subject to public oversight, they may have limited 
capacity to rapidly respond to market demand.
Institutional capacity also needs to be built within local (and city) governments to 
lay the foundations for coordinating with the private sector and leveraging land-
backed instruments for infrastructure fi nancing. The Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility, for instance, helps build the capacity of city government offi cials to 
prepare and enter into public-private partnership arrangements with private partners 
(such as with reforms to institutions, policies, and legal and regulatory frameworks). 
The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility’s goal is to provide local govern-
ments with market-based fi nance (such as municipal bonds or bank loans) without 
sovereign guarantees to improve their ability to fi nance urban development. 
Other actors include the multilateral development banks (MDBs) and bilateral 
development banks, which provide advisory services to help countries develop strong 
capital markets and channel offi cial development assistance. Although these additional 
fi nancial resources are small relative to the need—MDB lending for infrastructure 
peaked at about $70 billion in 2010 (fi gure 6.3)—they are critical in the poorest coun-
tries, where they often fund a substantial share of infrastructure investments. MDBs 
can have a signifi cant impact if they are leveraged to make investments more attractive 
to the private sector. 
Recent years have seen increasing calls, especially from the large middle-income 
countries, for increasing both the capital base of MDBs and their ability to leverage 
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their resources—either through a more aggressive use of their capital base or through 
a greater focus on cofi nancing projects that bring in external fi nancing. 
But this has proved challenging. In recent years, the equity-to-loan ratio of the World 
Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has improved from 
about 30 percent in 2009 to about 25 percent in 2014, enabling it to fi nance $156 billion 
in  outstanding loans for $40 billion in usable equity. Howev er, considering the current 
equity-to-loan ratio, appropriate risk limits, and the maximum gearing ratio of 1 to 1 
between outstanding loans and subscribed reserves (including  call-in capital that 
amounts to $233 billion), the current capital base cannot provide an increase in lending of 
the order of magnitude required to fi nance the needs for infrastructure development. 
Other MDBs may have more room to increase their lending envelope, and MDB 
recapitalization is also an option, but while useful, these options cannot alone close the 
current fi nancing gap. Private capital is necessary in all scenarios, and making the most 
out of MDB resources requires leveraging them to attract private resources, for instance, 
through derisking projects with guarantees and blended fi nancial instruments. 
Finally, large middle-income countries—notably Brazil, China, and India—are 
playing an increasingly important role, particularly in Africa, where their annual com-
mitments rose to nearly $10 billion in 2010. China’s spending has contributed to 
Africa’s power generation, helping install 9 gigawatts of additional capacity, including 
10 major hydropower projects. Other emerging economies have also taken an active 
interest in African infrastructure fi nancing during the past decade. On average, India 
FIGURE 6.3 Multilateral Development Bank Lending for Infrastructure Peaked in 2010 
(Recent and projected MDB lending for infrastructure)
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invested $1.2 billion and the Arab states $1.5 billion from 2005 to 2009. But unlike 
traditional offi cial development assistance, this new fi nancial assistance is provided on 
the basis of mutual benefi ts and reciprocity, and is rooted in bilateral agreements. 
China and India generally do not channel their offi cial development assistance through 
a development agency, but rather through their export-import banks, which have an 
explicit trade promotion objective.
Regardless of progress in using existing instruments to increase fi nancing for 
long-term investments in developing countries, there is a growing recognition that 
marginal changes may not be enough to close the gap in development fi nance, espe-
cially in lower-income environments. A holistic approach may be needed to align 
the fi nancial system toward longer-term sustainable development. That will be key 
to delivering the long-term economy-wide transformation to greener growth and 
to mobilizing domestic investors to deliver on both countries’ development and 
 climate objectives. 
Aligning the fi nancial system to development needs would require a shift in its focus 
toward longer-term profi tability. Indeed, there is evidence that fi nancial markets have 
a short-term bias and place too much emphasis on short-term earnings (Black and 
Fraser 2002; Bushee 2001; Miles 1993). That bias can be explained in part by the way 
compensation schemes are designed (Tehranian and Waegelein 1985), and by herd 
behavior (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2000) and other imperfections in capital markets, 
such as credit constraints and arbitrage costs (Shleifer and Vishny 1990). It leads to 
chronic underinvestment in long-term projects.
Even regulators of the fi nancial sector usually focus on short periods. For instance, 
in 2011, U.S. supervisors began integrating coordinated stress testing into the supervi-
sion of large banks and bank holding companies with the Comprehensive Capital 
Analysis and Review—a supervisory program to assess large banking companies’ 
internal capital planning processes and capital positions—and the Dodd-Frank Act 
Stress Testing. Those two stress tests use scenarios with time horizons of nine quar-
ters, a little more than two years (Hirtle and Lehnert 2014). Although obviously rele-
vant for macroeconomic risks, those assessments of the robustness of the fi nancial 
system do not say anything about long-term risks, such as stranded assets (assets ren-
dered prematurely obsolete because of greener needs; see chapters 2 and 8) or climate 
change impacts.
Greening the Pie 
In addition to growing the fi nancial pie, decarbonization will entail allocating a 
larger share to low-carbon investments. A lack of available fi nancing for infrastruc-
ture has led countries to invest in the options with lowest up-front costs—which are 
often the most polluting. Solving global capital market issues will help promote 
higher-quality and cleaner infrastructure in developing countries. But low-carbon 
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investments also present a number of additional challenges that decrease their 
 risk-adjusted returns compared with conventional investments and require specifi c 
solutions.
The Specifi c Challenges of Low-Carbon Projects
Higher up-front costs. Initial investments for green projects are a higher proportion 
of total costs than in conventional projects (such as renewable electricity production 
compared with thermal power plants), making projects even more sensitive to the 
fi nance cost. It is therefore critical to reduce the risks of green infrastructure. It should 
be noted that being more capital intensive need not mean being more expensive, as 
the additional up-front capital cost can be partly or fully offset by the savings gener-
ated through lower operating expenses. Thus, an initial investment in energy effi -
ciency can be partially or fully recouped by subsequent reductions in fuel costs. And 
although solar and wind power plants typically are much more expensive to build than 
thermal power plants, they operate at practically zero cost. Nevertheless, a higher 
 up-front capital cost increases both the need for up-front capital and sensitivity to 
fi nancing costs. 
Higher technology risks. Higher technology risks occur simply because the underlying 
technologies are newer and are still being innovated, with anticipated rapid declines in 
costs in the future. Consequently, a particular fear of investors is to develop a cost dis-
advantage by moving too early and having to compete with later-generation technol-
ogy that is cheaper, more reliable, or both. 
Higher regulatory risks. To reduce the previously mentioned risks, some governments 
have provided subsidies (such as feed-in tariffs for renewables) to green power tech-
nologies since the early 1990s. But given the high cost and long-term commitments, a 
number of countries (most notably Spain, but also Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and 
Romania) have reversed earlier commitments and reduced their feed-in tariff, resulting 
in a drop in investments (Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2014). With green technolo-
gies still largely reliant on government subsidies, policy reversals create uncertainty 
among investors as to whether they will recoup their initial investments.
Different risk perceptions. Low-carbon projects require project fi nanciers and devel-
opers to innovate and think differently relative to the standard deals they would have 
made even 10 years ago. This is a challenge, given the tendency of individuals to stick 
to the default option and to prefer the status quo—and thus to keep doing the same 
thing (Weber and Johnson 2011; Weber, Lindemann, and Plessner 2008). China’s expe-
rience shows that it takes considerable encouragement (credit lines and public sup-
port) to get commercial banks involved in a new area like energy effi ciency (Wang et al. 
2013). The general tendency to stay with the status quo may be the strongest argument 
in favor of dedicated green fi nance schemes, given the well-documented herd 
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behaviors found in fi nancial markets (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2000; Chari and 
Kehoe 2004; Devenow and Welch 1996). To attract signifi cant resources, green invest-
ments need to become mainstream. 
The combination of higher up-front costs and higher risks decreases the risk-
adjusted return of low-carbon projects compared with conventional ones. Previous 
chapters of this report have discussed the many instruments that can make green 
investments more attractive by increasing their returns compared with brown 
 projects—such as carbon prices, feed-in tariffs or standards and regulation. Here, we 
focus on instruments that rebalance risk perception between low-carbon and brown 
projects, and tools that increase the risk-adjusted returns of green projects.
Rebalancing Risk Perception
A crucial step in the transition toward low-carbon fi nancing is to mainstream low-
carbon projects and change expectations about future policies to bring the perceived 
risks of green and brown projects closer to their fundamental values. 
First, the international community, governments, and local actors can pave the 
way by sending a clear signal that they are committed to trigger a transition toward a 
carbon-neutral world (see chapter 1). The best place to do so would be the 21st 
Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change—to be held in Paris in December 2015. It would mean convincing all eco-
nomic actors that the future is carbon neutral, along with designing an international 
architecture to support climate change mitigation (including fi nancial instruments).
Doing so would be the most powerful instrument for redirecting investments. 
It would help with risk perception and the fear of policy reversal. It would make it 
easier to fi nance green projects, especially those with a long lifetime. It would also sup-
port the long-term credibility of climate policies that is required to make fi rms invest 
in long-term projects; new, more effi cient, products; and radical green research and 
development. Furthermore, it would help address the need for cross-sector coordina-
tion (for instance, among developers of electric cars, producers of batteries, and local 
authorities able to deploy recharge infrastructure). That contribution from the Paris 
meeting could be strengthened further by involving nongovernmental actors—such as 
cities, private fi rms, and investors. After all, the broader the coalition, the stronger the 
signal sent to the economic community, and the more likely the shift in investment 
patterns. 
Second, fi nancial actors need to be aware that the implementation of climate 
 regulations—regardless of its perceived likelihood—would trigger a major shift in the 
profi tability of various assets. Here, a key would be credit ratings, which play a critical 
role in resource allocation. Methodologies already exist to account for environmental 
risks in sovereign credit risk analysis (such as the United Nations Environment 
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Programme Financial Initiative’s E-RISC (Environmental Risk Integration in Sovereign 
Credit) analysis methodology), and some major rating agencies have started to include 
green considerations in their ratings (Inquiry 2015). If credit ratings include the risk 
that some assets may lose their value if climate mitigation policies are implemented, 
it could already redirect large fl ows of private capital from carbon-intensive assets 
to carbon-free assets, on the basis of the risk diversifi cation argument alone. Recent 
investments of oil companies in renewable energy illustrate such a diversifi cation 
 strategy. A similar strategy could be recommended to countries that are exposed to 
carbon-pricing risks (such as fossil-fuel exporters) and countries that heavily rely on 
energy-intensive industries. 
Third, a fundamental innovation being considered is extending stress testing of 
fi nancial actors—that is, simulations of what would happen in the event of an equity 
markets crash, high unemployment, or other drivers of fi nancial crisis—to take the 
long term into account (beyond the two years that are currently being looked at) and 
to include unconventional factors, such as climate policy (carbon exposure) and envi-
ronmental constraints. In December 2014, the Bank of England agreed to examine for 
the fi rst time the vulnerability that fossil-fuel assets could pose to the stability of the 
fi nancial system in a carbon-constrained world. The results of that effort—combined 
with changes in investment patterns—could lead many investors to reconsider their 
perception of risks and investment decisions, resulting in increased fl ows to greener 
projects. Discussions on this topic are still at an early stage, but stress tests could evalu-
ate the fi nancial impacts of plausible environmental scenarios on assets, portfolios, 
institutions, and fi nancial markets as a whole.
Fourth, green fi nancial products such as green bonds are being used to help over-
come the behavioral bias toward conventional investment. In 2014, the green bond 
market experienced exponential growth, reaching almost $35 billion in bond issuances, 
up from about $12 billion the year before (fi gure 6.4). Concurrently, guidelines set by 
the International Capital Markets Association—such as the Green Bond Principles—
have been key to promoting the integrity of the green bond market by clarifying the 
issuance process. A further sign of momentum in the market has been the development 
of green bond indexes from such heavyweights as Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, 
Standard & Poor’s, MSCI, and Barclays. Although the selection criteria are different for 
each of the existing indexes, they serve as tangible benchmarks that help the growing 
investor base assess the performance of this asset class.
Fifth, private actors are beginning to voluntarily decarbonize asset portfolios as a 
business strategy on the basis of diversifi cation and long-term expectations regarding 
the future of energy. At the United Nations Climate Summit in September 2014, insti-
tutional investors committed to decarbonize $100 billion in institutional equity invest-
ments by the 21st Conference of the Parties in Paris and to measure and disclose the 
carbon footprint of at least $500 billion in investments, all while accelerating 
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investments in low-carbon assets. Commercial banks agreed to provide $30 billion in 
new climate fi nance by the end of 2015 by issuing green bonds and other innovative 
fi nancing instruments. The insurance industry committed to double its green invest-
ments to $84 billion by the end of 2015 and to multiply them by a factor of 10 by 2020.
Increasing Risk-Adjusted Returns for Low-Carbon Projects
The imbalance between green and brown projects is not just a perception issue. Where 
prices do not include the climate externality, low-carbon projects are most of the time 
less profi table. Measures are also needed that reduce the actual risk from green invest-
ments and that rebalance their costs and benefi ts. 
FIGURE 6.4 Annual Green Bond Issuances Are Up Dramatically 
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Green Projects Can be Supported by Public Resources
The fi nancial costs of low-carbon investment can be reduced through direct govern-
ment support, either by lending directly to low-carbon sectors or by backing low- 
carbon projects. Given the limited funds available in an era of shrinking government 
budgets, public fi nance is a short-term option that aims at leveraging private fi nance. 
Many tools are available. Green credit lines, which channel public money to low- carbon 
projects, use commercial banks as an intermediary—and typically, the private sector 
bank or fi nancial institution provides additional cofi nancing for the projects. Risk-
sharing facilities—such as partial risk or partial credit guarantee programs—are 
 established by a government agency or public fi nancial institution to reduce the risk to 
the private sector of fi nancing a green project (IEA 2011). 
Importantly, domestic green public fi nance can be viewed as a way to increase the 
long-term credibility of other climate mitigation instruments and to reduce regulatory 
risk (as governments are perceived to have skin in the game). When such fi nance is used 
to back risky low-carbon projects, the government bears the loss in case of failure 
because of, for instance, a change in environmental regulation. The United Kingdom’s 
Green Investment Bank has backed many projects, including offshore wind farms, bio-
energy, and waste and energy effi ciency, with capital costs ranging from £2 million to 
£1 billion. The Green Investment Bank has also set up fi ve funds with £250 million to 
help attract private fi nance for small projects. In France, the Caisse des Dépôts et 
Consignations invests in low-carbon projects in cities and participates as a minority 
shareholder in the capital of low-carbon fi rms.
Internationally, the role of multilateral and bilateral development banks, as well as 
multilateral funds, will be central in leveraging private capital. The Climate Investment 
Funds—which hold more than $8 billion in resources and are expected to attract at 
least $57 billion in cofi nancing—are investing in the energy, transport, and forestry 
sectors and in climate-resilient development in 63 developing countries. The Green 
Climate Fund, which recently reached its capitalization goal of a minimum of 
$10  billion, is in the process of designing a Private Sector Facility targeting private 
investors. It will provide catalytic fi rst-loss capital guarantees to help smaller invest-
ments (such as off-grid solar lighting or clean cookstoves) or subordinated debt to 
enable fi nancing for large-scale clean-energy infrastructure. 
MDBs can also develop common metrics and analytical tools to help measure 
 performance and to improve clarity on the fi nancing purpose. Doing so will require 
innovation and experimentation, and a combination of many instruments and tools. 
Box 6.2 gives examples of innovative public fi nance ranging from China’s Energy 
Effi ciency Finance Program to the Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate 
Change Mitigation. Box 6.3 provides a list of potential innovations proposed by the 
Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance, which facilitates access to fi nance for low-
carbon projects and reduces their risk, thereby lowering overall fi nancial costs. 
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Finally, fi nancial guarantees against policy, regulatory, and macroeconomic risks 
can enhance the creditworthiness of public off-takers of green power and can encour-
age foreign and local commercial lenders to participate in projects via new players such 
as export credit agencies (Frisari et al. 2013).
Investments Can Also be Redirected through Regulation of the Financial System
Giving commercial banks fi nancial incentives to support greener projects can contrib-
ute to changing investment fl ows, even in the absence of a strong price signal. 
Commercial banks are the largest asset poolers worldwide and are the principal source 
of external fi nance for both small and medium-size enterprises and the emerging mar-
kets (Campiglio, forthcoming; Eickmeier, Gambacorta, and Hofmann 2013). Also, 
although fi nancial markets reallocate the existing stock of credit, commercial banks are 
the only fi nancial institutions, together with central banks, allowed to create new credit 
(McLeay, Radia, and Thomas 2014).
BOX 6.2 Innovative Public Finance at Work
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) recently provided a $30 million loan to the  respons 
Ability Energy Access Fund, which will provide working capital loans to manufacturers and dis-
tributors of solar LED lighting. Solar LED devices provide lighting as well as power for charging 
cell phones or small appliances, thereby supporting economic activity and better livelihoods. As 
such, they provide an affordable fi rst step up the energy access ladder for the underserved with 
entry-level products costing $12–$20 per unit (paybacks as short as two to four months).
Global Energy Effi ciency and Renewable Energy Fund. This fund is advised by the European 
Investment Bank Group and was launched in 2008 with funding of a112 million from the European 
Union, Germany, and Norway. It aims to anchor new private equity funds focusing on renewable 
energy and energy-effi ciency projects in emerging markets and economies in transition (Africa, 
Asia, the Caribbean and Pacifi c region, non-EU Eastern Europe, and Latin America). In 2013, it 
welcomed its fi rst private sector investors and by year-end had invested in six funds. The goal is 
to invest in up to 14 funds.
In China, IFC has worked with the Chinese banks on the China Energy Effi ciency Finance 
Program, which provides loans worth $790 million and fi nances 226 projects that are slated to 
reduce emissions by 19 million tons of carbon dioxide per year. The program has enabled key play-
ers in China’s economy—banks, utility companies, government agencies, and suppliers of energy-
effi ciency equipment and services—to collaborate in creating a sustainable fi nancing model that 
will long outlive IFC’s initial investment.
The World Bank Group and its partners recently launched the Pilot Auction Facility for 
Methane and Climate Change Mitigation, a pay-for-performance instrument that will use auctions 
to  maximize the use of public resources for climate mitigation while leveraging private sector 
fi nancing. It was approved in November with an initial $53 million in funding and will organize its 
fi rst auction in the second quarter of 2015 (see World Bank [2014]).
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In many countries, banking regulators already use regulation to encourage or dis-
courage bank lending activities, such as infl uencing which sectors to prioritize or which 
borrowers to favor (such as small and medium-size enterprises). Similar policies could 
be used to promote long-term or low-carbon projects (box 6.4). 
In fact, many are already being implemented:
 ■ In Lebanon, the National Energy Effi ciency and Renewable Energy Action 
provides cheaper credit to the private sector for renewable energy and build-
ing energy-effi ciency projects (Banque du Liban 2010; PWMSP 2011). 
BOX 6.3 Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance’s “Call for Ideas” 
The Global Innovation Lab is a global initiative that supports the identifi cation and piloting of 
cutting-edge climate fi nance instruments by bringing together private and public partners (devel-
opment fi nance institutions, export credit agencies, and multilateral development banks). It aims 
to drive billions of dollars of private investment into climate change mitigation and adaptation in 
developing countries. In spring 2015, its principals are expected to endorse the top instruments 
and to weigh how and where the most promising ones could be piloted through Lab-backed public-
private partnerships.
In 2014, an international call for ideas attracted more than 90 proposals, which were screened 
for actionability, innovativeness, and catalytic and transformative potential. The Lab is now 
focused on fi nalizing four of them: 
Agricultural supply chain adaptation facility
The facility intends to tackle small to medium-size producers’ and processors’ inability to access 
medium- and long-term credit, as well as their information and capacity gaps. It will assume the fi rst-
loss position that multilateral development banks and other market-based lenders are unable or are 
unwilling to take, and it targets corporations’ credit analysis and agricultural extension capacity gaps. 
Climate development and fi nance facility 
The facility combines fast-track project development support with better and timely capital for 
private sector climate mitigation projects. The target country group represents a signifi cant market 
in which the proposal can reduce the complexity and delays in project development that emerge 
from development fi nance institutions and other investors’ exposure limits to individual projects. 
Insurance for energy savings
The proposal aims to effectively address technical and fi nancial risks and to enhance access to 
fi nancing energy-effi ciency measures for small and medium-size enterprises in developing countries. 
Long-term currency swap
The currency swap provides a practical solution to the problem of exchange-rate risk. This instru-
ment could facilitate greater fl ows of foreign capital to developing countries, lower the cost of 
capital and improve debt tenors. The market for this instrument is very large and two experienced 
and suitable institutions are interested, although some implementation hurdles remain. 
Source: Global Innovation Lab website, http://climatefi nancelab.org/.
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If a commercial bank endorses a loan request, the technical proposal is then 
assessed by the Lebanese Center for Energy Conservation, an agency affi liated 
with the Lebanese Ministry of Energy and Water. If approved, the Lebanese 
Central Bank provides its  support by reducing the bank’s obligatory reserve 
requirements by an amount equal to 100–150 percent of the loan.2
 ■ In Bangladesh, the central bank is promoting sustainability, growth, and fi nan-
cial stability simultaneously through the following measures: (a) concessional 
refi nancing for commercial banks at reduced interest rates for loans given in 
priority areas, such as renewable energy; and (b) requiring fi nancial institutions 
to allocate a share of their loan portfolios to agriculture, a key climate-affected 
sector (Inquiry 2014).
BOX 6.4 A Toolkit of Banking Regulation Measures for Low-Carbon Finance 
 ■ Refi nancing. Linking the quantity and prices of central bank refi nancing operations to 
 long-term sustainability factors (such as dedicated credit lines for low-carbon and green 
investments at discounted interest rates). 
 ■ Fractional reserve banking. In countries where banks have sizable binding reserve require-
ments, increasing the bank’s mandatory reserves in the central bank in exchange for 
new loans targeted at low-carbon projects. Specifi c proposals include creating carbon 
 certifi cates that a bank would get in exchange for fi nancing an abatement project and that 
would act as legal reserves (Rozenberg et al. 2013).
 ■ Basel requirements. Extending Basel III rules—a comprehensive set of measures devel-
oped by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision—to allow lower capital or liquidity 
requirements for low-carbon projects.
 ■ Liquidity operations. Updating the defi nitions of what can be considered as collateral in 
repurchase agreements to include green assets. 
 ■ Balance sheet management. Mainstreaming environmental and social factors in the 
 routine management of assets on central bank balance sheets from a risk and asset 
 allocation perspective (including in pooled asset management services offered by the 
Bank for International Settlements and the World Bank). 
 ■ Quantitative easing. Integrating environmental and social factors into special asset 
 purchase programs, including the purchase of green bonds. In the Euro Area, proposals have 
been made for the European Central Bank to purchase a1 trillion in new bonds from the 
European Investment Bank to fund infrastructure projects as a way of escaping defl ation.
 ■ Transparency. Extending central bank reporting on monetary policy to refl ect social and 
environmental impacts and dimensions. 
Internationally, there are proposals for deploying special drawing rights, the international reserve 
asset created by the International Monetary Fund, to fi nance climate action and sustainable devel-
opment more broadly, fl owing from the IMF’s Article XVIII, which authorizes a new special drawing 
rights allocation to meet “the long-term global need.”
Source: Adapted from Inquiry (2015).
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 ■ In Brazil, the central bank regulates environmental and social risk management 
for banks and monitors fi nancial resources allocated to the green economy. 
At this point, 12 percent of bank lending and 62 percent of assets under manage-
ment in the pension system are now covered by policies that require sustainabil-
ity assessments (Inquiry 2014). 
The bottom line is that monetary policies in favor of low-carbon projects can be a 
temporary alternative to carbon pricing (Rozenberg et al. 2013). They can also comple-
ment other climate mitigation policies when banks are hesitant or uninterested in new 
low-carbon investments. But asking monetary authorities to support or implement 
environmental policies creates a risk of capture and rent-seeking behavior, underscor-
ing the need for transparent and careful monitoring (see chapter 8).
That said, since these subsidies are channeled through a bank that is investing in the 
project and takes on some of the risk—and is therefore likely to assess the project and 
provide additional validation—these policies provide more control and accountability 
than other forms of direct subsidies.
Notes
 1. A discussion of the limitations of Africa’s many project preparation facilities is available from 
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, http://www.icafrica.org/en/knowledge-publications/article 
/ ica-assessment-of-project-preparation-facilities-for-africa-197/.
 2. This is an illustration in one sector of the proposal made by Rozenberg et al. (2013) for the entire 
economy.
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Managing the Transition: 
 Protecting the Poor and Avoiding the 
 Potential  Pitfalls of Reforms
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7. Ensuring the Poor Benefi t
■ Climate reforms can benefi t the poor and improve equity, but this requires careful attention to 
their design and distributional impacts.
■ Fossil-fuel subsidy reform and carbon pricing generate resources that can be redistributed to 
compensate adverse distributional effects and to ensure that climate policies are progressive.
■ Reforms of energy prices are more likely to succeed if they include a well-designed and 
 well-communicated compensation scheme for those negatively affected. 
By this point, it should be clear that decarbonizing development and securing a low-
carbon future must begin with good planning. To that end, part I of this report has 
explored the pathways for us to achieve zero net emissions by 2100, with an emphasis 
on acting early with an eye on the end goal, and favoring measures that are urgent and 
provide synergies with economic development. But for plans to become realities, as 
discussed in part II, governments need to enact policies to trigger the transition and 
enforce those pathways. That means removing fossil-fuel subsidies, pricing carbon, 
adopting complementary policy packages, and securing the needed fi nancing.
What has been left out so far is whether the resulting climate change policy packages 
will be socially (and politically) acceptable, which, we would argue, is a necessary 
 condition for success. Acceptability requires those packages to be consistent with a 
country’s social objectives, such as protecting the poor, and to garner political support. 
Granted, the poor are expected to benefi t in the long run from mitigation policies, 
given that they are the most vulnerable to climate change, but it does not follow that 
climate policies are necessarily pro-poor in the short run. Thus, there is scope for 
ensuring that those policies contribute to both long-term and short-term improve-
ments in poverty and inequality—a worthwhile goal in and of itself. 
In part III, we focus on how to navigate the potential downsides and pitfalls of 
reform, especially on the social front. Fortunately, the evidence suggests that carbon 
pricing and fossil-fuel subsidy reform can easily be designed to be pro-poor—not least 
because those measures generate resources that can be recycled in direct cash transfers 
to maintain or improve poor households’ welfare. As to land-use-based mitigation 
policies, their distributional impacts depend entirely on their design. 
However, protecting the poor and most vulnerable may not be enough. As the next 
chapter contends, it may also be necessary to smooth the overall short-term economic 
cost and compensate those who stand to be most affected.
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Direct Distributional Impacts of Right Pricing—Possibly Positive?
Let’s start from the question of how higher energy prices affect poor people. We know 
that poor households in high-income countries are hardest hit, because they allocate a 
larger part of their income to energy consumption and carbon-intensive goods than 
richer households. As a result, higher energy prices—due to carbon pricing or subsidy 
removal—are regressive in high-income countries.1 
However, this is not the net effect. Wages and capital income are also affected by 
energy prices, so carbon taxes may be progressive overall in countries with strong redis-
tribution policies: in such countries, poor households derive a larger fraction of their 
income from government transfers that are indexed to infl ation (and thus largely unaf-
fected by carbon pricing). A modeling exercise for the United States (Rausch et al. 
2010) fi nds that this income effect dominates the consumption one in determining dis-
tributional outcome.
The story in developing countries could be quite different, although so far few 
studies are available (Ruggeri-Laderchi 2014). On the consumption side, energy 
price increases are likely to be progressive as modern energy’s share of household 
budgets rises with income in developing countries, contrary to developed  countries.2
But the fi nal impact will depend on the fuel mix used by the poor. Those who rely 
on traditional biomass would be unaffected by carbon price policies, although the 
many who use kerosene for lighting and cooking would be affected by kerosene 
price increases.
Households can also be affected indirectly through the price of nonenergy goods 
and services. Those impacts will vary, depending on the consumption baskets of poor 
households, their ability to substitute for other goods, and the direct and indirect sen-
sitivity to transport costs. In principle, one would expect the urban poor—who are 
most dependent for their basic needs on goods transported from somewhere else and 
who often use public transportation for personal transport—to be particularly vulner-
able to those effects. Oil prices also signifi cantly affect food prices, especially in more 
remote and less urbanized regions. 
On the income side, an increase in energy prices would likely be regressive in devel-
oping countries—the impact of social transfers is not as strong as in high-income 
countries, because many developing countries have truncated social safety nets that 
often offer less support to, or even exclude, the poorest households. And for those 
engaged in commercial activities, the extent of the impact critically depends on how 
much of the additional input cost they can pass through to fi nal consumers. Groups 
that have been found to be particularly vulnerable include fi shermen (who depend on 
diesel fuel), farmers (who use diesel pumps for irrigation), and small and medium-size 
enterprises. Agricultural households are also affected by rising fertilizer costs and by 
increased transportation costs to get their produced goods to markets. 
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Finally, there is a dynamic dimension to the impact of energy prices on poverty. 
Higher prices for modern energy could slow down poor households’ transition away 
from biomass to modern fuels for cooking, with signifi cant adverse health effects. And 
industrialization, which has been a powerful force for poverty reduction in many coun-
tries, could theoretically be slowed down by higher energy prices. 
Overall, studies of the impact of right pricing in developing countries have focused on 
fossil-fuel subsidies and show that those subsidies tend to be highly inequitable and pri-
marily benefi t the rich, so that their removal will generally improve equity. The same is 
likely to be true for carbon pricing. But regardless of the overall impact on equity, higher 
energy prices may increase the depth and severity of poverty. It is critical therefore that the 
proceeds of the reform be used to prevent setbacks for the poorest households. 
Revenue Recycling Enables Redistribution and Allows for Pro-Poor 
Climate Policies
The great advantage of both fossil-fuel subsidy reform and carbon pricing is that they 
generate resources that can be redistributed. Almost all simulations fi nd that when 
carbon revenues are recycled in lump-sum cash transfers to the population, the overall 
impact of the tax is to improve equity (Cohen, Fullerton, and Topel 2013). That result 
directly follows from the fact that poor households consume less energy, in absolute 
amount, than nonpoor households. For the same reason, modeling exercises agree that 
removing fossil-fuel subsidies and distributing the revenue in the form of lump-sum 
cash transfers would improve equity (World Bank 2013). For instance, data from devel-
oping countries suggest that taking $100 away from fossil-fuel subsidies and redistrib-
uting the money equally throughout the population would on average transfer $13 to 
the bottom quintile and take $23 away from the top quintile (fi gure 7.1). 
Moreover, recycling only part of the revenues may suffi ce to make the overall scheme 
progressive. In British Columbia, the recycling of carbon revenue through tax cuts on 
both labor and capital, as well as through higher transfers to the population, is what has 
made the carbon tax progressive (Beck et al. 2014).
Reforms of fossil-fuel subsidies provide useful lessons on how the freed-up resources 
can help poor households adjust to the change in energy prices, through in-kind or in-
cash transfers (Ruggeri Laderchi 2014). The following are examples:
In kind. Ghana’s 2005 fossil-fuel subsidy reform increased the price of transport 
fuels by 50 percent but also included in-kind benefi ts for the poor: an expansion of 
primary health care and electrifi cation in poor and rural areas, large-scale distribution 
of effi cient lightbulbs, public transport improvements, and immediate elimination of 
school fees at government-run primary and secondary schools (IMF 2013; Vagliasindi 
2012). Those policies and transfers were well-targeted to the poor and contributed 
to the reform’s success (IMF 2013; Ruggeri-Laderchi 2014). 
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In cash. India piloted a cash transfer to replace subsidies for liquefi ed petroleum gas 
in 2014, taking advantage of the new unique biometric identifi er. Indonesia has intro-
duced programs to mitigate the effect of higher energy prices through subsidized rice, 
free health care, cash assistance to poor students, and a one-year conditional cash 
transfer targeting poor households with pregnant women or school-age children 
(Perdana 2014). Iran implemented a quasi-universal cash transfer (approximately 
$45 per month per capita) when it reformed its energy subsidies (IMF 2013). And 
Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, and Mexico have used well-functioning 
cash-transfer programs to protect basic consumption of the poor, helping to reduce 
public opposition to reform (Beaton and Lontoh 2010; Diaz 2013; Vagliasindi 2012). 
Other choices entail whether to expand existing social programs or to create new 
ones. Some fuel reforms have been used to create entirely new social programs and thus 
served as an impetus for social reforms, whereas others, as in India, have modernized 
social programs to facilitate subsidy reforms. 
The ability to use new resources for those programs is what makes price-based 
 policies so attractive—especially since some of the other instruments required in the 
policy package have been found to worsen inequality (box 7.1). And studies show that 
by alleviating the impact on the poor, policy makers sharply boost the odds of the sub-
sidy reform succeeding. In the Middle East and North Africa, Sdralevich, Sab, and 
Zouhar (2014, 42) note that “of the cases where cash and in-kind transfers were intro-
duced, 100 percent were associated with a successful outcome, while only 17 percent of 
the cases where these transfers were not introduced resulted in a successful reform.” 
FIGURE 7.1 Using Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Resources for Universal Cash Transfers 
Benefi ts Poor People
(Impact of recycling $100 from a fossil fuel subsidy to a universal cash transfer)
Source: Based on Arze del Granado et al. (2012). 
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Another important consideration for subsidy reform is the sequencing of reforms. 
One way to mitigate the poverty impact is to target existing subsidies better or to progres-
sively phase out subsidies in a way that favors the poor. If policy makers reduce the num-
ber of goods subsidized, they should target subsidies on goods that are consumed mainly 
by wealthier segments of the population fi rst (such as gasoline), before those consumed 
by lower-income groups (such as diesel and kerosene, which the poor use for cooking and 
lighting). That was the approach taken in India, Niger, and Peru. If policy makers phase 
out subsidies, they should initially protect the poorest individuals, possibly using a means 
test—which is what Brazil did with its former gas-voucher scheme. 
The same is true for carbon taxes or other price instruments: sequencing changes 
and targeting support are key to combining poverty reduction with energy effi ciency 
and emission reductions. For instance, a recent study fi nds that bringing universal 
access to modern cooking by 2030 requires a combination of low-cost fi nancing for 
stove purchase and—at least temporarily—some subsidy for liquid fuels (in its analy-
sis, liquefi ed petroleum gas) (Pachauri et al. 2013). If well targeted, such a subsidy 
would have a negligible impact on fossil-energy consumption and greenhouse gas 
BOX 7.1 Nonprice Instruments Are Often Regressive 
Renewable portfolio standards 
Many policies can be used to promote higher production of energy from renewable energy 
sources—such as a clean energy standard (CES) and a carbon price—but studies show that 
they do not share the same effects (Rausch and Mowers 2014). With regard to geographic dis-
tribution, the burden of a carbon price is more evenly spread across regions than the CES, which 
results in larger price rises in regions with low-cost coal generation than in areas with abundant 
clean resources. With regard to income distribution, carbon pricing may be initially regressive, 
but it becomes progressive if revenues are redistributed as a lump sum. In contrast, the CES 
is regressive and stays that way because, as a revenue-neutral system, it does not generate 
revenues that can be used to address concerns over distributional outcomes. 
Feed-in tariffs (FITs)
Feed-in tariffs are designed to boost investment in renewable energy technologies by offering 
long-term contracts to small producers, but they also affect equity. In the United Kingdom and 
in Germany, FITs were found to be slightly regressive (Grösche and Schröder 2014; Grover 2013). 
Indeed, wealthy households tend to own more houses or land, where photovoltaic panels can be 
installed, and can better afford the high up-front cost of installing panels. As a result, payments 
for renewable electricity tend to end up in wealthy households’ pockets, even as the cost of the 
scheme is spread over all households in proportion to their electricity consumption (and poorer 
households in high-income countries spend a higher share of their income on electricity). Better 
policy design can mitigate those drawbacks (CPUC 2013; Granqvist and Grover 2015; Macintosh 
and Wilkinson 2010). In California, low-income households are encouraged to participate in the 
scheme, and in Australia, the FIT is fi nanced by the taxpayers (which leads to better equity as 
poorer household spend a lower share of their income on taxes). 
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emissions, and the generalization of access to modern cooking would avert between 
0.6 million and 1.8 million premature deaths annually in 2030. It would also contribute 
to gender balance and educational opportunities, as woman and children spend a sig-
nifi cant amount of time collecting solid fuels (WHO 2006). 
Managing Perceived Impacts
It is not just impacts that matter, but also perception of impacts. Lessons from a  number 
of successful reformers underscore that even good reforms need to be supported by a 
solid understanding of the country’s political economy and a well-crafted communica-
tion strategy (box 7.2). Thus, building support requires clearly articulating the goal of 
the reforms and managing both actual and perceived impacts (IMF 2013).
BOX 7.2 Tips on a Good Communication Strategy for Fossil-Fuel Reform
Many countries have stumbled—and sometimes failed—in their attempts to remove fossil-fuel 
subsidies, but Ghana shows how a carefully crafted strategy can make a difference. Its reform 
package in the mid-2000s included a strong communication campaign that answered the critical 
“what’s in it for me?” question before the public had been infl uenced by other sources of infor-
mation (Ruggeri Laderchi 2014). The subsidy’s negative impact on equity was documented and 
presented to the public in an easily accessible manner. And mitigation policies (health, education, 
and energy access) were targeted to the poor and communicated by radio broadcast. Key lessons 
that have emerged from this and other reform episodes include the following: 
First, understand the audience 
Understanding the audience is vital as “the success of strategic communication does not depend 
on creative messages or enticing incentives to try new practices. Rather, it demands a clear under-
standing of the perceptions, motivations, beliefs, and practices of everyone involved in or affected 
by a reform program” (Cabañero-Verzosa and Garcia 2009, 7). That means determining not only 
who is concerned and what they stand to gain and lose but also what they know about the issue, 
along with their preferences, beliefs, and values. The Egyptian government sponsored a survey in 
2014 that found that nearly 70 percent of households did not know the scale of the energy subsidy 
(fi gure B7.2.1)—even though it absorbs 8 percent of gross domestic product and 39 percent of the 
government’s budget. Plus, most households believed that energy prices were already too high. 
Similarly, in Morocco, a 2010 survey found that 70 percent of the population was unaware of the 
energy subsidy that absorbed 5.5 percent of gross domestic product, or 17 percent of the govern-
ment budget (World Bank 2012).
Second, choose the message
Keep it simple, positive, and tailored to the various  audiences—always answering the “what’s 
in it for me?” question. In Iran’s 2010 fuel reform campaign, the message was that the reforms 
were not about eliminating subsidies, but about switching subsidies from products to households.
(Box continues on the following page.)
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For example, one reason for the unpopularity of carbon prices may be the percep-
tion that they impose a disproportional cost on low-income households, or particular 
groups, such as inhabitants of rural and remote areas and energy-intensive business 
(Dresner et al. 2006; Gaunt, Rye, and Allen 2007; Harrison and Peet 2012; Kallbekken 
and Aasen 2010; Kallbekken, Kroll, and Cherry 2011). 
Communication about the distributional impact is therefore critical. In Bolivia, the 
public was not aware that a new cash-transfer scheme was funded by, and meant to 
Third, choose the channels of communication 
Channels of communication need to be tailored to the different audiences. In 2013, when Malaysia 
decided to tackle the $7.9 billion fuel subsidy, the government relied on a variety of channels: 
■ A public forum on fossil-fuel subsidies inviting members of Parliament, leading academics, 
business leaders, and representatives of consumer groups to address the key issues.
■ A public survey asking two simple questions: Malaysia spent RM 74 billion on subsidies in 
2009 causing a fi scal defi cit. (1) Should subsidies be reduced? (Yes/No). (2) If Malaysia reduces 
its subsidies, should it be done: In one year? Over three years? Over fi ve years?
■ YouTube videos explaining basic information about fuel subsidies.
■ A Twitter account for announcements and answering questions from the public on the topic.
■ Engaging public fi gures to write about subsidy-related issues in the media.
Source: Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum et al. (forthcoming).
Note: Bars shows shares of respondents believing that the size of the energy subsidy is a particular amount. The actual 
amount of the subsidy is 39 percent of the government budget (IMF 2013).
FIGURE B7.2.1 Most Egyptian Households Were Unaware of the Size of the 
Energy Subsidy 
(Household beliefs about the size of the subsidy)
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compensate for, fossil-fuel subsidy removal. The cash transfer was well received, but the 
public opposed the subsidy removal, which was eventually rolled back (Ruggeri 
Laderchi 2014). In British Columbia, the carbon tax was not actually regressive, and it 
did not hit rural households disproportionally, but that was not communicated to the 
general public (Harrison and Peet 2012). 
Furthermore, it is critical that steps to protect the poor during the transition not be 
limited to a one-off payment to buy off opposition in exchange for permanently 
increased energy prices. Fossil-fuel subsidy removal and carbon pricing provide a sus-
tainable source of revenue for governments, thus giving them the opportunity to 
implement sustained policies to combat poverty.
Land-Use-Based Mitigation—Impacts Depend on Design 
As for land-use-based mitigation, its impact on equity depends on how the policies are 
designed (Barbier 2014). The key issues that arise are access to and returns from land and 
demand for labor-intensive activities. Both national and global schemes can be designed 
to be pro-poor, although global large-scale, land-use-based mitigation is more complex, 
as it affects income distribution through changes in commodity prices (box 7.3), which 
are not in the control of countries designing national mitigation actions. 
Access to land. Land-use-based mitigation policies can be designed to protect poor 
rural communities’ access to land or even to strengthen their land titles. Often poor 
people depend on ecosystems for food, fuel, materials, and income generation (Angelsen 
et al. 2014). In particular, indigenous people’s livelihoods frequently depend on non-
managed lands, which store large stocks of carbon (Ricketts et al. 2010; Walker et al. 
2014). Where such groups and other poor land users lack formal and secure land titles, 
they could be displaced by more powerful actors that seek benefi ts from mitigation 
actions (Larson et al. 2013). Yet mitigation policies can also provide an opportunity for 
clarifying land and resource tenure. For instance, under the Terra Legal program, Brazil 
has started a formal process of recognizing indigenous lands and granting land titles to 
about 300,000 smallholders, conditional on compliance with the Brazilian Forest Code 
(Duchelle et al. 2014). Also, a recent ruling by the Constitutional Court in Indonesia 
improved the status of forestlands used by indigenous peoples. 
Returns from land. One direct way to increase the incomes of poor land users is by 
providing payments for ecosystem services for the preservation and increase of natural 
carbon sinks. However, very little fi rm evidence exists on the distributional impacts of 
existing projects. Out of 1,382 studies related to payments for avoiding deforestation, 
only 1 (from Mozambique) undertook a formal evaluation of impacts on poor house-
holds’ income. It found no signifi cant impact (Samii et al. 2014). 
Even if trade-offs are likely to occur between effi ciency and equity impacts, many 
programs have chosen to target the poorest, thereby improving both distributional 
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impacts and legitimacy (Börner et al. 2010; Jindal et al. 2013; Kosoy et al. 2007; 
Sommerville et al. 2010). They include programs such as Brazil’s Bolsa Floresta and 
Ecuador’s Socio Bosque (see chapter 4). Similarly, the Guatemalan government offers 
forest incentive programs, which aim to support forestry activities by poor smallhold-
ers without land title. Overall, estimates are that if carbon-related payments were fully 
developed and pro-poor participation conditions secured by the year 2030, an esti-
mated 25 million to 50 million low-income households could be benefi ting from them 
(Milder, Scherr, and Bracer 2010).
Demand for labor-intensive activities. Actions to implement land-use-based miti-
gation, such as climate-smart agriculture, land restoration, selective logging, and for-
est protection, are labor intensive and can thus provide jobs and revenues to poor 
rural households. Experiences from Chile, Colombia, and Moldova show that 
 community-based land restoration and reforestation created new employment and 
stable income streams. 
Land-use-based mitigation can be complex, and it often affects local users with low 
education levels. Hence, good communication and the participation of key 
BOX 7.3 Managing the Impacts of Global Land-Use Initiatives on the Poor 
Large-scale land-use-based mitigation at the global scale, especially bioenergy expansion, can 
reduce the availability of land for food production, with implications for food security (Smith and 
Bustamante 2014). Regional and local commodity prices, such as food, timber, and energy, could 
increase (Chen et al. 2011; Golub et al. 2013; Kuik 2013). Food price hikes could be most severe 
for large-scale bioenergy deployment—especially when combined with protecting natural carbon 
sinks (Calvin et al. 2013; Popp et al. 2011; Wise et al. 2009). 
Those prices are driven by global dynamics and not by national policies, but their distributional 
impacts will unfold at the local level. Increased commodity prices benefi t food producers but harm 
consumers. In the short term, food price hikes increase poverty levels, as poor people spend a 
larger share of their budget on food (Ivanic and Martin 2014). However, the price-induced changes 
in earnings from land are likely to be a more important driver of household poverty than the 
commodity price changes themselves (Hertel, Burke, and Lobell 2010; Ivanic and Martin 2014). 
Typically, landowners in developing countries are not among the poorest, meaning that relatively 
better-off households benefi t from such policies. But even so, such price increases can also 
help landless poor people through higher incomes for unskilled agricultural labor (Cororaton and 
Timilsina 2012; Huang et al. 2012). 
Further, those price impacts may be moderate. Overall, food price changes from land-use-based 
mitigation could be lower than those from yield decreases because of unmitigated climate change 
(Lotze-Campen et al. 2014). And well-planned expansion of bioenergy (e.g., using degraded areas) 
could reduce competition for land used for food crops. 
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stakeholders are essential. For example, in the Peruvian Amazon forest, some projects 
found it a struggle to explain REDD (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation) policies in a way that local people could relate to—something that could 
undermine the acceptance of the scheme (Evans, Murphy, and de Jong 2014). 
Fortunately, increasing the awareness and understanding of land-use changes, their 
drivers, and local impacts can increase the acceptability of policy solutions (Osmond 
et al. 2010). And involving key stakeholders and local people early in the design of 
 land-use-based mitigation policies increases the buy-in of relevant landscape actors. 
Countries such as Costa Rica, Ethiopia, and Indonesia have initiated workshops and 
consultations to facilitate understanding of the national REDD+ process and to involve 
indigenous people and civil (FCPF 2014).
Finally, some of the impact of land-use policies will be channeled through global 
markets and will mostly depend on the ambition and design of global policies (box 7.3). 
Individual countries will have little control over those global processes and will there-
fore have to rely on national or local policies to manage impacts. 
Notes
 1. Available studies cover many countries, including Denmark (Wier et al. 2005), Ireland (Callan et 
al. 2009), the United States (Cohen, Fullerton, and Topel 2013), and British Columbia (Beck et al., 
2014).
 2. Using household survey data in nine developing countries in Africa and Asia, Bacon, Bhattacharya, 
and Kojima (2010) fi nd that the evidence for total energy consumption is mixed: in four countries, 
lower quintiles spend more on energy than higher quintiles, whereas in fi ve countries the shares are 
similar. But what matters is the share spent on modern energy, which rises in all countries from 
lower to higher quintiles.
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8.  Smoothing the Transition to Make 
It Happen
■ It is not enough to protect the poorest and most vulnerable. It may also be necessary to 
smooth the transition and compensate those who stand to be affected, even when they are 
not  particularly vulnerable. 
■ Targeted support may be required if economic losses are concentrated on a sector or region, or 
in countries that are implementing low-carbon policies earlier than others. 
■ Available options to manage the transition and smooth its negative effects range from 
strengthening social protection schemes to carefully designing sector-specifi c climate policies 
and introducing compensation systems.
The transition toward carbon neutrality implies that some sectors, activities, or 
 technologies will be replaced by new ones that are more effi cient or based on zero-
carbon energy sources. That cannot be done without some negative impacts on the 
owners and employees of those carbon-entangled fi rms or sectors. The question then is 
whether governments need to provide relief and to compensate losers when new poli-
cies are implemented. That question can certainly be debated on ethical grounds (is the 
government morally obligated to compensate losers?). But from a pragmatic point of 
view, government relief is usually needed for the social and political acceptability of 
reforms (Olson 1971; M. Trebilcock 2014; World Bank 2001, chap. 3).
Economic transitions always create winners and losers. And when losses are concen-
trated on a few well-identifi ed and organized actors, like the coal industry, those actors 
may have a de facto ability to veto the reform. Governments can deal with that situation 
by designing policies in a way that avoids concentrating losses, or by compensating 
those most affected. Even when those affected have no moral claim to it, compensation 
may be necessary for reforms to pass. One dramatic example is the abolition of slavery 
in Britain in 1833, which involved a payment of £20 million (around 40 percent of the 
British budget at that time, and some $21 billion in present value) to former slave own-
ers (M. Trebilcock 2014). More recently, experience with successful and unsuccessful 
fossil-fuel subsidy reform episodes suggests that compensation—and even buyouts—is 
key to making the reform feasible (Sdralevich, Sab, and Zouhar 2014). 
Success also requires managing vested interests without getting captured by those 
interests. Indeed, a review of the three great energy transitions of modern times—the 
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rise of steam during the fi rst Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, electrifi cation 
in the 19th century, and the advent of oil-fueled cars in the 20th century—fi nds that 
where vested interests were overly protected, transitions were delayed at a high cost 
(C. Trebilcock 1981). In France, during the advent of coal, pressure from domestic 
coalminers and charcoal producers resulted in the adoption of a tariff on coal imports 
and continued support to charcoal iron producers. As a result, French coal mining 
remained an uncompetitive industry of small producers relying on old-fashioned 
methods. In contrast, the energy transformation in Britain was swift, enabling a struc-
tural industrial change (Moe 2010). Similar successes and failures are possible in the 
transition toward carbon neutrality, with implications for development and welfare. 
This chapter focuses on how to tackle political economy challenges to ensure that 
reforms can in fact be adopted and implemented. We have already made the case (in 
chapter 7) that it is essential to protect poor people for the reforms to succeed—as 
reforms must be consistent with broader social goals to be acceptable. Now, we turn to 
navigating the potential pitfalls of reforms that fall into the realm of (a) avoiding con-
centrated losses (that are both socially damaging and the source of powerful push-
back), (b) managing the risk of competitiveness losses, and (c) reducing the risk of 
government failures. Measures that address those three sets of issues are crucial com-
ponents of any realistic and ambitious green policy package—the kind that will be 
needed to reach the zero-carbon-emissions goal by 2100.
Managing Concentrated Losses
There is no reason to think that a zero-carbon economy would be any less prosperous 
in the long run than a high-carbon one (if anything, it is likely to be more prosperous). 
But the transition will be disruptive in the short term. A carbon price will cause con-
centrated losses in carbon-intensive sectors, especially in the form of stranded assets—
whose owners may therefore oppose the reform and in some cases have the power to 
veto it. For a carbon price consistent with the 2°C target, the value of coal power plants 
stranded worldwide between now and 2050 could reach $165 billion (Johnson et al. 
2015). And climate stabilization will require keeping much of the known fossil-fuel 
reserves in the ground, leading to a loss of wealth for some countries and regions. 
Where vulnerable sectors, such as steel or coal mining, dominate the local economy, 
regional impacts could be severe, with social, cultural, and political implications. 
What can be done to reduce the concentrated impacts from climate policies? One 
solution is to kick-start climate policies with regulations and incentives that apply only 
to new capital. That approach improves energy effi ciency, creates low-carbon substitu-
tion options without hurting the owners of existing assets, and reduces vulnerability to 
the subsequent introduction of carbon prices (Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, and Hallegatte 
2014). That approach is often used: energy-effi ciency standards for buildings typically 
apply to only new buildings, as it would be extremely costly to require all existing ones 
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to be retrofi tted. Also, feebates or performance standards on new cars redirect 
 investment toward cleaner vehicles, without hurting households that are stuck with a 
vehicle bought before the reform. As stressed in chapter 7, the challenge with these 
instruments is that they do not create resources that can be used to correct possible 
adverse side effects. They need therefore to be particularly well crafted. 
Another solution is to adopt compensation schemes, using either resources from 
carbon pricing or the existing tax and social protection system. Overall, countries with 
strong social protection may be better able to support the transition of workers from 
declining polluting sectors to growing greener sectors. Social protection plays the role 
of horizontal compensation systems, since it protects households and individuals 
against economic shocks, regardless of their origin. In addition, specifi c targeted instru-
ments can be used. When Japan modernized its economy in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
more public support went to traditional industries (such as textiles) than to modern 
growing sectors (such as electronics and manufacturing) (Beason and Weinstein 1996). 
Later, the 1978 Law for Temporary Measures for the Stabilization of Specifi c Depressed 
Industries helped smooth the decline of 14 structurally depressed industries—including 
textiles and shipbuilding. It did so by planning capacity reduction, reallocating 
resources within and outside the depressed industries, providing fi nancial assistance to 
troubled fi rms, and mitigating negative impacts on labor (Krauss 1992; Peck, Levin, 
and Goto 1987). 
The compensatory approach has also been used by the United States in the context 
of trade liberalization—typically through wage subsidies in the sectors that benefi t 
from liberalization (to help them absorb workers from declining sectors) and unem-
ployment insurance for the workers who remain trapped in losing sectors. Studies 
show that those measures can mitigate most of the losses at a very small aggregate cost 
(Porto and Lederman 2014; M. Trebilcock 2014). In the mid-1970s, U.S. Trade 
Adjustment Assistance was used to provide reemployment services to displaced work-
ers and fi nancial assistance to manufacturers and service fi rms hurt by import compe-
tition. A review of the program found that it helped workers affected by trade 
liberalization—more so than traditional unemployment insurance—although it did 
not cancel losses for the most vulnerable fi rms and workers (Richardson 1982).
Another promising option is to help those who could stand to lose become part of 
the transition and to benefi t from it instead. For instance, some automakers have 
already positioned themselves as leaders in green and electric or hybrid cars, and thus 
as potential winners from more ambitious climate mitigation. Oil and gas companies 
can reinvent themselves if they develop technologies to capture and store carbon from 
the atmosphere. Research and development and innovation support are a way of sup-
porting this transition, if they target potential losers to transform them into possible 
winners. Also, when pilot projects for green technologies are created, it is possible to 
locate them in the areas that are most likely to lose from climate policies, to ensure that 
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all regions get some benefi ts from the reform. Innovative concentrated solar power 
generation or carbon capture and storage plants could for instance be located in places 
where coal is extracted, therefore creating green jobs and activities in those places. 
Well-designed policies could make traditional opponents supporters of the reforms.
Managing the Fears of Competitiveness Loss
It is unrealistic to expect all countries to implement comparable environmental poli-
cies at the same time. Differences in sociopolitical context mean that some countries 
are moving fi rst and will continue to do so. That situation creates the risk of a carbon-
haven effect—whereby production of carbon-intensive goods, and associated carbon 
emissions, could relocate from countries with strict environmental regulations to laxer 
countries. Such relocation would both reduce the effectiveness of the environmental 
regulation and cause losses in economic growth, employment, and income. 
Such fears of deindustrialization and job losses have played a large role in debates 
on a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system. In Europe, the cement industry fi nanced 
a study that—perhaps unsurprisingly—argued that 80 percent of the European cement 
market would be captured by importers if a carbon price of a25 per ton was intro-
duced. Many other ex ante modeling studies have suggested that existing policies would 
have signifi cant sector-scale effects in heavy industries, although they would lead to 
limited carbon leakage at the macro level (Branger and Quirion 2013). 
But the reality is quite different, raising doubts about the existence of a signifi cant 
carbon-haven effect. Indeed, ex post studies fi nd no signifi cant impact of existing envi-
ronmental policies on fi rm competitiveness, even in heavy industries (Dechezleprêtre 
and Sato 2014; Sartor 2013). A detailed analysis of the European iron and steel industry 
shows that the impact of the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) 
on the competitiveness of the European industry remains limited, with an impact on 
marginal cost smaller than interannual exchange-rate variations (Demailly and Quirion 
2008). Panel data from the United Kingdom’s production census suggests that the 
introduction of the Climate Change Levy (an energy tax) had a signifi cant impact on 
energy intensity, but no detectable effects on economic performance or plant exit 
(Martin, Wagner, and de Preux 2009). 
The reason is that pollution abatement costs represent only a small fraction of pro-
duction costs for most industries, and factors such as the availability of capital and 
skilled labor or proximity to markets are much more important determinants of fi rm 
location and competitiveness (Copeland 2012). In addition, many energy-intensive, 
trade-exposed industries are characterized by high capital intensity and high transpor-
tation costs, which limit their ability to relocate (Ederington, Levinson, and Minier 
2005). As a result, environmental regulations typically make a small difference on pro-
ductivity and employment, and jobs are unlikely to move across borders in signifi cant 
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numbers. And for environment regulations that raise signifi cant revenues—such as 
carbon pricing instruments—the new resources can be used to improve other 
 determinants of competitiveness through investments in education and workers’ skills 
or infrastructure, or through reduction in capital and labor taxes.
Nevertheless, some uncertainty remains about the effect of carbon policies, given 
that the estimates to date are based on relatively modest mitigation efforts—and it is 
possible that future policies will become much stricter in some countries but not 
 others. Thus, additional measures may be needed to maintain a level playing fi eld 
between stricter and laxer countries.
In theory, carbon border tax adjustments—that is, import tariffs that tax the carbon 
content of imports at the difference between the domestic and the foreign carbon tax—
are the best way to avoid the negative consequences of a partial implementation of 
climate policies. Unfortunately, an effi cient tariff would be extremely diffi cult to esti-
mate, as the carbon content of each good imported from each different county is 
 different.1 For that reason, proposals of border tax adjustments are frequently limited 
to those few goods for which the carbon content is large and easy to estimate, such as 
fossil fuels. 
Furthermore, border tax adjustments pose equity issues, as low-income country 
exports tend to be more carbon intensive, and the border tax imposes costs on the 
exporter (Böhringer, Carbone, and Rutherford 2012). One way to mitigate this issue 
may be to refund revenues from the import tariff to exporter countries. Another is for 
the exporting countries to tax themselves for the carbon embedded in their exports 
(Copeland 2012). Border tax adjustment is also frequently interpreted as green protec-
tionism by exporter countries, and it could be challenged under World Trade 
Organization rules (Branger and Quirion 2013; Monjon and Quirion 2011a, 2011b).
If border tax adjustments cannot be used, an alternative is to rebate carbon levies to 
energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries proportionally to their output. That can be 
achieved by granting free allowances to the relevant fi rms under a cap-and-trade 
scheme or by refunding part of the proceeds of a carbon tax. Such a scheme is equiva-
lent in its economic impacts to imposing a carbon price and subsidizing domestic 
 production (Fischer and Fox 2012). It thus corrects part of the problem, as it favors 
local, presumably cleaner, production, and it alleviates the competitive loss at the same 
time. That is done at a cost: the subsidy effect reduces the price of energy-intensive 
goods for domestic consumers, resulting in a loss of effi ciency. Examples of successful 
output-based rebating include Sweden’s nitrous oxide tax, whose revenues are refunded 
to the polluting fi rms in proportion to their output, and the carbon markets in 
California and New Zealand.
Finally, in countries with high fi scal pressure, the best way to improve the competi-
tiveness of energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries may be to recycle carbon 
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levy revenues through reduced distortive taxes (Metcalf, forthcoming). Since most 
such fi rms are also capital intensive, lower capital taxes offset higher energy prices in 
an effi cient way. 
Managing the Risk of Government Failures
A successful transition will require government support to develop new sectors and 
technologies. It may also require helping and providing temporary support to sectors 
that are particularly negatively affected. But the use of sector-specifi c or technology-
specifi c policies is not without risks. Here, we focus on three types of risk: (a) the risk 
of being wrong (picking and supporting the wrong technology or sector), (b) the risk 
of being captured (distributing resources to friends and political allies instead of prom-
ising fi rms), and (c) the risk of negative policy interactions. 
Governments, notably in Asia, have often tried to modify the structure of their 
economy by using industrial policies to correct market failures, such as economies of 
scale, learning by doing, coordination failure, and latent comparative advantages. 
Whether those policies were cost-effective is still being debated, but the consensus is 
that at least in China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea , the desired structural transfor-
mation took place (Chang 2006; Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare 2009; Noland and Pack 
2003; Pack and Saggi 2006).2 Since climate policies also aim at changing the economic 
structure, we can draw lessons from the successes and failures of industrial policies 
(Hallegatte, Fay, and Vogt-Schilb 2013). 
The Risk of Being Wrong
One fear is that governments may pick the wrong winner when backing a specifi c  technology. 
There is a real potential for costly failure and waste of scarce public resources, as illus-
trated by Norway’s extensive support to Norsk Data, which went bankrupt in 1993. 
Output-based or horizontal approaches are thus generally considered superior to vertical 
policies (those that pick preferred technology), because they reduce the risk of capture 
and rent seeking by vested interests. However, absolute technology neutrality is diffi cult 
to use as a guiding principle, given that governments can never avoid setting some priori-
ties (Azar and Sandén 2011; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2014). As such, the appropriate 
question is how much, not whether, a particular policy is technology specifi c.
Further, a reliance on market instruments (like a carbon price) is likely to favor 
established technologies, given knowledge externalities, learning by doing, economies 
of scale, and the valley of death that hampers the transition from lab to market. Such 
favoring may be optimal if the goal is to encourage the deployment of the cheapest 
technology available today. But if the goal is to develop the technology with the greatest 
potential, then it is the market that may pick the wrong winner (Acemoglu et al. 2012; 
Azar and Sandén 2011; del Rio Gonzalez 2008).
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So what can be done to help governments manage the uncertainties of technologi-
cal potential and production costs? First, countries should take advantage of the 
embeddedness of government offi cials in civil society and business networks (Evans 
1995; Rodrik 2013). That means the private sector and the government agencies that 
regulate and support it need to collaborate and coordinate. However, those agencies 
may lack the capacity needed to plan, monitor, and evaluate such activities—especially 
in developing countries where technical capacities for data collection and analysis are 
often low. 
Second, governments should not just support an industry; they should also collect 
information about technologies, costs, and potentials and avoid relying on information 
that fi rms can manipulate. For instance, the Chinese government used tenders to assess 
solar electricity production costs before it implemented a feed-in tariff, in the hope of 
collecting enough data to set the tariff at the right level. Governments also need to 
defi ne success indicators that facilitate objective and predictable decisions on how and 
how long to support a fi rm or a technology. 
Third, policies must have termination clauses to ensure that support is discontinued 
when a business or sector fails. Regardless of the ability of governments to pick winners, 
plenty of political economy reasons exist to explain why governments are worse than 
the private sector at dropping losers or terminating support when a project or business 
fails. Yet climate policies will necessarily support risky projects and are thus expected to 
experience a signifi cant share of failures—unless a low-risk, low-return strategy is 
being followed (Rodrik 2013). Given that policies are likely to support a portfolio of 
projects, overall performance will depend on both the successful projects and their 
benefi ts, and on how the costs of the inevitable failures are minimized. East Asian 
countries addressed that problem by using export performance—an indicator that is 
diffi cult for local fi rms to manipulate—as a marker of success. Indeed, East Asian 
authorities were fairly ruthless in making continued protection in the domestic market 
contingent on export performance (World Bank 1993).3 
The Risk of Being Captured 
Well-targeted policies face signifi cant risks of capture and rent-seeking behaviors. That 
said, rents should not be avoided entirely, as the objective of green sectoral policies is to 
create the appropriate level of rent from low-carbon investment to facilitate the transi-
tion to a near-zero emissions economy. Thus, the objective is to fi nd a balance in man-
aging both market failures and the risks of government failures (Pegels 2014). 
The risk of capture is particularly important when policies that promote investment 
in low-carbon sectors and technologies are implemented in the absence of correct price 
incentives. Ideally, targeted policies should be temporary and can be tested by the via-
bility of the supported industry when the support is removed (the so-called Mill test).4
For instance, the objective of feed-in tariffs is to shrink the cost of renewable energy 
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until it becomes competitive against fossil-fuel power plants. In the absence of carbon 
pricing, however, a number of low-carbon industries (like carbon capture and storage) 
will remain nonviable and thus cannot be market tested. 
How can those potential pitfalls be avoided? Suggestions include the following 
(Rodrik 2013): 
 ■ Predictable and transparent criteria that determine when public support should 
be terminated. Doing so is much easier for policies that are well targeted, since 
the target can more easily be translated into an indicator for success.
 ■ Navigating the trade-offs between fl exibility (the ability to act on new informa-
tion regarding technology potentials, for instance) and predictability (needed to 
stimulate private investments). Feed-in tariffs are meant to provide some degree 
of assurance to producers, yet they need to be adjusted if input prices decrease 
signifi cantly, which requires regulators and industries to share information and 
knowledge. France, Germany, Italy, and Spain successfully adjusted solar feed-in 
tariffs following changes in input prices between 2005 and 2012 (de La Tour, 
Glachant, and Ménière 2013), but adjustment required an iterative process with 
regular revision based on participatory approaches and consultations (World 
Bank 2013). 
 ■ Transparency and public accountability. Transparency and public accountability 
help ensure that the benefi ciaries of sectoral policies are the public, rather than 
the fi rms receiving support. Resource allocations should be made public, and a 
regular auditing process is needed. An independent auditing agency could be 
created and held responsible for an annual analysis of how funds are distrib-
uted, although the effectiveness of such an agency is largely dependent on the 
existence of a free press and an active civil society that can react to mismanaged 
funds. Further, when supported fi rms and technologies cannot be subjected 
to a market test—possibly because of distorted relative prices—other success 
indicators need to be devised, such as reduced production costs or improved 
performance. 
The Risk of Negative Policy Interactions 
This report argues that a climate policy package should include a mix of pricing instru-
ments, targeted policies to support specifi c sectors, and compensatory measures. Such 
measures are vital to correct market failures (learning by doing), to cope with govern-
ment limitations (incapacity to commit to future prices), and to avoid concentrating 
losses on a few actors. But policies often overlap, possibly resulting in unintended con-
sequences with regard to cost and effectiveness.
One example is the complex interaction between the Emissions Trading System 
(ETS) for carbon to which fi rms in EU member countries are subject, and the domestic 
policies adopted by a number of EU countries to support renewable energy (feed-in 
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tariffs or renewable production mandates). The problem is that those domestic policies 
cannot create additional abatement, because the ETS caps total greenhouse gas emis-
sions. The result is less demand for—and hence a lower price of—emission allowances, 
which reduces the incentive to invest in low-carbon alternatives in the other sectors 
covered by the ETS. In the end, adding renewable energy support to an existing ETS 
tends to increase the cost of the ETS without changing greenhouse gas emissions in the 
sectors covered by the ETS in the short term (Böhringer and Rosendahl 2010; Braathen 
2011).5 Similar detrimental interactions have also been documented for fuel perfor-
mance standards enacted at both the national and the state levels in the United States 
(Goulder and Stavins 2011).
Overlapping policies may also have unintended distributional impacts. For 
instance, support for renewable energy under an ETS tends to shift the burden of the 
abatement cost in two ways. It reduces the carbon price, thus temporarily favoring 
production from the dirtiest sources (Böhringer and Rosendahl 2010). It also tends to 
reduce wholesale electricity prices—known as the merit order effect—because renew-
able sources produce electricity without having to purchase the fuel (Würzburg, 
Labandeira, and Linares 2013). That effect tends to shift the burden of the reduction 
from  electricity consumers to electricity producers.
There are two ways to reduce unwanted consequences from interactions among 
policies. Ideally, all climate mitigation policies should be designed and updated simul-
taneously, taking into account their interactions. Doing so requires coordinated inter-
governmental action, starting with a mapping of existing policies relevant for climate 
mitigation, their precise objective (such as the market failure they are supposed to 
address), and the different government agencies involved in their implementation 
(Hood 2013). For instance, when the quantity of emissions allowed under the EU ETS 
was decided, it would have been best to take into account the fact that national govern-
ments would subsequently enact policies to promote renewable electricity. 
But that approach is not always possible, especially with overlapping jurisdictions 
(such as national and subnational governments) and different sectoral scopes (as when 
the ministry of fi nance implements an economy-wide carbon price and the ministry of 
transportation implements a performance standard). Institutions may also lack the 
technical capacity to analyze in detail how policies interact with each other.
Thus, an easier and maybe more robust way is to favor price over quantity 
 instruments—such as carbon taxes instead of carbon markets, and feebate schemes 
instead of performance standards on new capital. Indeed, overlapping price instru-
ments interact more effi ciently and more predictably (Goulder and Schein 2013; Hood 
2013; Williams 2012). Under an economy-wide carbon tax, a feed-in tariff promotes 
 investment in renewable power without reducing incentives to abate in other sectors, 
and under a national feebate program, more ambitious state-level feebate programs 
simply add up. 
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Notes
1. Moreover, the optimal tariff taxes only the emissions that have not been taxed in the exporter 
 country, which requires a precise understanding of the marginal abatement cost in both the 
domestic and the exporter countries (which comes not only from the carbon price but also from its 
interaction with other taxes and regulations and depends on both direct and indirect greenhouse 
gas emissions).
2. Some believe industrial policies played a key role in the catching up of Japan and other Asian 
countries (Chang 2006). Others believe that success was a consequence of large investments (and 
the associated catch-up in capital intensity) in countries that already had high education levels and 
institutional capacity (Krugman 1994).
3. Note, however, that subsidies conditional to export are formally prohibited by World Trade 
Organization rules (Charnovitz 2014).
4. Classical assessments of industrial policies often rely on the Mill and Bastable tests (Harrison 
and Rodríguez-Clare 2009). The Mill test asks whether the supported sector or technology can 
become competitive in the absence of support, whereas the Bastable test asks whether the benefi t 
of  support exceeds the cost. 
5. However, support for renewable power can also complement an ETS effi ciently when the price 
of carbon in the ETS is too volatile (Lecuyer and Quirion 2013). External factors (such as an 
economic slowdown or higher fossil-fuel prices) can momentarily undermine the carbon price 
to the point where the ETS does not provide any signifi cant incentive to invest in low-carbon 
activities. In that case, support for renewable power is useful and economically effi cient, in that it 
ensures that a minimal amount of decarbonization effort is maintained when the carbon price is 
too low.
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